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INTRODUCTION
To begin with a brief overview, this Article takes a comprehensive
look at the use of riot-control agents (RCAs) by U.N. forces and the le-
gal issues that arise as a result. This Article is the first to look at these
legal issues from a practical perspective, not merely a theoretical one,
because prior publications have questioned what would happen if U.N.
forces used these weapons, whereas this Article analyzes forty instances
of actual use. This Article is designed to spark debate within the areas of
peacekeeping law, collective security law, the responsibility of interna-
tional organizations, and arms control law relating to RCAs, and
provides compelling legal and policy arguments for why U.N. forces
should refrain from using them. This Article is particularly timely, given
that some key states, such as the United States, recently have shown a
willingness to reconsider their interpretation of disabling chemicals un-
der the Chemical Weapons Convention and support the ICRC's efforts in
this realm. Moreover, as this Article was going to press, numerous news
reports described how U.N. forces in Haiti heavily relied on RCAs in
subduing victims of the January 12 earthquake who aggressively were
demanding food from relief workers. These particular instances in Haiti
are not included in the forty instances analyzed in Part II due to time
constraints, although they are entirely relevant to this Article. With this
overview in mind, the remainder of this Introduction sets out the thesis
and the structure for defending that thesis throughout this Article.
The 2004 High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change
identified chemical weapons as a "growing threat," with then United
Nations (U.N.) Secretary-General Kofi Annan following up with a call
for recommitment from all states to their total elimination.! Moreover, at
the Millennium Summit in 2000, Secretary-General Annan included the
Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stock-
1. The Secretary-General, A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility, Report
of the Secretary-General's High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, 1 114,
delivered to the GeneralAssembly, U.N. Doc. A/59/565 (Dec, 2, 2004).
2. The Secretary-General, In Larger Freedom: Towards Development, Security and
Human Rights for All, 102, delivered to the General Assembly, U.N. Doc. A/59/2005 (Mar.
21, 2005).
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piling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction (Chemi-
cal Weapons Convention, or CWC)3 among the twenty-five core treaties
states ought to join and respect since they are the "most central to the
spirit and goals of the Charter of the United Nations."4 Yet the United
Nations has not recognized that U.N. forces may be contributing to the
problem of chemical weapons by using RCAs in their operations, with at
least forty instances of such RCA use to date. RCAs are banned chemi-
cal agents under the CWC, except when used in law-enforcement
situations. Since the United Nations is not a member of the Chemical
Weapons Convention, the CWC does not apply to the United Nations per
se, regardless of whether its operations can be classified as law enforce-
ment. Moreover, it is difficult to argue that the substance of the CWC's
RCA prohibition applies as customary international law, given the in-
tense debate over the applicability of these particular provisions of the
CWC to activities in which U.N. forces typically participate. These
points notwithstanding, U.N. forces might be bound by the CWC's RCA
prohibition through the troop-contributing countries that are parties to
the CWC-presuming that the United Nations assumes the obligations
of its member states indirectly as their alter ego, or through similar types
of argumentation. Further, there might be valid reasons other than clear
legal obligations, such as moral and tactical considerations, for the Unit-
ed Nations to abide by the norms in the CWC relating to RCAs. To
borrow a climber's saying, "One who is poised on the edge of a cliff is
wise to define progress as a step backward." This is not to say that U.N.
forces never can use less-lethal weapons. On the contrary, they certainly
should try less-lethal weapons before using more-lethal ones. The point
here is that they should use varieties of less-lethal weapons other than
legally controversial, toxic RCAs.
In making this point and in defending this Article's thesis, a few pre-
liminary definitions and deliminations are in order. The term "U.N.
forces" comprises three types of military operations falling under the
auspices of the United Nations: U.N.-controlled peacekeeping opera-
tions, U.N.-controlled enforcement operations, and U.N.-authorized
enforcement operations. According to this definition, forces such as the
Kosovo Force (KFOR) and the Stabilisation Force (SFOR) in Bosnia and
3. Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and
Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction, opened for signature Jan. 13, 1992, S.
Treaty Doc. No. 103-21, 32 I.LM. 800, available at http://www.opcw.org/chemical-weapons-
convention/ (last visited Mar. 31, 2010) [hereinafter CWC].
4. See Letter from the Secretary-General to Heads of State and Government, May 15,
2000, reprinted in MILLENNIUM SUMMIT MULTILATERAL TREATY FRAMEWORK: AN INVITA-
TION TO UNIVERSAL PARTICIPATION, at vii, U.N. Doc. DPI/2130 (2000).
5. See DOCUMENTS ON THE LAWS OF WAR 721-22 (Adam Roberts & Richard Guelff
eds., 3d ed. 2000).
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Herzegovina are included among U.N. forces because the Security
Council created them. This is the case even though critics might disagree
on account of the fact that they were led by an entity other than the United
Nations. Including these forces within the definition of U.N. forces makes
sense inasmuch as the U.N. Security Council exercises a measure of con-
trol over them by creating their mandates. This control continues on after
that initial act with the continuing validity of those mandates for those
particular forces. For simplicity's sake, this Article tends not to distin-
guish between the different types of U.N. forces. Ultimately the
difference in U.N. responsibility for the actions of the different types of
U.N. forces will depend on the degree of control that the United Nations
exercises over those forces.6 The degree of U.N. control can vary be-
tween operations even within the same type of U.N. force, and so
distinguishing between the different types of forces throughout the Arti-
cle would overly complicate matters and frustrate the effort to reach
some general conclusions and recommendations. Inasmuch as the United
Nations exercises a measure of control over each type of force, this Arti-
cle's general conclusions and recommendations apply to all three types.
Certainly the responsibility of other entities for RCA reliance during
peace support operations is a valid topic that should be explored, such as
the responsibility of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) for
RCA use in KFOR and SFOR or the responsibility of troop-contributing
countries. Nevertheless, this Article is delimited to looking specifically
at the United Nations and U.N. forces as defined above.
This Article is divided into five parts. Part I provides a brief history
and portrayal of RCAs in order to define the subject matter of this Arti-
cle. Part II describes the forty instances of RCA use by U.N. forces. This
Part is particularly important because most prior commentaries on RCA
use by U.N. forces have assumed that such use will be possible in the
future without acknowledging that such weapons already have been used
by these forces,' thus this Article shifts the focus of this area of peace-
6. See generally Int'l Law Comm'n, Draft Articles on the Responsibility of Interna-
tional Organizations arts. 4-5, in Report of the International Law Commission, Fifty-Fifth
Session, U.N. GAOR, 58th Sess., Supp. No. 10, at 14, 23, U.N. Doc. A/58/10 (2003). See also
C.F. AMERASINGHE, PRINCIPLES OF THE INSTITUTIONAL LAW OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZA-
TIONS 401-04 (2d rev. ed. 2005).
7. See Gergely T6th, So-Called "Non-Lethal" Weapons in Peace Support Operations,
in PRACTICE AND POLICIES OF MODERN PEACE SUPPORT OPERATIONS UNDER INTERNATIONAL
LAW 157, 157 (Roberta Arnold & Geert-Jan Alexander Knoops eds., 2006) ("Given the fact
that these very same nations [that have RCAs in their arsenals] are engaged in various peace
support operations (PSO), there is a high probability of them being used in these circum-
stances too."); id. at 179 ("There is a great chance that developed nations [in their
involvement in peacekeeping] ... will resort to such [NLW] systems in their conflicts with
less developed adversaries...."); see also DAVID A. KoPLOW, NON-LETHAL WEAPONS: THE
LAW AND POLICY OF REVOLUTIONARY TECHNOLOGIES FOR THE MILITARY AND LAW EN-
[Vol. 31:475
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keeping law and collective security law from the theoretical to the prac-
tical. Part Ill explains how the CWC prohibits RCAs and explores
whether this prohibition applies directly to U.N. forces. It is important to
note that troop-contributing countries and states acting in an enforcement
capacity under a U.N. authorization likely have legal obligations in this
context through their ratification of the CWC.8 However, this Article fo-
cuses exclusively on the legal obligations and interests of the United
Nations concerning RCA use by U.N. forces. Part IV describes the myr-
iad dangers that U.N. forces face when using RCAs, which serves as the
basis for arguing why the United Nations should take steps to ensure that
U.N. forces do not use RCAs even if the CWC's legal obligations do not
apply directly to the United Nations. While the dangers identified in Part
IV could act as the basis for a total prohibition of RCAs in all scenarios,
both for U.N. forces and all military forces, this Article is limited to
looking only at U.N. forces and takes as a given that RCAs can be used
lawfully for domestic law enforcement, as the CWC allows. The case of
RCA reliance by U.N. forces is particularly interesting because of the
difficulty in characterizing their activities. Critics might be quick to as-
sert that such a delimitation, which assumes the acceptability of RCA
use for domestic law enforcement purposes, encourages U.N. forces to
keep their hands clean of RCAs while the local-police component of a
coordinated peacekeeping force is left to do all of the dirty work. In re-
sponse, this Article encourages this type of arrangement no more than
the CWC encourages it, inasmuch as this Article bases its arguments on
the limitations established by the CWC. As explained in Part III below,
the CWC clearly allows RCAs for domestic law-enforcement purposes
and is unclear, at best, for many other situations. Finally, Part V suggests
ways for the United Nations and concerned states to ensure that U.N.
forces do not rely on RCAs in the future, thereby avoiding many of the
dangers associated with RCA use in a non-law-enforcement setting. To
be perfectly clear, the thesis of this Article is that RCA use by U.N.
forces is potentially illegal and certainly bad policy. As Dorothy Parker
FORCEMENT 80-87 (2006) (discussing "what might have been" had U.N. forces used non-
lethal weapons and RCAs to stop the genocide in Rwanda in 1994). In reality U.N. forces
used RCAs on at least two occasions there, as explained in Part II.C, infra. But see Jean Pascal
Zanders, Peacekeeping Operations, Law Enforcement, and the Use of RCAs: Two Examples, at
1 (unpublished discussion paper, 19th Workshop of the Pugwash Study Group on the Imple-
mentation of the Chemical and Biological Weapons Conventions, Apr. 26-27, 2003) (on file
with author).
8. For information on the obligation under Article 36 of the First Additional Protocol
to the Geneva Conventions to conduct contextualized legal reviews of the methods and means
of warfare in light of such treaties as the CWC, see generally James D. Fry, Contextualized
Legal Reviews for the Methods and Means of Warfare: Cave Combat and International Hu-
manitarian Law, 44 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 453 (2006).
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concluded in her poem Rgsumg, "Gas smells awful; You might as well
live."9
I. A BRIEF HISTORY OF RIOT-CONTROL AGENTS
RCAs are a class of less-lethal weapons that include tear gas, pepper
spray, and other irritants, lacrimators (or tear producers), and sternutators
(or cough and sneeze producers).' Although there are numerous types of
RCAs, each with its own distinctive set of attributes," RCAs all tend to
cause pain to any individual with uncovered or unprotected eyes, skin,
and respiratory areas in an effort to control the individual's activities.
Tear-gas weapons and other RCAs were in the early stages of develop-
ment at the time of the Hague Convention of 1899, which adopted the
Hague Gas Declaration. '3 It was not until after the First World War that
the term "riot control agent" was coined, after they were used against
rioters in Pittsburgh.'4 Although the United States and Europe were re-
luctant to join the Declaration in 1899, this reluctance had dissipated by
the 1907 Hague Convention once they acknowledged the rapid rate of
weaponization of such gases as hydrogen cyanide and tear gas, fearing
that these gases would revolutionize warfare." Articles 22 and 23 of the
Hague Gas Declaration provided that the "right of belligerents to adopt
9. DOROTHY PARKER, Rdsumd, in ENOUGH ROPE 61 (1926).
10. See Frederick R. Sidell, Agent of the Month: Riot Control Agents (Oct. 14, 1999)
(unpublished article) (on file with author). When the present Article refers to RCAs, it-like
the CWC-is referring to chemical RCAs but without the "chemical" qualifier. While RCAs
include far more substances than tear gas, tear gas is the most common RCA, especially
among U.N. forces, and so it tends to receive greater attention in this Article. Moreover, al-
though RCAs are a subset of non-lethal weapons (NLWs), this Article prefers to refer to them
as less-lethal weapons to reflect the simple fact that they actually have a non-negligible lethal-
ity rate. See infra Part IV.B.2. As explained in the Conclusion below, this Article encourages
U.N. forces to carry and use non-RCA NLWs, but to be careful not to use them in an indis-
criminate manner.
11. See R. EVERETT LANGFORD, INTRODUCTION TO WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION:
RADIOLOGICAL, CHEMICAL, AND BIOLOGICAL 261-68 (2004) (listing properties of seven
common tear gases in total).
12. See generally Sidell, supra note 10.
13. See Alice I. Youmans et al., Questions and Answers, 83 LAW LIBR. J. 195, 200
(1991).
14. See J.P. Perry Robinson, Solving the Problem of "Law Enforcement" 2 (Apr. 26-
27, 2003) (unpublished discussion paper, 19th Workshop of the Pugwash Study Group on the
Implementation of the Chemical and Biological Weapons Conventions, Apr. 26-27, 2003)
[hereinafter Robinson, Solving].
15. See Joseph W. Cook, III et al., Non-Lethal Weapons Technologies, Legalities, and
Potential Policies, 5 USAFA J. LEGAL STUD. 23, 29 (1995); Youmans et al., supra note 13, at
200.
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means of injuring the enemy is not unlimited '1 6 and that "it is especially
forbidden ... [t]o employ poison or poisoned weapons" 7 or "[tfo em-
ploy arms, projectiles, or material calculated to cause unnecessary
suffering."'' 8 Despite these broad prohibitions, which conceivably in-
cluded the use of RCAs, tear gas was used as a method of warfare in
August 1914, when a Paris policeman brought ethyl bromoacetate to the
front of the First World War. 9 The initial idea to use chemical agents for
riot control seems to have originated with Parisian chemists Kling and
Florentin, who encouraged the police to use such agents in their opera-
tions because of their incapacitating properties.20 The initial use of RCAs
on the battlefield was so successful that approximately 12,000 tons of
tear gas were deployed during the First World War." It is ironic that the
French military consistently worried about tear gas during the First
World War but was the first to introduce it to the battlefield. Germany
initially retaliated with a type of RCA of its own, dianisidine chlorosul-
phonate, delivered by 105mm howitzers, which was designed to cause
violent sneezing by the target.23 In its haste, Germany failed to test the
weaponized chemical, and the targets felt no effect from the gas.24 It did
not take long for Germany to discover the properties of tear gas, al-
though its first attempt to use tear gas also failed because German
scientists did not take into account the low winter temperatures in Russia
that inhibited vaporization of the gas.25 Germany eventually added bro-
26
macetone to aid with vaporization and finally saw results from tear gas.
However, this first mixing of chemical agents led Germany to experi-
ment with tear gas and phosgene (a far more lethal gas), and later to add
16. Hague Convention IV Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land Annex
art. 22, Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2277, 1 Bevans 631 (entered into force Jan. 26, 1910) [herein-
after Hague Convention IV].
17. Id. art. 23(a).
18. Id. art. 23(e).
19. See Robinson, Solving, supra note 14, at 2. The Hague Gas Declaration was handi-
capped from the start by the requirement that all parties to a conflict would need to be parties
to the agreement in order to be bound by it. This scenario is highly unlikely, particularly in
cases of a world-wide war. See Hague Convention IV, supra note 16, art. 2 ("The provisions
contained in the Regulations referred to in Article 1, as well as in the present Convention, do
not apply except between Contracting Powers, and then only if all the belligerents are parties
to the Convention.").
20. See L.F. HABER, THE POISONOUS CLOUD: CHEMICAL WARFARE IN THE FIRST
WORLD WAR 20 (1986).
21. See R.R. Baxter & Thomas Buergenthal, Legal Aspects of the Geneva Protocol of
1925, 64 AM. J. INT'L L. 853, 857 (1970).
22. See HABER, supra note 20, at 46.
23. See id. at 24-25.
24. See id. at 25.
25. See id.
26. See id. at 25, 78 (recounting an occasion where the Germans captured thousands of
French prisoners by using tear gas).
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chlorine in place of tear gas (another extremely lethal gas)," thus chang-
ing the general lethality of chemical warfare forever."
In an effort to avoid repeating the horrendous gas-related casualties
of the First World War, the newly established League of Nations called a
conference-the International Conference on the Control of the Interna-
tional Trade in Arms, Munitions, and Implements of War in 1925
(Geneva Conference)-which produced the 1925 Geneva Protocol for
the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other
Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare (Geneva Gas Proto-
col).29 Among other things, this Protocol prohibited "the use in war of
asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases," with tear gas arguably prohib-
ited either as an "other gas" or under one of the first two categories.0
Despite this new norm, approximately eight thousand tons of a type of
tear gas reportedly were used during the Second World War.31 One possi-
ble reason for this use is that the Protocol, like its predecessors, failed to
spell out exactly which agents were prohibited, and prohibited only first
use.32 For example, neither the Protocol nor the proceedings contained
27. See id. at 25.
28. See Kenneth Adelman, Chemical Weapons: Restoring the Taboo, 30 ORBIs 443,
444 (1986).
29. See Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other
Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, June 17, 1925, 26 U.S.T. 571, 94 L.N.T.S.
65 [hereinafter Geneva Gas Protocol]. In 1938, the International Law Association drafted a
convention designed to protect civilians from weapons that injure an adversary "by reason of
... being a toxic, asphyxiating, irritant or vesicant substance[,]" but expressly excluded "la-
chrymatory" (or tear-producing) gases. However, the draft convention was never entered into
force. Draft Convention for the Protection of Civilian Populations Against New Engines of
War art. 7(a), (b)(IV), Aug. 29, 1938, adopted by the International Law Association, available
at http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/FULL/345?OpenDocument (last visited Mar. 31, 2010) (empha-
sis added).
30. See 1 JEAN-MARIE HENCKAERTS & LouiSE DOSWALD-BECK, CUSTOMARY INTER-
NATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW: RULES 263-64 (2005) [hereinafter HENCKAERTS &
DOSWALD-BECK, RULES] (discussing how a majority of states initially saw the Geneva Gas
Protocol as prohibiting RCAs, but that Australia, Portugal, and the United Kingdom later
reversed their opinion, and that the United States maintained that RCAs were not covered by
the Geneva Gas Protocol).
31. See Jeffrey Osborne, Verification Div., Org. for the Prohibition of Chem. Weapons
[OPCWI, Non-Lethal Weapons: Current Issues and the Chemical Weapons Convention,
OPCW Lunchtime Lecture Series, Jan. 24, 2003 (on file with author). Even though Germany
had chemical weapons that were significantly more lethal than Allied chemical weapons dur-
ing the Second World War, Germany refrained from using them even when being invaded.
This is largely because it mistakenly believed that the Allies had comparable chemical weap-
ons, but perhaps also because Hitler remembered the pain that he had suffered from having
been a victim of chemical weapons during the First World War. See Adelman, supra note 28,
at 446.
32. See Youmans et al., supra note 13, at 202. Please note that neither does the CWC
spell out the agents that are prohibited as chemical weapons. See CWC, supra note 3, Annex
on Chemicals, pt. B (Scheds. of Chemicals) (providing a list of specific chemicals, which is to
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any mention of RCAs.33 In 1930, after finding a discrepancy in the au-
thoritative English and French versions of the Protocol (with the French
using "similaires" instead of "other"), the United Kingdom, France, and
eleven others endorsed the interpretation that the Protocol prohibited tear
gases, while the United States asserted that the Protocol did not cover
them.14 Despite this ambiguity, whether the Protocol prohibited tear gas
did not become a hot issue until the United States used large amounts of
it (approximately seven thousand tons35) in Vietnam in the 1970s.36 The
United States had adopted rules of engagement that provided that "[r]iot
[c]ontrol agents [would] be used to the maximum extent possible. 37 The
U.S.S.R. objected to such use of RCAs as a violation of the Protocol's
38
spirit. Secretary of State Dean Rusk countered that the United States
be used solely for verification purposes and "do[es] not constitute a definition of chemical
weapons").
33. See generally Geneva Gas Protocol, supra note 29. See also Baxter & Buergenthal,
supra note 21, at 861. Interestingly, Reisman and Antoniou base their conclusion that the
prohibition of the use of gas in general is "soft" law merely on the basis that tear gas is not
clearly prohibited under this regime. See W. Michael Reisman & Chris T. Antoniou, Introduc-
tion to THE LAWS OF WAR: A COMPREHENSIVE COLLECTION OF PRIMARY DOCUMENTS ON
INTERNATIONAL LAWS GOVERNING ARMED CONFLICT, at xxii (W. Michael Reisman & Chris
T. Antoniou eds., 1994).
34. See 2 JEAN-MARIE HENCKAERTS & LOUISE DOSWALD-BECK, CUSTOMARY INTER-
NATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW: PRACTICE 1749-56 (2005) [hereinafter HENCKAERTS &
DOSWALD-BECK, PRACTICE] (providing excerpts of various states' interpretations of the 1925
Geneva Gas Protocol as it relates to RCAs); see also DOCUMENTS ON THE LAWS OF WAR,
supra note 5, at 155-56; Jill M. Sheldon, Note, Nuclear Weapons and the Laws of War: Does
Customary International Law Prohibit the Use of Nuclear Weapons in All Circumstances?, 20
FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 181, 220-22 (1996).
35. See Osborne, supra note 31.
36. See Elizabeth A. Smith, Note, International Regulation of Chemical and Biological
Weapons: "Yellow Rain" and Arms Control, 1984 U. ILL. L. REV. 1011, 1036. It is interesting
to note that North Korea allegedly used tear gas in Kampuchea that it had taken from the
United States around the time of the Vietnam War. See Paul G. Cassell, Note, Establishing
Violations of International Law: "Yellow Rain" and the Treaties Regulating Chemical and
Biological Warfare, 35 STAN. L. REV. 259, 265-66 n.31 (1983) (citing Strategic Implications
of Chemical and Biological Warfare: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on International Secu-
rity and Scientific Affairs and on Asian and Pacific Affairs of the H. Comm. on Foreign
Affairs, 96th Cong. 45 (1980) (statement of Matthew Meselson, Professor, Biochemistry,
Molecular Biology, Harvard Univ.).
37. HENCKAERTS & DOSWALD-BECK, PRACTICE, supra note 34, at 1745 (quoting
United States, Rules of Engagement for Vietnam § d(2) (1971); United States, Air Force Pam-
phlet § 6-4(e) (1976) (providing that "the [Geneva Gas] Protocol does not restrain the use of
riot control agents as such")).
38. See Youmans et al., supra note 13, at 202. The U.S.S.R. continued to give the Unit-
ed States a difficult time in the 1980s, alleging that the United States provided the Afghan
mujahadeen with gas grenades. See Cassell, supra note 36, at 266 n.33. However, the U.S.S.R.
did not have entirely clean hands during this time, as allegations had been made that it had
used much harsher chemical and biological weapons in various situations over the years, such
as in Afghanistan, Kampuchea, and Laos. See id. at 263.
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was not "embarking upon gas warfare in Viet-Nam"3 9 because tear gas
was not a "gas that [was] prohibited by the Geneva Convention of 1925
or any other understandings about the use of gas."40 During this time, the
United States claimed that tear gas was not covered by the Protocol be-
cause it did not kill the targets but merely incapacitated them while they
were in contact with the agent. 41 In response to Secretary-General
Thant's call for a "clear affirmation" that tear gas was covered by the
Protocol,42 the U.N. General Assembly passed Resolution 2603A (1969),
which purportedly gave its definitive interpretation of the Protocol to
include tear gas.4 '3 However, surprisingly, the Resolution itself did not
mention tear gas or RCAs, but instead introduced the new phrase
"chemical agents of warfare" without defining it beyond saying that
these are "chemical substances, whether gaseous, liquid or solid" and
banning those that might be "employed because of their direct toxic ef-
fects on man, animals or plants." Despite this debate over the Protocol's
scope, no state clarified its interpretation in a reservation, 4 even though
several had the chance after the ambiguity emerged. 6 The debate contin-
ues over whether the Protocol prohibits RCAs in warfare. 47 The debate,
however, has become somewhat moot in light of the CWC's language
concerning RCAs and the near-universal adoption of the CWC.
39. See Youmans et al., supra note 13, at 202 (quoting 52 DEP'T ST. BULL. 528
(1965)).
40. Id.
41. See id. Please note that the United States was not a party to the Geneva Gas Proto-
col until April 10, 1975, although it was one of the original signatories on June 17, 1925. See
Geneva Gas Protocol, supra note 29. Regardless, the United States unilaterally declared that it
followed the Protocol, even though it continued to use RCAs, because its interpretation of the
Protocol did not prohibit such use. See HENCKAERTS & DOSWALD-BECK, RULES, supra note
30, at 264.
42. See THE 1925 GENEVA PROTOCOL: SUMMARY AND ANALYSIS 9 (2003), available at
http://www.nti.org/c-press/treaties-l.pdf (last visited Mar. 31, 2010) (citing U.N. Secretary-
General U Thant, Foreword to HEALTH ASPECTS OF CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS:
REPORT OF A WHO GROUP OF CONSULTANTS (1970)).
43. See GORDON M. BURCK & CHARLES C. FLOWERREE, INTERNATIONAL HANDBOOK
ON CHEMICAL WEAPONS PROLIFERATION 158-59, 542 (1991); Howard Hu et al., Tear Gas-
Harassing Agent or Toxic Chemical Weapon?, 262 JAMA 660, 663 (1989). See generally
ERIC CRODDY, CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL WARFARE: A COMPREHENSIVE SURVEY FOR THE
CONCERNED CITIZEN 118-19 (2002) (discussing various eye irritants).
44. G.A. Res. 2603 (XXIV), A(a), U.N. Doc. A/RES/2603 (Dec. 16, 1969).
45. See Smith, supra note 36, at 1037 (citing 3 STOCKHOLM INTERNATIONAL PEACE
RESEARCH INSTITUTE, THE PROBLEM OF CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL WARFARE 33 (1978)).
46. Although the Nixon Administration had included a reservation that excluded riot-
control gases when it sent the Protocol to the Senate for its advice and consent, the Senate
dropped this reservation and approved the treaty unanimously. See Cook et al., supra note 15,
at 29; Smith, supra note 36, at 1036-37.
47. See Stefan Oeter, Methods and Means of Combat, in THE HANDBOOK OF HUMANI-
TARIAN LAW IN ARMED CONFLICTS 105, 148 (Dieter Fleck ed., 1995).
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Pepper spray (or Oleoresin Capsicum) made from cayenne peppers
or from synthetic materials appears to have replaced tear gas as the pre-
ferred less-lethal chemical weapon for many modem forces on account
of its added potency against individuals vis-A-vis traditional tear gas.48
The emergence of this relatively new substance and the legal problems
associated with RCAs under the Geneva Gas Protocol and the CWC led
some military planners down the path of trying to define pepper spray as
a non-RCA substance, although this effort appears to have been aban-
doned.49
Despite the legal questions surrounding them, RCAs continue to
play a part in states' arsenals. It is interesting to note that, in 2007, 125
of the then 182 (now 188) member states of the Organisation for the
Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) declared that they possessed
RCAs, which CWC Article 11(1 )(e) requires of states.0 Unfortunately
states' particular use of RCAs is not reported to the OPCW, so it is diffi-
cult to determine the extent of the legal problems that RCAs pose
generally. Nevertheless, their mere existence within many states' arse-
nals is sufficient to raise some concerns, and similarly, the use of RCAs
by U.N. forces should raise others. The following Part describes in-
stances in which U.N. forces have relied on RCAs in their operations to
illustrate the magnitude of the potential problem and the ways that RCA
use by U.N. forces might be problematic.
II. USE OF RIOT-CONTROL AGENTS BY U.N. FORCES
U.N. forces are reported to have used RCAs on at least forty separate
51
occasions in fourteen missions. Commentators who have written on
48. See KoPLOW, supra note 7, at 18; T6th, supra note 7, at 170.
49. See Roger D. Scott, Getting Back to the Real United Nations: Global Peace Norms
and Creeping Interventionism, 154 MIL. L. REv. 27, 42 n.84 (1997) (reporting that U.S. mili-
tary officers tried to adopt this definition but that the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
decided against it).
50. See OPCW, Report of the OPCW on the Implementation of the Convention on the
Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and
on Their Destruction in 2007, 1.20, C-13/4 (Dec. 3, 2008). Some commentators mistakenly
overlook states' obligations to report their RCA stockpiles. See Marian Nash, Contemporary
Practice of the United States Relating to International Law, 88 AM. J. INT'L L. 312, 329
(1994).
51. Please note that this Article recognizes that newspaper reports and other sources are
not always entirely reliable. As one commentator has noted, "we may never know for sure"
when RCAs have been used in operations. Ronald D. Rotunda, The Chemical Weapons Con-
vention: Political and Constitutional Issues, 15 CONST. COMMENT. 131, 137 (1998). The
author has attempted to confirm these reports, without much notable success. However, since
these reports ostensibly have not been denied by the respective states or the United Nations, it
is relatively safe to assume there is at least some merit to them. At the same time, there also
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RCA use by U.N. forces have assumed that such use would be possible
in the future without acknowledging that such weapons already have
been used by these forces on numerous occasions.52 The forty examples
of RCA use by U.N. forces described in this Part not only take the dis-
course from the theoretical realm to the practical, but show the vast
extent to which U.N. forces have relied on RCAs. Many of these in-
stances suggest that their use was improper, such as against
schoolchildren and pregnant women or in combination with deadly
force. Admittedly, many instances of RCA use by U.N. forces have been
in situations similar to those in which domestic law enforcement person-
nel might use RCAs. However, a key difference, as explained in Part
III.A.2, is that these U.N. forces typically have not had a mandate to act
in a domestic law-enforcement capacity.
The first two incidents of RCA use by U.N. forces occurred in the
early days of the United Nations. The first reported use was by the U.N.-
authorized, U.S.-led United Nations Command in Korea in 1951 against
agitated North Korean POWs.53 The second incident was in 1957 by
Danish members of the United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF I)
peacekeeping mission in the Gaza Strip, who threw tear-gas bombs at
civilians trying to take over a U.N. post. 4 Several days after this incident,
U.N. headquarters approved the UNEF I commander to proclaim that
UNEF I had assumed responsibility for civil affairs there.5 5 It was not
until 1993 that RCA use by U.N. forces became far more common, when
then Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Kofi Annan called for
U.N. forces to be equipped with riot-control gear, after U.N. forces in
Somalia, poorly equipped for dispersing threatening crowds, killed
scores of demonstrators with live rounds on two separate incidents 6
This Part focuses on the instances of RCA use by U.N. forces after 1993.
might be cases of RCA use by U.N. forces that have gone unreported, for whatever reason, in
which case this portion of the Article is both under-inclusive and over-inclusive. While the
possibility always exists that journalists will be mistaken or biased, especially when reporting
on battlefield activities, there are few, if any, perfectly reliable alternatives.
52. See sources cited supra note 7.
53. See CRODDY, supra note 43, at 117; see also discussion infra Part II.A.3 (discuss-
ing that this type of use of RCAs against rioting POWs held within the user's jurisdiction
likely falls within the law-enforcement exception, and therefore would be allowable).
54. See Zanders, supra note 7, at 1.
55. See id.
56. See Peter Pringle, Overload for Peace-Keepers: Three-Month Wait for Troops to
Bosnia as U.N. Accused of Bad Management, INDEP. (London), June 16, 1993, at 13; Paul
Watson, Family Says Boy, 14 Hit by U.N. Bullets as He Read Koran, TORONTO STAR, Sept.
1I, 1993, at A13. But see First U.N. Troops Land in Somalia, WASH. POST, Sept. 15, 1992, at
A12 (asserting that U.N. forces in Somalia were equipped with "light weapons, tear gas and
rubber bullets").
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A. RCA Use in the Former Yugoslavia
U.N. forces in the former Yugoslavia have used RCAs in their opera-
tions on at least ten occasions. The first incident there, and the third
overall, was on August 28, 1997, when U.S. troops of the U.N.-authorized,
NATO-led SFOR in Bosnia dropped tear gas from helicopters when SFOR
clashed with civilians in the Serb town of Brcko after SFOR troops en-
tered a police station looking for pro-Karadzic police; this led to radio
announcements calling for an attack on SFOR troops.57 Just three days
later, SFOR again used tear gas against civilian attackers in another village
near Brcko.9
The other eight incidents of RCA use by U.N. forces in the former
Yugoslavia all occurred in the Kosovo town of Mitrovica. Most involved
one side of the conflict trying to cross a bridge into the area controlled
by the other. The first such incident was on October 15, 1999, when over
a hundred stone-throwing Albanian Kosovars tried to cross over a bridge
into the Serb-controlled part of town, and French troops in the U.N.-
authorized, NATO-led KFOR drove them back using tear gas and stun
grenades. KFOR feared that ethnic violence would erupt if they allowed
these Albanian Kosovars to return to their homes in the Serb-controlled
side.59 Similarly, the second incident occurred on February 22, 2000, this
time when French and British KFOR troops kept a group of approxi-
mately one thousand Albanians from crossing the same or similar bridge
into the Serb-controlled part of Mitrovica by firing tear gas at approxi-
mately five-minute intervals. 6° Apparently KFOR was trying to partition
Mitrovica and the Albanians were protesting because they had strong ties
to the Serb-controlled part of the city. Soon thereafter, on March 3, 2000,
in a reverse-course effort to reintegrate the city, French troops in KFOR
used tear gas and stun grenades against a Serb group that had blocked
the bridge into the Serb-controlled part of Mitrovica, enabling armored
carriers to return forty-one ethnic Albanians to their homes. 6' Ten months
later, another incident occurred in roughly the same place and with
roughly the same parties, when French and British KFOR troops kept
57. See Brad Knickerbocker, Can New Arms Cut Casualties?, CHRISTIAN SC. MONI-
TOR, Mar. 11, 2003, available at http://www.csmonitor.com/2003/031 1/p01s03-woiq.html
(last visited Mar. 31, 2010); Tom Walker, U.N. Troops Tear-Gas Bosnian Serbs, Mobs Smash
Peacekeeping Vehicles in Karadzic's Towns as Revolt Spreads, GLOBE & MAIL (Can.), Aug.
29, 1997, at Al; Zanders, supra note 7, at 1.
58. See Zanders, supra note 7, at 1.
59. See George Jahn, Kosovars Fail to Bridge Barriers, SUNDAY AGE, Oct. 17, 1999, at
12.
60. See NATO Troops Use Tear Gas in Kosovo, A.P. DAILY PROGRESS, Mar. 2, 2000, at
A3; Elena Becatoros, Albanian Bridge Riot: U.N. Troops Fire Tear Gas, DAILY TELEGRAPH
(Sydney), Feb. 22, 2000, at 24.
61. See World Briefs, HERALD-SUN (Durham, NC), Mar. 4, 2000, at A5.
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Albanians out of the Serbian quarter of Mitrovica with tear gas and plas-
tic bullets, 62 apparently marking a return to a policy of partition. Between
those latter two incidents, on July 17, 2000, KFOR troops used tear gas
and stun grenades to disperse a crowd of a hundred violent Serbs who
had confronted KFOR troops at the Mitrovica police station to demand
the release of the president of the Serb National Council's security
committee.63 Soon thereafter, on August 14, 2000, when KFOR troops
took over a lead-smelting plant in Mitrovica in order to shut it down for
ecological reasons, they apparently used tear gas and rubber bullets to
control the Serb crowd that had gathered in protest.' U.N. forces have
continued to use RCAs in Mitrovica in more recent years. On March 17,
2004, KFOR troops fired tear gas and rubber bullets at Albanian youths
attacking Serbs, apparently in retaliation for when three Albanian chil-
dren drowned after being chased into a river by Serbian youths. One
month after Kosovo's declaration of independence from Serbia in 2008,
KFOR troops used tear gas and stun grenades, along with gunfire, in its
effort to retake Mitrovica's courthouse, which had been taken over by
Serbs.6 As these examples show, RCA use in the former Yugoslavia has
tended to be used in approximately the same places against the same
people in combination with the same types of weapons.
B. RCA Use in Haiti
U.N. forces in Haiti reportedly have used RCAs on at least twelve
occasions, starting in 1995 and continuing until the present. The first use
of RCAs in Haiti was on April 13, 1995, when troops of the United Na-
tions Mission in Haiti (UNMIH) used tear gas on prison inmates who
were wielding hammers and throwing stones while attempting to break
out of Haiti's National Penitentiary. At the same time Haitian police
opened fire on these inmates.67 Second, on October 15, 1995, large
groups of slum dwellers threw stones at the motorcade of the wife of
then U.S. Vice President Al Gore as it passed through Cit6 Soleil, in pro-
62. See The Week in Review-NATO Peacekeepers Injured in Mitrovica, JANE'S DE-
FENCE WEEKLY, Feb. 7, 2001, available at http://www.janes.com (last visited Mar. 31, 2010).
63. See Kosovo: Tension Rising in Divided Town Following Serb's Arrest, BBC
WORLDWIDE MONITORING, July 18, 2000.
64. See Stefan Racin, Yugoslavia Blasts Takeover of Plant, UNITED PRESS INT'L, Aug.
14, 2000.
65. See Lateline: Kosovo Tensions Boil Over (Austl. Broad. Corp. television broadcast
Mar. 18, 2004), transcript available at http://www.abc.net.au/ateline/contenti2004/
s1069028.htm (last visited Mar. 31, 2010).
66. See Serbs in U.N. Battle, MIRROR (U.K.), Mar. 18, 2008, at 11.
67. See Police Open Fire to Quell Mass Prison Breakout, SEATTLE POST-
INTELLIGENCER, Apr. 14, 1995, at A2 (noting that a crowd outside of the prison had beaten up
an escaped prisoner and returned him to prison authorities).
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test against the limited amount of U.S. aid they had been receiving;
UNMIH troops used tear gas to repel the crowdi8
The third use of RCAs in Haiti occurred nearly nine years later, on
September 24, 2004, when the United Nations Stabilization Mission in
Haiti (MINUSTAH) used tear gas to disperse a crowd rioting at a food-
distribution center after Hurricane Jeanne. The riot began after gang
members cut in front of a thousand hungry hurricane victims-many of
whom were elderly and pregnant-who had been waiting in the heat for
food for several hours.69 While many problems arise at food-distribution
centers in Haiti, leading to the use of RCAs, not all of them involve
gangs or criminals. For example, in October and December 2004,
MINUSTAH troops used tear gas to restore order among large groups of
unruly women-again, many of whom were pregnant-who were trying
to grab food for their families.70 Another such use occurred on January
13, 2005."' In that case, it is unknown why the crowd started throwing
rocks at U.N. troops,72 although it likely all started with people shoving
in line while trying to get food. Sadly, approximately thirty children
from a school near the food-distribution center had to be treated for tear-
gas inhalation and skin irritation, and further street protests erupted
against the U.N. troops after it was falsely believed that their use of tear
gas had caused a woman's death. 73 Food and food distribution has con-
tinued to be the main issue that has sparked protests and RCA use in
Haiti. More recently, there were incidents of RCA use by MINUSTAH,
68. Car in Tipper Gore's Motorcade Stoned in Haiti, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 16, 1995, at A3;
Editorial, PRESS-ENTERPRISE, Oct. 17, 1995, at D14.
69. See James C. McKinley, Jr., Floodwaters Recede from Haitian City, but Hunger
Does Not, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 25, 2004, at A7, available at http://query.nytimes.comgst/
fullpage.html?res=9BODE4DF1F39F936A1575ACOA9629C8B63&sec=health (last visited
Mar. 31, 2010); Letta Tayler, Misery in Haiti Turns Violent, TIMES UNION, Sept. 25, 2004, at
A1; Mamie Ward, Aid Arrives in City of Chaos, MIAMI HERALD, Sept 25, 2004, at 16A (re-
porting that many in the crowd were pregnant and elderly, and who were supposed to have
priority in receiving supplies).
70. See Indira Lakshmanan, Awaiting the Next Disaster: Floods, Devastated Economy
Leave Little Hope in Haiti, BOSTON GLOBE, Dec. 8, 2004, at Al; Susannah A. Nesmith, In
Gonaives, Suffering Endures After Jeanne, MIAMI HERALD, Oct. 16, 2004, at IA (reporting
that the commander of the U.N. forces protecting the food distributors, Capt. Jorge Muga,
explained that "sometimes it seems they're all pregnant"). These news reports did not mention
that the riots were incited by gangs, although they might have been if the rioters were hoard-
ing all of the food and water.
71. See Fifth Person Dies of Bird Flu, More Likely, SEATTLE POST-INTELLIGENCER,
Jan. 14, 2005, at A4 (suggesting that U.N. forces used tear gas in order to protect those indi-
viduals who were working with an NGO to distribute the food); Peacekeepers Fire Tear Gas
at Haiti Crowd, A.P., Jan. 14, 2005.
72. See Peacekeepers Fire Tear Gas at Haiti Crowd, supra note 71.
73. Amy Bracken, Two People Killed During Police Raid in Haitian Slum, A.P.
WORLDSTREAM, Jan. 14, 2005 (reporting that the woman had been suffering from a heart ail-
ment, and that the precise cause of death was unknown).
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in April 2008 against violent protests over high food prices, and in
August 2008 after Hurricane Gustav set off protests over even higher
food prices.75
In addition to RCA use at food-distribution centers, U.N. forces have
used RCAs against alleged gang members in slums of Port-au-Prince.
On July 6, 2005, MINUSTAH troops used tear gas, along with helicop-
ters, tanks, and machine guns, in a relatively aggressive operation that
the United Nations has claimed was "designed to rout gangs," but that
human rights NGOs have claimed was a massacre of unarmed civilians
in one of Port-au-Prince's poorest neighborhoods, Cit6 Soleil. 76 Cit6
Soleil has been the center of many problems and therefore much RCA
use. For example, MINUSTAH again used RCAs at a polling station
there in December 2006, in an effort to keep order during municipal
elections." It also must be noted that MINUSTAH used RCAs against
78
rioting prisoners at an overcrowded prison in 2006, and most recently,
on March 3, 2009, when students in Port-au-Prince protested curriculum
changes by throwing rocks and MINUSTAH, in conjunction with do-
mestic police, responded with tear gas.79
While there are similarities between RCA use in Yugoslavia and
Haiti, the instances of RCA use in Haiti are more troubling for three rea-
sons. First, RCA use by U.N. forces there affected vulnerable individuals
such as children, pregnant women, and the elderly. When considering
use of RCAs in these types of settings, U.N. forces must keep in mind
that the lethality of RCAs significantly increases when the targets are
these types of vulnerable individuals.0 Where U.N. forces lack control
over who is affected by these RCAs on account of their indiscriminate
nature (as demonstrated by the January 13, 2005 incident which injured
74. See Leonard Doyle, Starving Haitians Riot as Food Prices Soar, INDEP. (London),
Apr. 10, 2008, at 22.
75. See Joseph Guyler Delva, In Haiti, Food Costs Provoke New Protests, WASH. POST,
Aug. 26,2008, at A10.
76. See Haider Rizvi, "Massacre" Charged in U.N. Raid on Slum, IPS-INTER PRESS
SERV., July 14, 2005 (asserting that at least twenty-five people were killed in this operation,
including a street vendor and a mother with her two children); see also Marc Lacey, U.N.
Troops Fight Haiti's Gangs One Battered Street at a Time, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 10, 2007, at Al
(providing a photograph of a U.N. peacekeeper before protestors in Citd Soleil with a tear gas
canister behind his back, suggesting that RCA use by U.N. forces in Cit Soleil has continued
since the alleged massacre there in 2005).
77. See Haiti: Four Killed During Poll, ADVERTISER (Adelaide, Austl.), Dec. 5, 2006,
at 24.
78. See Rent Prdval Is Inaugurated as President in Uneasy Haiti, N.Y. TIMES, May 15,
2006, at A6.
79. See Jonathan M. Katz, Poverty, Elections Place Haiti at Risk for Unrest, A.P., Mar.
4, 2009.
80. See infra Part IV.B.2.
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thirty nearby schoolchildren), U.N. forces should forsake RCA use.
Second, U.N. forces in Haiti used RCAs in combination with deadly
force and an aggressive attack on a community that allegedly had a his-
tory of being repressed by local police authorities.82 These two elements
should be sufficient for U.N. forces to foreswear further RCA use in
Haiti, on account of the possibility of a general escalation of hostilities
and retaliation with more-lethal chemical weapons.83 Although it is diffi-
cult to prove causation, the use of RCAs by U.N. forces in Haiti might
be why protestors and other non-state actors in Haiti have been so eager
to use RCAs against government forces during their protests.4 Some
critics might argue that it is better that these protestors and non-state ac-
tors used RCAs instead of more lethal weapons. However, to do so, they
would have to assume that the choice was between less-lethal and more-
lethal weapons, rather than between less-lethal weapons and no attack.
Still, the possibility of escalation should be avoided, beginning with
U.N. forces refraining from RCA use.
C. RCA Use in Western and Central Africa
Western and Central Africa have received much attention from U.N.
forces over the years, and so it is no surprise that there have been a large
number of incidents of RCA use by U.N. forces there-fourteen in total.
Six such incidents involved operations in Liberia. The first incident, re-
portedly on April 2, 2004, involved United Nations Mission in Liberia
(UNMIL) troops suppressing demonstrations of thousands of students
upset by problems associated with budgetary restraints on the school
system, and who allegedly were joined by demobilized militia groups."
The second reported incident involved a riot that broke out at a U.N. dis-
armament location on May 17, 2004, killing one and injuring four, after
rebels demanded full and immediate payment for the weapons they had
surrendered to the program.86 The third reported incident, which occurred
on October 21, 2004, is perhaps the most surprising: UNMIL troops
used tear gas against parents and students of a primary school who were
81. See supra note 71 and accompanying text.
82. See Rizvi, supra note 76.
83. See infra Part IV.B.3.
84. See Jonathan M. Katz, Haiti President Asks U.N. for Long-Term Help, A.P., Sept.
26, 2008 (reporting that hungry Haitian protesters used tear gas in their assault on the presi-
dential palace in 2008, which led the president to promise aid to farmers in producing more
food for the country).
85. See Chris Melville, World Markets Analysis: U.N. Troops Quell Student Unrest in
Liberia, GLOBAL INSIGHT, Apr. 6, 2004.
86. See Jonathan Paye-Layleh, Liberia: Fighters Riot in Latent Violence Surrounding
U.N. Disarmament, A.P., May 17, 2004.
Spring 2010]
Michigan Journal of International Law
protesting the closure of their school.8 7 Just over a week later, on October
29, 2004, UNMIL troops used tear gas against clashing Muslims and
Christians to restore order in the Liberian capital of Monrovia, and at
least three people were killed by U.N. efforts to disperse the crowd.88
Just over a year later, on November 12, 2005, UNMIL troops again used
tear gas and batons in an attempt to control hundreds of protesters who
were throwing rocks at police after allegations of fraud arose over the
presidential elections that brought President Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf into
power.89 Next, on September 17, 2007, fourteen decommissioned Liberian
soldiers broke into a radio station in order to make certain demands of
President Johnson-Sirleaf, and UNMIL troops used tear gas to repel
them.'
Two reported incidents of RCA use by U.N. forces occurred in
Rwanda. On February 21, 1994, 1500 troops with the United Nations
Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR) used tear gas against
Rwandan rioters who were protesting then President Juvenal
Habyarimana's prosecution of Tutsis.9' As Hutu-Tutsi tensions further
intensified and the situation deteriorated in Rwanda in April 1994
(although before Habyarimana's assassination), UNAMIR troops used tear
gas against allegedly peaceful protestors, a use that U.N. officials later
considered a mistake.92 This, of course, is not to say that this RCA use
contributed to the Rwandan genocide or that there would not be ample
justification for using RCAs in the face of an impending genocide.
U.N. forces also have used RCAs in Somalia on at least three occa-
sions. On November 8, 1993, troops in the United Nations Operation in
Somalia II (UNOSOM II) used tear gas to disperse a hundred protestors
who were at the U.N. compound in Mogadishu calling for the United
Nations' withdrawal from Somalia, after Somali warlord Mohamed
87. See World Briefs: Liberia: Students Confront U.N. Peacekeepers, MIAMI HERALD,
Oct. 21, 2004, at 21A.
88. See Jonathan Paye-Layleh, Muslim-Christian Violence Erupts in Liberian Capital,
Head of State Orders Round-the-Clock Curfew, A.P., Oct. 29, 2004 (describing the conflict
zone as being "near torched churches and mosques," and explaining that U.N. forces later
were given permission to shoot to kill).
89. See Bill Corcoran, U.N. Forces Use Tear Gas After Liberian Rioters Stone Police
in Election Protest, IRISH TIMES, Nov. 12, 2005, at 10; Jonathan Paye-Layleh, All Ballots
Counted, Johnson-Sirleafs Victory Hinges on Fraud Investigation, A.P., Nov. 15, 2005;
World Brief. U.N. Turns Back Vote-Count Protest, MIAMI HERALD, Nov. 12, 2005, at 12.
90. See Nana Adu Ampofo, Former Liberian Soldiers Charged for Violent Protests,
GLOBAL INSIGHT, Sept. 20, 2007 (noting that President Johnson-Sirleaf had left before these
protestors arrived).
91. See Rwanda: U.N. Chief Deplores Assassination of Cabinet Minister, IPS-INTER
PRESS SERV., Feb. 22, 1994.
92. See Farhan Haq, RwandalBurundi: U.N. Concerned as Situation Deteriorates, IPS-
INTER PRESS SERV., Apr. 7, 1994.
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Farah Aideed charged the United Nations with provoking hostilities
there; the crowd dispersed without any injuries.93 On January 3, 1994,
UNOSOM II troops used tear gas to disperse a crowd of protestors out-
side of the U.N. compound in Mogadishu who had become angry when
rumors of potential employment there proved to be untrue.94 Later that
same year, on November 5, 1994, UNOSOM II troops again used tear
gas and batons against a group of Somali protestors who had been dis-
missed from employment by a U.S. construction company.9
There are other relatively isolated instances of RCA use by U.N.
forces in other African states. In Sierra Leone on July 18, 2002, troops
with the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) used tear
gas and fired warning shots in an effort to control several hundred rioters
who were attacking Nigerian businesses and business-owners after Nige-
rian businessmen were accused of kidnapping and murdering a Sierra
Leonean currency exchanger.96 In the Democratic Republic of the Congo
(D.R.C.) on June 3, 2004, troops with the United Nations Organization
Mission in the D.R.C. (MONUC) fired tear gas (while Congolese secu-
rity forces apparently fired live rounds) at a group of protestors in
Kinshasa who were trying to storm U.N. property there.97 The group
ranged in number from tens to hundreds of thousands at different points
in time, and blamed the United Nations for having allowed the eastern
city of Bukavu to fall to rebel forces.98 This, of course, is not to say that
it would have been better for the notoriously harsh Congolese security
forces to have used the RCAs instead of MONUC, although it arguably
would have been more acceptable from the perspective of the CWC's
norms if an entity that was not part of the military forces there-such as
the National Congolese Police (PNC)-had used them. In C6te d'Ivoire
on January 17, 2006, troops with the United Nations Operation in C6te
d'Ivoire (UNOCI) used tear-gas grenades and stun grenades against pro-
testers attacking the U.N. headquarters in Abidjan with petrol bombs
after a U.N.-backed mediation group suggested that the Parliament's
mandate should be allowed to expire without renewal. 99 The protesters
93. See Osman Ali, U.N. Soldiers Kill Aid Worker, UNITED PRESS INT'L, Nov. 8, 1993.
94. See 2 U.N. Aid Agencies Shut Down Offices in Somalia's Capital, N.Y. TIMES, Jan.
4, 1994, at A5.
95. See Somalis Protest Dismissals by a U.S. Company, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 6, 1994, at
A13.
96. Clarence Roy-Macaulay, U.N. Checking Allegations that Peacekeepers Killed Two
Civilians During Riot, A.P., Aug. 23, 2002.
97. See Daniel Balint-Kurti, Gunshots Sound at U.N. Headquarters in Congo's Capi-
tal, Amid Angry Protests, A.P., June 3, 2004.
98. Id.
99. See John Lichfield, Five Protesters Killed as U.N. Peacekeepers Open Fire in Ivory
Coast, INDEP. (London), Jan. 19, 2006, at 27; Peter Murphy, Anti-UN Riots Called Threat to
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rubbed orange peels on their eyes in order to stop the tears,' °° which sug-
gests that the protesters already had experienced the effects of tear gas
and had come somewhat prepared, although gas masks obviously would
have been a better form of preparation. Following this incident, violence
against the United Nations spread to other cities in C6te d'Ivoire, such as
the political capital of Yamoussoukro and Guiglo.'0 ' One U.N. spokes-
person described the UNOCI as dealing with terrorism rather than
peaceful demonstration,10 2 which suggests that the U.N. forces likely
were not operating as domestic-law-enforcement. It is unclear what role
UNOCI's use of RCAs had on the spread of violence against the United
Nations throughout C6te d'Ivoire around that time, although it might not
be unreasonable to assert that the RCA use did not help the situation in
the long run, even though it may have helped fend off some of the at-
tackers in the short run.
These fourteen incidents of RCA use by U.N. forces raise at least
three problems. First, much like in Haiti in 2004 and 2005, on October
21, 2004 UNMIL troops used RCAs on a group of vulnerable individu-
als-namely, a large group of primary-school children and their parents.
Second, several of these incidents involved RCA use alongside deadly
force, which threatens an escalation of hostilities.' 3 Finally, many of
these incidents involved hundreds and even thousands of unruly protes-
tors, which must have instilled anxiety if not fear in the U.N. forces, and
so it is commendable that they had the discipline to resort to less-lethal
weapons before more-lethal ones. However, where domestic law en-
forcement forces acted alongside these U.N. forces, it arguably would
have been better for these domestic forces to have used the RCAs, in-
stead of the U.N. forces. Such use by domestic law-enforcement officers
clearly falls within the law-enforcement exception, while it is unclear
whether U.N. forces can rely on this exception."
Ivory Coast Peace Process, BOSTON GLOBE, Jan. 18, 2006, at A12; Lydia Polgreen, Ivorian
Leader Urges Youths to End Anti-U.N. Protests, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 20, 2006, at A8.
100. Polgreen, supra note 99, at A8.
101. See Ivory Coast: Ruling Party Withdraws from Peace Process, FACTS ON FILE
WORLD NEWS DIG., Jan. 19, 2006, at 37F3.
102. See Cote D'Ivoire: Anti-UN Protesters Refuse to Budge Despite President's Plea
for Calm, U.N. INTEGRATED REGIONAL INFO. NETWORKS, Jan. 19, 2006, available at
http://www.irinnews.org/Report.aspx?Reportld=57859 (last visited Mar. 31, 2010) (quoting
another U.N. spokesperson as saying, "UN forces are exercising maximum restraint in dealing
with these attacks").
103. See infra Part IV.B.3.
104. See infra Part III.A.2.
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D. RCA Use in Other Areas
Although most RCA use by U.N. forces has occurred in Haiti, the
former Yugoslavia, and parts of Africa, there are a few relatively isolated
instances in other areas of the world. For example, on October 20, 1993,
troops with the United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus
(UNFICYP) used tear gas against four thousand Greek Cypriot school-
children who were trying to cross over the green line into the Turkish
part of Cyprus in protest of a speech by the president of Cyprus concern-
ing Cyprus' division into Turkish and Greek portions.' In addition, on
December 4, 2002, troops with the United Nations Mission of Support in
East Timor (UNMISET) used tear gas against high-school students who
were protesting at Parliament the arrest of one of their friends the day
before, and who were joined by a nearby group of former rebel fighters
protesting unemployment.' °6 Both incidents involved targets vulnerable
to greater harm from RCAs than the average person.
These forty instances by fourteen separate U.N. forces are all of the
readily discoverable examples of RCA use by U.N. forces, and collec-
tively demonstrate that this is not merely a theoretical problem, as some
commentators have asserted. To this number could be added instances of
RCA development, production, stockpiling, retention, or transfer by
U.N. forces, which also are prohibited under CWC Article I(1)(a),' ° and
other unreported uses. Some commentators assert that U.N.-authorized
forces in Somalia used RCAs when evacuating UNOSOM II personnel
in 1995.08 Other commentators challenge this assertion, pointing out that
they merely considered using three types of pepper spray and a tear gas
foam barrier"° but finally decided against using them.1 ° U.N. forces in
Rwanda also allegedly carried pepper spray without using it."' In 1998,
105. Ian Black, Queen Ready to Accept Breaks with Monarchy, GUARDIAN (London),
Oct. 22, 1993, at 11; Alex Efty, After Apartheid, Commonwealth Seeks New Role at Summit,
A.P., Oct. 21, 1993.
106. Police Patrol Riot-Hit Timor, CNN, Dec. 4, 2002, available at http://
archives.cnn.com/2002/WORLD/asiapcf/southeast/12/04/timor.violence/ (last visited Mar. 31,
2010).
107. CWC, supra note 3, art. I(l)(a).
108. See, e.g., KopLow, supra note 7, at 28-29 (implying that this operation was a suc-
cess because of chemical RCAs); Council on Foreign Rel. Indep. Task Force, Nonlethal
Weapons and Capabilities 12-13 (2004), available at http://www.cfr.org/pdf/Nonlethal
TF.pdf (last visited Mar. 31, 2010).
109. MALCOLM DANDO, A NEW FoRM OF WARFARE: THE RISE OF NON-LETHAL WEAP-
ONS 188 (1996).
110. Jonathan S. Landay, Pentagon Explores Fighting the Enemy with Glue, Bad Odors,
CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, June 29, 1995, at 3; see Ernest Harper, A Call for a Definition of
Method of Warfare in Relation to the Chemical Weapons Convention, 48 NAVAL L. REV. 132,
132 (2001).
111. See KoPLOw, supra note 7, at 18.
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the Dutch contingent to the U.N. forces in Bosnia and Herzegovina ap-
parently were to receive RCAs from the United Kingdom, ' 2 although
there were no reports of RCA use there after that time. It is difficult to
estimate what percentage of U.N. forces possesses RCAs, since no
guidelines or manuals for U.N. forces require (or even encourage) RCA
possession, and mere possession usually does not merit media attention.
The United Nations' General Guidelines for Peacekeeping Operations
contains a section on crowd control which provides the following:
"Force is used only as a last resort and must be restricted to the mini-
mum requirement. The use of crowd control techniques and equipment
designed to avoid inflicting casualties is essential.""' 3
Clearly the United Nations understands the need for less-lethal wea-
pons. However, this acknowledgement does not equate to a specific
instruction on the use and possession of RCAs, since there are many
types of crowd-control equipment that avoid inflicting casualties that are
not RCAs, such as slippery foams, acoustic and heat rays, and tasers."'
U.N. forces typically possess and use the weapons that their home mili-
taries provide,' so whether or not they have access to RCAs likely will
depend on what weaponry troop-contributing countries normally provide
their troops. Similarly, the rules for possessing and using RCAs typically
are determined by the home military, only a few of which have adopted
provisions in their military manuals on RCAs." 6 This decentralized ap-
proach does not mean that the United Nations cannot and should not take
steps to regulate RCAs, as will be shown in the remaining portions of
this Article.
112. See HENCKAERTS & DOSWALD-BECK, PRACTICE, supra note 34, at 1754 (citing UK,
House of Lords, Reply to a Question by the Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for For-
eign and Commonwealth Affairs, Hansard, 12 January 1998, Vol. 584, Written Answers,
cols. 122-23).
113. U.N. Dep't of Peacekeeping Operations, General Guidelines for Peacekeeping
Operations, 52, U.N. Doc. UN/210/TC/GG95 (1995) [hereinafter General Guidelines].
114. See generally KoPLOW, supra note 7, at 14-21 (discussing modem NLWs and
noting some of the reasons why they have not been more successful); Paul R. Evancoe, Non-
Lethal Technologies Enhance Warrior's Punch, NAT'L DEF., Dec. 1993, at 25 (providing
examples of other non-lethal technologies and noting some of the reasons why they have not
been more successful). See the Conclusion at the end of this Article for a more detailed dis-
cussion of the options available to U.N. forces.
115. See U.N. Dep't of Peacekeeping Operations, United Nations Peace-Keeping Train-
ing Manual 24 (2001) [hereinafter Training Manual].
116. See HENCKAERTS & DOSWALD-BECK, RULES, supra note 30, at 264 (discussing the
field manuals and legislation of twelve states that mention RCA use); HENCKAERTS &
DOSWALD-BECK, PRAcrICE, supra note 34, at 1744-48 (reviewing and excerpting the same
field manuals and legislation). As a result of this decentralized approach to arming U.N.
forces, it is no surprise that the U.N. Peacekeeping Training Manual does not review RCAs in
its section on weapon training or in any other section, even though it re-emphasizes the need
to use a minimum amount of force to achieve its aims. See Training Manual, supra note 115,
at 23-32, 56.
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As U.N. operations become increasingly aggressive and crowd con-
trol becomes a greater focus of these operations,"7 less-lethal weapons
understandably will feature more prominently in forces' arsenals. The
following Part looks specifically at the limits to RCA possession and use
under the CWC, with the purpose of explaining the legal norms concern-
ing RCAs that the United Nations might elect to uphold. Given the
questionable legality of RCAs under the CWC and the availability of
less-controversial, less-lethal weapons, it would be best for U.N. forces
to foreswear all RCA use.
Before proceeding with that analysis, however, this Article would be
myopic if it did not acknowledge that most instances of reported RCA
use are not malignant on their face. The exceptions, of course, are those
instances in which young children, pregnant women, and elderly people
were involved and when RCAs were used in combination with lethal
force in more offensive operations. U.N. forces admittedly are faced with
the extremely difficult task of completing their important missions while
trying not to cause harm to sometimes hostile civilians. It is easy to ra-
tionalize RCA use by U.N. forces, especially in light of the more-deadly
option of bullets and grenades. However, due regard must be given to the
language and spirit of the CWC as it relates to RCAs, as explained in the
following Part. Perhaps the difficulty of the U.N. forces' task, combined
with the valuable assistance U.N. forces generally provide to maintain-
ing international peace and security, stymie objections from states.
Alternatively, perhaps states are too preoccupied with other aspects of
the CWC regime and international relations generally to make a fuss
over improper RCA use by U.N. forces. Regardless, this Article shines a
spotlight on the issue of RCA use by U.N. forces in an effort to encour-
age greater debate on the matter, rather than to hinder the work of the
United Nations or to frustrate the realization of peace. Given that this is
an academic article, the focus is on defending a thesis through argumen-
tation and through anticipating counterarguments, with the full
knowledge-and even hope-that criticism will be levied where valid
counterarguments have been missed or weaknesses inadvertently ig-
nored.
III. LEGAL NORMS AGAINST RIOT-CONTROL AGENTS
As indicated in Part I above, there have been considerable interna-
tional efforts to prohibit the use of chemicals as a method of warfare in the
past. The CWC goes much further than its predecessors in prohibiting
117. See Andy Oppenheimer, Non-Lethal Chemical Weapons, JANE'S CHEM-BIo WEB,
Nov. 29, 2004, available at http://jcbm.janes.com (last visited Mar. 31, 2010).
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RCAs. Admittedly, the CWC still does not state exactly which chemicals
are prohibited. However, it prohibits, inter alia, the production and pos-
session of banned chemical weapons, and not just their use (as does the
Geneva Gas Protocol)."8 Of particular relevance to a discussion of RCAs
are the two sets of CWC provisions that prohibit RCAs as chemical
weapons-the first focusing on RCAs as a method of warfare and the
second focusing on RCAs as temporary incapacitators." 9 After laying out
the first set of provisions, this Part explores the definitions of the key
phrases "law enforcement" and "method of warfare" in determining
when RCAs are prohibited. This set of prohibitions is relatively ambigu-
ous because the CWC defines neither phrase. This Part then looks in
detail at the second set of provisions that prohibit RCAs. It concludes by
exploring whether the CWC's legal norms apply directly to the United
Nations and U.N. forces.
Before proceeding, however, it is important to emphasize that this
Part looks at the legality of RCA possession and use by U.N. forces from
a general perspective. It is conceivable that both the United Nations and
troop-contributing countries could be held jointly accountable for
breaches by U.N. forces of relevant CWC norms if both exercise the ap-
propriate amount of control over the operation.'20 As this Part concludes,
the United Nations likely has no legal obligations under the CWC's RCA
prohibitions. The Part is nonetheless important because it lays out the
legal norms that bind most of the U.N. membership--norms that should
have considerable influence on U.N. actions if the United Nations is to
fulfill its purpose of maintaining international peace and security (and
other ends provided for in Article 1 of the U.N. Charter), act as an exam-
ple for the international community, and do its utmost to protect its
forces in the short-term and the long-term by supporting the CWC re-
gime.
A. First Prohibition Set: Riot-Control Agents
as a Method of Warfare
The more direct set of prohibitions starts with Article 1(5), which
states: "Each State Party undertakes not to use riot control agents as a
118. CWC, supra note 3, art. I.
119. Please note that what this Article refers to as the first set of prohibitions actually
was negotiated and introduced after the second set; that is, Article 1(5) was not added until the
final draft, when the non-aligned states insisted on a redundancy before they would agree to
the Convention. This Article adopts reverse-chronological numbering of these sets of provi-
sions because of a belief that it is important to address the more specialized provisions dealing
specifically with RCAs before addressing the more general provisions.
120. See, e.g., MARTEN ZWANENBURG, ACCOUNTABILITY OF PEACE SUPPORT OPERA-
TIONS 103 (2005).
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method of warfare."'12' A riot-control agent is defined under CWC Article
11(7) as "[a]ny chemical not listed in a Schedule, which can produce rap-
idly in humans sensory irritation or disabling physical effects which
disappear within a short time following termination of exposure.' 22 The
only relevant exception to Article I(5)'s prohibition is found in Article
II(9)(d), which states that "Purposes Not Prohibited Under this Conven-
tion" include, inter alia, "[f]aw enforcement including domestic riot
control purposes."'' 23 This exception applies, however, only after the law-
enforcement purpose is made clear by the state deploying the RCAs. In
other words, if a chemical agent has an effect listed in Article 11(7) but
does not fit within the law-enforcement exception in Article 1(9), then it
is a banned chemical weapon. Arguments that a chemical was calculated
to be less-lethal or is militarily necessary are no excuse from the strict
scrutiny provided for in the CWC.
These provisions are nevertheless ambiguous, however, because al-
though Article 1(5) clearly prohibits RCAs as a method of warfare and
Article II(9)(d) clearly allows RCAs for law enforcement, the CWC de-
fines neither "method of warfare" nor "law enforcement." This section
explores the contours of these phrases in order to determine when and
whether the activities of U.N. forces fit within these categories.
1. Method of Warfare
Use of RCAs as a method of warfare is a direct violation of CWC
Article 1(5) and may result in severe penalties. States such as Australia,
New Zealand, Romania, and Singapore have declared that this violation
may lead to life imprisonment.1'2 Other states, such as Hungary and
Sweden, provide that such acts may constitute war crimes.
2 6
Yet the meaning of the phrase "as a method of warfare" is unclear.
The literature contains numerous definitions, many of which seem to be
121. CWC, supra note 3, art. 1(5).
122. Id. art. 11(7).
123. Id. art. II(9)(d).
124. Given the CWC's broad language, the same analysis would hold true for the vehi-
cles for delivering RCAs. Until the state possessing RCAs (and its delivery vehicles)
demonstrates its intent to use the weapons for law-enforcement purposes, all such weapons
must be considered prohibited, or else violate both the spirit and the letter of the CWC. The
broad language in the CWC suggests that the default position is one of prohibition.
125. See HENCKAERTS & DOSWALD--BECK, PRACTICE, supra note 34, at 1746-48 (quot-
ing Chemical Weapons (Prohibition) Act, 1994, §§ 9(d), 12(f) (Austl.); Chemical Weapons
Act, 1996 S.N.Z. No. 37, pt. II § 8; Law on the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (1997), art.
50 (Rom.) (providing that such use of RCAs that causes death may lead to life imprisonment);
Chemical Weapons (Prohibition) Act (2000), § 8 (Sing.)).
126. See HENCKAERTS & DOSWALD-BECK, PRACTICE, supra note 34, at 1747-48 (quot-
ing Hungary, Criminal Code as amended (1978), Section 160, § A(3)(c); Strafflagen [SF]
(Penal Code) 22:6(a)(4) (1962) (Swed.)).
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crafted to support a particular position.' While there are numerous ways
to interpret a treaty,' one of the more logical ways is to interpret it "in
the light of its object and purpose" so that the drafters' intentions are
given their due effect.' 29 Based on the tone of the preamble,3 1 the object
and purpose of the CWC seems to be the total elimination of chemical
weapons, which means that the prohibiting language should be inter-
preted broadly and the exceptions narrowly. Indeed, if "warfare" were
interpreted narrowly, Article I(5)'s prohibition of RCAs would have lim-
ited meaning due to the fact that many states since the Second World
War have refrained from declaring war when in armed conflict. ' 3'The
main ambiguity lies in whether "warfare" covers all or only international
armed conflicts.3 2 It turns out not to be too much of an ambiguity, as the
Geneva Conventions defined the term to include both international and
127. See, e.g., Harper, supra note 110, at 158 (defining "method of warfare" in the con-
text of RCAs as a method "used to systematically enable or multiply the use of lethal force
against hostile enemies").
128. See generally ALEXANDER ORAKHELASHVILI, THE INTERPRETATION OF ACTS AND
RULES IN PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 301-92 (2008); James D. Fry, Remaining Valid:
Security Council Resolutions, Textualism, and the Invasion of Iraq, 15 TUL. J. INT'L & COMP.
L. 609, 622-23 (2007) (discussing that Article 31(1) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties is a poor guide to treaty interpretation because it refers to four distinct schools of
interpretation without creating a hierarchy between them).
129. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 3 1(1), opened for signature May 23,
1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331 ("A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the
ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its
object and purpose.").
130. See, e.g., CWC, supra note 3, pmbl. para. 1 (stating that the states parties were
"[d]etermined to act with a view to achieving effective progress towards general and complete
disarmament under strict and effective international control, including the prohibition and
elimination of all types of weapons of mass destruction") (emphasis omitted).
131. See, e.g., Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Congressional Authorization and
the War on Terrorism, 118 HARV. L. REV. 2047, 2060 (2005) (giving the United States as an
example).
132. See FRITs KALSHOVEN & LIESBETH ZEGVELD, CONSTRAINTS ON THE WAGING OF
WAR: AN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW 175 (2001). But see Mi-
chael N. Schmitt, Humanitarian Law and the Environment, 28 DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y
265, 290 (2000) (indicating that the CWC's use of the phrase "under any circumstances"
makes its prohibitions reach both internal and international conflicts, whereas the Geneva Gas
Protocol only applied to international conflicts). This Article proposes that "method" simply
means the manner in which a weapon is used, as widely defined in the context of the First
Additional Protocol. See, e.g., Isabelle Daoust et al., New Wars, New Weapons?: The Obliga-
tion of States to Assess the Legality of Means and Methods of Warfare, 84 INT'L REV. RED
CROSS 345, 352 (2002); see also Harper, supra note 110, at 154-55 (discussing a distinction
made in Hays Parks' memorandum between a "method" and a "means" of warfare, in which
Parks argued that the CWC does not prohibit RCA use because RCAs are a means, not a
method, of warfare). This Article dismisses Parks' argument as overly legalistic. See also
Schmitt, supra, at 290 (substituting "instrument of warfare" for "method of warfare" when
quoting the CWC, thus supporting the notion that one should not be overly legalistic when
analyzing the meaning of this word).
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non-international armed conflicts.'33 Regardless, the ambiguity becomes
irrelevant in the context of U.N. forces, since U.N. operations depend on
a Security Council determination that a situation threatens or has the po-
tential to threaten international peace and security, and thus all fit within
the international realm.'3
A second ambiguity lies in whether the prohibition even applies to
U.N. forces-that is, whether these forces can "wage war." U.N. Charter
Article 42 expressly envisions U.N. forces taking the initiative in a con-
flict.'35 Practice indicates that U.N. forces can take and have taken an
active part in hostilities. For example, in 2005, U.N. troops in the Ituri
district of eastern Congo killed thirty-eight militiamen in a raid sup-
ported by helicopter gunships-arguably the most aggressive U.N.
operation in recent history.36 Names of U.N. force operations such as the
1961 Operation "Rumpunch" in the Congo illustrate nicely how warlike
U.N. operations are designed to be.137 Under the first-shot principle for
the commencement of an international armed conflict, as supported by
the ICTY Appeals Chamber in the Tadi6 case, 38 it conceivably would not
take much to trigger the "method of warfare" language. There are at least
three examples of state practice that support this principle. First, the
United States claimed the applicability of the law of armed conflict dur-
ing a brief escalation of tensions with Syria when a U.S. Navy plane was
shot down over Lebanon in 1983 and Syrian forces captured the pilot.
39
Similarly, India claimed the applicability of the law of armed conflict
from the first shot fired when its pilots were captured after their planes
were shot down-a law Pakistan also has recognized in situations of
133. See WALTER KRUTZSCH & RALF TRAPP, A COMMENTARY ON THE CHEMICAL
WEAPONS CONVENTION 18 (1994).
134. See Steven J. Lepper, The Legal Status of Military Personnel in United Nations
Peace Operations: One Delegate's Analysis, 18 Hous. J. INT'L L. 359, 400 (1996) ("[T]he
involvement of a U.N. force-an international force by definition-automatically makes any
conflict in which they are introduced an international armed conflict.").
135. U.N. Charter art. 42; see also INGRID DETTER, THE LAW OF WAR 133 (2d ed.
2000).
136. See David Lewis, U.N. Troops Kill 38 Militiamen in Congo Raid, REUTERS, Apr. 2,
2005.
137. See, e.g., JOHN TERENCE O'NEILL & NICHOLAS REES, UNITED NATIONS PEACE-
KEEPING IN THE POST-COLD-WAR ERA 51-53 (2005).
138. See Prosecutor v. Tadid, Case No. IT-94-1-AR72, Decision on the Defence Motion
for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, 70 (Oct. 2, 1995) ("On the basis of the foregoing,
we find that an armed conflict exists whenever there is a resort to armed force between States
.... International humanitarian law applies from the initiation of such armed conflicts....");
see also Erik Suy, International Humanitarian Law and the Security Council Resolutions on
the 1990-1991 Gulf Conflict, in HUMANITARIAN LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT: CHALLENGES
AHEAD 515, 515 (Astrid J.M. Delissen & Gerard J. Tanja eds., 1991).
139. See Christopher Greenwood, Protection of Peacekeepers: The Legal Regime, 7
DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 185, 200 (1996).
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limited international conflict.'4 ° Finally, the United States applied the law
of armed conflict in its relatively limited operations in Grenada in 1983
and in Panama in 1989 after the first shot was fired.' Indeed, as the U.S.
Department of State declared, "'[a]rmed' conflict includes any situation
in which there is hostile action between the armed forces of two parties,
regardless of the duration, intensity or scope of the fighting."'' 4 2 This is as
true for international conflicts involving U.N. forces as it is for conflicts
between the armed forces of states.
2. Law Enforcement
The phrase "law enforcement" is no less ambiguous, given the lack
of a definition in the CWC. Keeping in mind the need to interpret pro-
hibiting language broadly and exceptions narrowly in light of the
CWC's object and purpose, under a plain-language reading the term
would apply to the punishment of violations of law, or in other words,
the enforcement of law.14'3 The word "enforcement" involves "the act or
process of compelling compliance with a law, mandate, command, de-
cree, or agreement." '44 Enforcement must be distinguished from such
activities as verification and monitoring, all of which are types of su-
pervision. As Eric Myjer asserts, there are three functions for
supervision: (1) a review function, which deals with determining facts;
(2) a creative function, which deals with interpreting the law; and (3) a
corrective function, which deals with seeing that a state adjusts its
behavior in order to comply with its obligations. 45 Verification and
monitoring fit under the review function of supervision, while enforce-
ment falls within the correction function, and interpretation is somewhat
important to both. This section focuses on the coercive correction func-
tion of enforcement.
140. See generally Khozem Merchant, India and Pakistan Try to Reduce Tensions, FIN.
TIMES (London), May 29, 1999, at 4 (reporting one such incident where an Indian pilot was
captured by Pakistan).
141. See United States v. Noriega, 808 F. Supp. 791, 795 (S.D. Fla. 1992) (dealing with
Panama); Greenwood, supra note 139, at 201 (citing W. Hays Parks, Department of the Army,
Memorandum for the Vice Chief of Staff, Status of Enemy Personnel Captured During Opera-
tion Urgent Fury, in 3 CUMULATIVE DIGEST OF U.S. PRACTICE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW:
1981-88, at 3452-56 (Marian Nash (Leich) ed., 1989) (dealing with Grenada)).
142. See Greenwood, supra note 139, at 200-01.
143. See David P. Fidler, On Law Enforcement Under the Chemical Weapons Conven-
tion, Panelist, in OPEN FORUM ON THE CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION: CHALLENGES
TO THE CHEMICAL WEAPONS BAN 30 (2003), available at http://www.sussex.ac.uk/
Units/sprulhsp/documents/OpenForumCWC.pdf (last visited Mar. 31, 2010) (adopting a simi-
lar approach to defining "law enforcement").
144. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 569 (8th ed. 2004).
145. See Eric P.J. Myjer, The Law of Arms-Control and International Supervision, 3
LEIDEN J. INT'L L. 99, 105-07 (1990).
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As for "law," it is important not to get caught up in the philosophi-
cal quagmire of defining "law," as the search for a concise definition
might end up being much like the fabled quest for the Holy Grail.46
However, equally eager not to brush off to the side the need to provide
some definition of law when it features prominently in the analysis, as
some commentators do,147 this Article adopts the somewhat conserva-
tive approach to defining law that legal positivists have adopted. 4'8 This
approach seems fitting in the CWC context because of the CWC's
strong emphasis on state sovereignty and equality in Articles VII, VIII,
X, XI, XII, XIV, and XVI, as well as in Parts VIII and IX of the Verifi-
cation Annex. Legal positivism traditionally focuses on law as flowing
from the edicts or actions of states, with law being whatever the sover-
eign determines it to be."49 Jeremy Bentham, one of the fathers of legal
positivism, saw law as an "assemblage of signs declarative of a volition
conceived or adopted by the sovereign in a state, concerning the con-
duct to be observed in a certain case by a certain person or class of
persons, who in the case in question are or are supposed to be subject
to his power" that "should act as a motive upon those whose conduct is
in question."'"5 Later legal positivists, when trying to define law,
emphasized coercion with enforcing rules. For example, Max Weber
stated that "an order will be called law if it is externally guaranteed by
the probability that coercion (physical or psychological), to bring about
conformity or avenge violation, will be applied by a staff of people
holding themselves specially ready for that purpose."' 5' Likewise, Hans
Kelsen used the phrase "coercive order" in referring to law. 52 In light
146. E. ADAMSON HOEBEL, THE LAW OF PRIMITIVE MAN: A STUDY OF COMPARATIVE
LEGAL DYNAMICS 18 (1954).
147. See Hurst Hannum, Book Review, 78 AM. J. INT'L L. 534, 535 (1984) (reviewing
PAUL SIEGHART, INTERNATIONAL LAW OF HUMAN RIGHTS (1983)); Karl N. Llewellyn, A
Realistic Jurisprudence-The Next Step, 30 COLUM. L. REV. 431, 432 (1930) ("I am not going
to attempt a definition of law.").
148. This Article adopts legal positivism for the sake of simplicity and out of a desire to
avoid being too controversial on a relatively minor point in the context of this Article. There
are many different approaches to defining law. Indeed, each school within the realm of juridi-
cal studies seems to have its own definition, many of which have considerable merit.
Moreover, there even are different approaches to legal positivism that are not discussed here.
A more nuanced analysis in defining law is reserved for future articles.
149. See WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 1 COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 53
(1769); see also JAMES L. BRIERLY, THE LAW OF NATIONS 34-47, 51-52 (1st ed. 1928).
150. See JEREMY BENTHAM, OF LAWS IN GENERAL I (H.L.A. Hart ed., Athlone Press
1970) (1782); John Griffiths, What Is Legal Pluralism?, 19 J. LEGAL PLURALISM & UNOFFICIAL
L. 1, 1-3 (1986) (noting how, with the state at the center of the definition, law becomes "an
exclusive, systematic and unified hierarchical ordering of normative propositions").
151. MAX WEBER, LAW IN ECONOMY AND SOCIETY 5 (Max Rheinstein ed., Edward
Shils & Max Rheinstein trans., Harvard Univ. Press 1954) (1925).
152. HANS KELSEN, PURE THEORY OF LAW 30 (Max Knight trans., Univ. of Cal. Press
1989) (1967).
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of such coercion, law is something that determines the acts of the sub-
jects of a sovereign, under the threat of significant punishment for
disobedience. Many contemporary commentators continue to empha-
size the role of coercion in defining law and legal orders.
15 3
The law enforcement exception in the CWC appears to refer to
domestic police activities, under Grotius' view of international law that
states have sovereignty within their own territory and in the policing of
it. This interpretation is supported by the reference to "domestic riot
control purposes" in CWC Article II(9)(d), even though the language is
inclusive with its use of the word "including." Experts assert that the
CWC's language concerning RCAs and law enforcement was specifi-
cally designed to allow domestic police forces to continue
uninterrupted their use of RCAs in crowd control.'" Although not con-
clusive, a survey of all fourteen of the Reports of the Ad Hoc
Committee on Chemical Weapons to the Conference on Disarmament
from 1984 to 1992 that deal with the definition of chemical weapons
indicates the consistent emphasis on "domestic law enforcement and
domestic riot control purposes," although this was changed in the final
version to leave open the possibility of non-domestic use of RCAs. '55
153. See, e.g., THOMAS Ross, JUST STORIES: HOW THE LAW EMBODIES RACISM AND
BIAS 6 (1997) ("When the state's agents apply their understanding of law and bring to bear the
specter and reality of force and violence that is the state's, this is the state's law."); Pierre-
Marie Dupuy, The Danger of Fragmentation or Unification of the International Legal System
and the International Court of Justice, 31 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 791, 793 (1999); Shige-
yoshi Ozaki, International Law and Coercion, 27 JAPANESE ANN. INT'L L. 12, 20 (1984).
154. See, e.g., J.P. PERRY ROBINSON, NON-LETHAL WARFARE AND THE CHEMICAL
WEAPONS CONVENTION, SUBMISSION TO THE OPCW OPEN-ENDED WORKING GROUP ON
PREPARATION FOR THE SECOND CWC REVIEW CONFERENCE 2 (Oct. 24, 2007) available at
http://www.sussex.ac.uk/Units/spru/hsp/Papers/421 rev3.pdf (last visited Mar. 31, 2010) [here-
inafter ROBINSON, NON-LETHAL WARFARE]; Robinson, Solving, supra note 14, at 6 (citing C.
Parker Ferguson, Less-than-Lethal Antipersonnel Chemicals, in US ARMY EDGEWOOD RE-
SEARCH, ABSTRACT DIGEST FOR THE 1995 ANNUAL SCIENTIFIC CONFERENCE ON CHEMICAL
AND BIOLOGICAL DEFENSE RESEARCH 77-78 (1995)) ("Law enforcement applications include
use by local, state and national law enforcement agencies in hostage and barricade situations;
crowd control; close proximity encounters; prison riots; and to halt fleeting suspects.") (em-
phasis added); see also DANDO, supra note 109, at 75; Fidler, supra note 143, at 28, 30-32
(asserting that "law enforcement" under CWC Article ll(9)(d) means, inter alia, "the en-
forcement of domestic law within the territory of a state and in areas subject to its
jurisdiction"). Please note that chemicals can be used as a part of law enforcement beyond riot
control, such as in jurisdictions that use lethal injections with capital punishment.
155. See Conference on Disarmament, Report of the Ad Hoc Comm. on Chem. Weapons,
CD/539, Annex 1, at 6, (Aug. 28, 1984); CD/636, app. I, at 5 (Aug. 23, 1985); CD727, app. I,
at 5 (Aug. 21, 1986); CD/734, app. I, at 5 (Jan 29, 1987); CD1782, app. I, at 6 (Aug. 26,
1987); CD/795, app. I, at 7 (Jan 29, 1988); CD/874, app. I, at 18 (Sept. 12, 1988); CD/881,
app. I, at 13 (Feb. 3, 1989); CD/952, app. I, at 21 (Aug. 18, 1989); CD/961, app. I, at 21 (Feb.
1, 1990); CD/1033, app. I, at 23 (Aug. 10, 1990); CD/1046, app. I, at 15 (Jan. 18, 1991);
CD/I 108, app. I, at 20 (Aug. 27, 1991); CD/1116, app. I, at 14 (Jan. 20, 1992) (emphasis
added) [hereinafter Reports of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons].
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Some states use this ambiguity to justify many non-domestic activities
under this exception. For example, as then U.S. President Bill Clinton
stated to the U.S. Senate before the CWC ratification debate, "Other
peacetime uses of RCAs, such as normal peacekeeping operations, law
enforcement operations, humanitarian and disaster relief operations,
counter-terrorist and hostage rescue operations, and noncombatant rescue
operations conducted outside such conflicts are unaffected by the Conven-
tion'" '56 The U.S. Naval Handbook has adopted this same language.'
Interestingly, by listing these non-domestic activities in addition to law
enforcement, this statement implicitly admits that they do not fit within
"law enforcement." Therefore, one might have a basis to apply the refer-
ences to "domestic law enforcement and domestic riot control
purposes" in earlier drafts of the CWC to the final draft.5 8 Again, as
noted in the Introduction above, while this interpretation of the CWC
might allow U.N. forces involved in coordinated operations with local
police forces to easily avoid the prohibition by letting the local police
do all of the dirty work, the drafts appear to have left this option open.
It is questionable whether U.N. forces can have powers equivalent
to those of domestic law enforcement. Commentators often talk of the
Security Council's "police powers." 159 However, these powers are
usually quite different from "law enforcement powers" or powers to
authorize troops to act as "law enforcement officials." Security Council
"police" activities generally involve monitoring the world for possible
threats to international peace and security, not arresting and detaining
individuals in accordance with law-activities that more closely fit
within the U.N. forces' general image as peace enforcers as opposed to
law enforcers. Admittedly, the United Nations has a long history of
156. William J. Clinton, Report on the Chemical Weapons Convention, 140 CONG. REC.
S7635-02 (daily ed. June 24, 1994) (statement of President Clinton); see also Exec. Order No.
11,850, 3 C.F.R. 149 (1971-1975) (allowing RCA use when rescuing the crew of downed
aircraft and when civilians are being used as human shields); ROBINSON, NON LETHAL WAR-
FARE, supra note 154, at 2 (citing Hearing on Chemical Weapons Ban Negotiation Issues
Before the Comm. on For. Rel., 102d Cong. 102-719 (1992)) (written response of Ambassa-
dor Stephen Ledogar to questions asked on May 1, 1992) ("We understand other law
enforcement activities to include: controlling rioting prisoners of war; rescuing hostages;
counterterrorist operations; drug enforcement operations; and noncombatant evacuation.").
157. See HENCKAERTS & DOSWALD-BECK, PRACTICE, supra note 34, at 1746 (quoting
United States, Naval Handbook §§ 10.3.2.1.1-10.3.2.1.2 (1995)).
158. See Reports of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons, 1984-1992, supra
note 155 and accompanying text.
159. See, e.g., ANTONIO CASSESE, INTERNATIONAL LAW 323 (2001) (stating that the Secu-
rity Council can "exercise police powers") (emphasis omitted); Thomas M. Franck & Faiza
Patel, UN Police Action in Lieu of War: "The Old Order Changeth", 85 AM. J. INT'L L. 63
(1991). But see Anthony D'Amato, Modifying U.S. Acceptance of the Compulsory Jurisdiction
of the World Court, 79 AM. J. INT'L L. 385, 402 (1985) (describing the Security Council's
international police power as stillborn).
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placing police officers within U.N.-controlled forces, who invariably
form a small fraction of the overall force. For example, officers of a
division of the U.N. Department of Peacekeeping Operations known as
United Nations Police (UNPOL) have served as an integral part of
U.N. forces since the 1960s, and currently there are approximately nine
thousand UNPOL officers in eighteen missions throughout the world.'
6
More specifically, since 2000, UNPOL has increasingly deployed
Formed Police Units (FPUs) in U.N. peacekeeping operations to han-
dle crowd and riot control, among other tasks. 16'Although UNPOL
individuals and FPUs might have been involved in all fourteen mis-
sions reported to have used RCAs in Part II above, there are no reports
that UNPOL officers actually were the ones deploying the RCAs.
Rather the absence of reference to these types of individuals and units
in the reports suggests that they were not the ones deploying RCAs.
Even if, arguendo, UNPOL officers and FPUs did use the RCAs in all
forty incidents, such RCA use does not necessarily fit within the law-
enforcement exception. Indeed, UNPOL primarily is involved with giv-
ing assistance to local police forces and monitoring situations where
U.N. forces are operating, not with engaging in actual law-enforcement
activities,'62 such as arrest or detention. 63 As the General Guidelines
state, "While powers of arrest are not ordinarily part of a peace-keeping
mandate, the civilian police and/or human rights components of a multi-
disciplinary operation may be mandated to monitor the civil authority's
160. United Nations Police, http://www.un.org/depts/dpko/police/index.shtml (last vis-
ited Mar. 31, 2010). For more information on U.N. policing, see Alexandra R. Harrington,
Policing Against the State: United Nations Policing as Violative of Sovereignty, 10 SAN DI-
EGO INT'L L.J. 155, 159-78, 185-87 (2009) (arguing that there are many instances in which
the United Nations has been involved in policing, although those have been mostly U.N.-
authorized enforcement operations). See also ANNIKA HANSEN, FROM CONGO TO Kosovo:
CIVILIAN POLICE IN PEACE OPERATIONS (2002) (discussing the development and shortcom-
ings of police efforts within U.N. peace support operations).
161. See generally U.N. Dept. of Peacekeeping Operations, Policy on the Functions and
Organization of Formed Police Units in United Nations Peacekeeping Operations, U.N. Doc.
DPKO/PD/2006/00060 (Nov. 9, 2006), available at http://es.unrol.org/doc.aspx?d=2824 (last
visited Mar. 31, 2010) (providing the broad policy to govern Formed Police Units (FPUs));
Luigi Bruno et al., Formed Police Unit Tasks: INPROL Consolidated Response (07-006), July
25, 2007, at 3-5, available at http://www.inprol.org/files/CR07006.pdf (last visited Mar. 31,
2010) (reporting on FPU activities and giving recommendations for reform).
162. See United Nations Police, supra note 160.
163. The U.N. General Assembly has adopted Resolution 34/169, which is a code of
conduct for law enforcement officials and defines "law enforcement officials" in its Article I
as "all officers of the law, whether appointed or elected [and whether uniformed or not], who
exercise police powers, especially powers of arrest or detention." Code of Conduct for Law
Enforcement Officials, G.A. Res. 34/169, art. 1(a), U.N. Doc. A/RES/34/169 (Dec. 17, 1979);
see also Adam Abdelmoula, Libya: The Control of Lawyers by the State, 17 J. LEGAL PROF.
55, 57 (1992).
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discharge of such responsibilities." '6 Based on the information provided
by UNPOL itself, law enforcement would appear to be a subset of polic-
ing. UNPOL has acknowledged that it has been involved in actual law
enforcement in only three peacekeeping missions-in Eastern Slavonia
(Croatia), Kosovo, and East Timor."" In such operations, UNPOL offi-
cers typically have operated within a U.N. transitional administration
and might have had the power to arrest, detain, and conduct searches,
along with other typical law-enforcement functions. '66 Since no incidents
of RCA use by U.N. forces have been reported in Eastern Slavonia, and
KFOR ostensibly is the only U.N. force to have used RCAs in Kosovo
(that is, not UNMIK, which includes UNPOL officers), UNMISET in
East Timor becomes the prime candidate for the law-enforcement excep-
tion.
The following section analyzes the mandates of all fourteen U.N.
forces discussed in Part II above to reveal whether the Security Council
authorized them to take on genuine law-enforcement responsibilities,
regardless of the presence of UNPOL officers. Critics will argue that one
must look beyond the mandates to see what the U.N. forces have been
asked to accomplish on the ground, although these critics inappropriately
will discount the text of these mandates. After all, if U.N. forces are be-
ing asked to accomplish a particular task on the ground, should not this
be clearly stated in the mandate? If the Security Council did not agree to
put it in the mandate, surely this cannot be one of the U.N. force's main
tasks. The following section gives the text of mandates their due weight.
While the Security Council obviously cannot foresee all of the situations
in which U.N. forces may need to operate, and possibly use force, the
norms prohibiting chemical weapons are of such an important nature that
a narrow focus on the text of these mandates seems justified.
164. General Guidelines, supra note 113, 54.
165. See United Nations Police, supra note 160; see also S.C. Res. 1410, 2(b), U.N.
Doc. S/RES/1410 (May 17, 2002) (providing in the mandate of UNMISET to "provide in-
terim law enforcement and public security"); S.C. Res. 1244, I l(i), U.N. Doc. S/RES/1244
(June 10, 1999) (providing in the mandate of UNMIK to "[mlaintain[] civil law and order,
including establishing local police forces and meanwhile through the deployment of interna-
tional police personnel to serve in Kosovo"); S.C. Res. 1037, 1 (a), U.N. Doc. S/RES/1037
(Jan. 15, 1996) (providing in the mandate of the U.N. Transitional Authority in Eastern Sla-
vonia, Baranja, and Western Sirmium (UNTAES) to "establish a temporary police force");
S.C. Res. 1145, 13, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1 145 (Dec. 19, 1997) (providing in the mandate of the
U.N. Police Support Group (UNPSG), which continued on from UNTAES after its mandate
expired, to "continue to monitor the performance of the Croatian police in the Danube re-
gion").
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a. Authorization to Provide Law Enforcement
The mandate of UNMISET in East Timor makes it the most likely
candidate to provide unequivocal authorization to handle law-
enforcement matters in the host state, as paragraph 2(b) of Resolution
1410 requires UNMISET to "provide interim law enforcement and pub-
lic security."'167 It is not entirely clear what law UNMISET was to
enforce, although commentators have asserted that UNMISET was to
enforce "an 'international' standard of criminality,"'168 not the edicts of
one particular entity. Nor is it clear when UNMISET stopped providing
its interim law enforcement services. A U.N. Secretary-General report
issued just over a month before the RCA usage on December 4, 2002
indicated that law and order in Timor-Leste was already being handled by
a joint service between the United Nations Police (UNPOL) associated
with UNMISET and the Timor-Leste Police Service, and that this force
enjoyed a unified chain of command.69 Therefore, while UNMISET was
not in total control of law enforcement at around the time of RCA use by
UNMISET troops, it likely had joint control at the time. Moreover, the
President of Timor-Leste specifically asked for UNMISET to help con-
trol the situation where RCAs eventually were used. 170 In sum, this would
appear to be a clear example of U.N. forces using RCAs under the law
enforcement exception.
b. Authorization to Assist with Developing
a Law Enforcement Agency
Some provisions of mandates of U.N. forces expressly authorize a
U.N. force to assist with developing a law enforcement agency. The oth-
er provisions of UNMISET's mandate are similar to those of other
mandates of U.N. forces, which fall short of authorizing the force to act
in a law enforcement capacity. For example, UNMISET's mandate re-
quires it to "assist in the development of a new law enforcement agency
in East Timor, the East Timor Police Service (ETPS)[.]' 17' The mandates
for several other U.N. forces also authorize them to assist in developing
a domestic law enforcement agency. UNMIH's mandate in Haiti was to
"provide guidance and training to all levels of the Haitian police and
167. S.C. Res. 1410, supra note 165, 2(b).
168. Harrington, supra note 160, at 185-86.
169. See The Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations
Mission of Support in East Timor, 24-25, delivered to the Security Council, U.N. Doc.
S/2002/1223 (Nov. 6, 2002).
170. Police Patrol Riot-Hit Timor, supra note 106; see also S.C. Res. 1410, supra note
165, 2(b).
171. S.C. Res. 1410, supra note 165, 1 2(b).
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monitor the way in which operations were implemented,"'' 2 not to take
over any aspects of actual law enforcement from the domestic police
force. Preambular paragraph 5 of Resolution 867 stresses the importance
of "establishing a new police force with the presence of United Nations
personnel,' 73 similar to the manner in which the Governors Island
Agreement between the Haitian political leadership and the military
leadership specified that the international community merely was to pro-
vide "[a]ssistance for ... establishing a new Police Force with the
presence of the United Nations personnel.' ' 7 However, this mandate did
not necessarily mean that UNMIH personnel assumed (or were to as-
sume) law enforcement powers of the Haitian police force, as UNMIH
still could be present during the formation of the new police force as an
adviser and trainer (as provided for in Resolution 867) without actually
taking upon itself the new police force's law-enforcement powers. The
Security Council updated UNMIH's mandate approximately ten months
after it established UNMIH, with the new mandate specifying that
UNMIH was to "assist the democratic Government of Haiti in fulfilling
its responsibilities in connection with ... the creation of a separate po-
lice force."'75 Yet again, this new mandate went no further than requiring
UNMIH to assist the Government of Haiti in establishing its own police
force, and did not mandate UNMIH to become Haiti's police force. The
Security Council established police-related missions in Haiti after the
termination of UNMIH in 1996, such as the United Nations Transition
Mission in Haiti (UNTMIH) and the United Nations Civilian Police
Mission in Haiti (MIPONUH), and the U.N. General Assembly also es-
tablished the United Nations General Assembly International Civilian
Support Mission in Haiti (MICAH); but, as none of these U.N. forces
appear to have used RCAs, their mandates are less relevant for the pur-
poses of this Article.
Likewise, neither do MINUSTAH's multiple instances of RCA use
in Haiti easily fall under the law-enforcment exception because
MINUSTAH's mandate only allowed it to assist the Haitian Transitional
Government (through the Haitian National Police, which had been estab-
lished as a professional police force in 2004 by the Consensus on the
Political Transition Pact) in stabilizing Haiti and in bringing about
172. S.C. Res. 867, 3, U.N. Doc. S/RES/867 (Sept. 23, 1993) (emphasis added).
173. Id. pmbl. T 5.
174. See The Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary-General on the Situation of
Democracy and Human Rights in Haiti, 5, delivered to the Security Council and the General
Assembly, U.N. Doc. S/26063, A/47/975 (July 12, 1993) [hereinafter Governors Island
Agreement].
175. S.C. Res. 940, 9, U.N. Doc. S/RES/940 (July 31, 1994).
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reforms, 76 not to exercise its own police powers directly on the Haitian
population. Also similar to MINUSTAH, UNMIL's mandate in Liberia
gave it a limited role in "assist[ing] the transitional government of Libe-
ria in monitoring and restructuring the police force of Liberia, consistent
with democratic policing, to develop a civilian police training pro-
gramme, and to otherwise assist in the training of civilian police, in
cooperation with ECOWAS, international organizations, and interested
States,' 77 not to act as Liberia's police force. While UNAMIR's mandate
in Rwanda initially authorized it to "investigate and report on incidents
regarding the activities of the gendarmerie and police,"'78 an updated
mandate just over a year-and-a-half after this initial mandate gave
UNAMIR the task of "[a]ssist[ing] in the training of a national police
force."'79 These two versions of UNAMIR's mandate provided no other
duties relating to law enforcement. The mandate for UNOCI in CMte
d'Ivoire authorizes it to "assist the Government of National Reconcilia-
tion in conjunction with ECOWAS and other international organizations
in restoring a civilian policing presence throughout CMte d'Ivoire"' 8°
UNOSOM II's mandate is similar to those already mentioned with respect
to the U.N. force assisting the target state in its law-enforcement-related
activities, although UNOSOM U's mandate does so as a request, not as a
requirement. In particular, paragraph 4(d) of Resolution 814 requests that
the U.N. Secretary-General and "all relevant United Nations entities, of-
fices and specialized agencies," which conceivably includes UNOSOM II,
"assist in the re-establishment of Somali police, as appropriate at the local,
regional or national level, to assist in the restoration and maintenance of
peace, stability and law and order, including in the investigation and facili-
tating the prosecution of serious violations of international humanitarian
law."'8 Finally, UNAMSIL's original mandate did not provide it with a
law enforcement function.12 Updates to that mandate came in 2000 and
2001, with the 2000 update requiring UNAMSIL to "coordinate with and
assist, in common areas of deployment, the Sierra Leone law enforce-
176. S.C. Res. 1542, 17(I), U.N. Doc. S/RES/1542 (Apr. 30, 2004); see also
MINUSTAH: United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti-Background, http://
www.un.org/Depts/dpko/missions/minustah/background.html (last visited Mar. 31, 2010).
177. S.C. Res. 1509, 1 3(n), U.N. Doc. S/RES/1509 (Sept. 19, 2003).
178. S.C. Res. 872, 1 3(h), U.N. Doc. S/RES/872 (Oct. 5, 1993).
179. S.C. Res. 997, 1 3(d), U.N. Doc. S/RES/997 (June 9, 1995).
180. S.C. Res. 1528, 6(p), U.N. Doc. S/RES/1528 (Feb. 27, 2004).
181. S.C. Res. 814,14, U.N. Doc. S/RES/814 (Mar. 26, 1993).
182. The only mention of police-related activities in the operative paragraphs of Security
Council Resolution 1270 can be found where the Security Council "[u]rges the Government
of Sierra Leone to expedite the formation of professional and accountable national police."
S.C. Res. 1270, 23, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1270 (Oct. 22, 1999).
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ment authorities in the discharge of their responsibilities.' 83 The 2001
update required UNAMSIL to "assist the efforts of the Government of
Sierra Leone to extend its authority, restore law and order and stabilize
the situation progressively throughout the entire country."'14 In both
cases, UNAMSIL's role was to assist the Government of Sierra Leone in
its law enforcement activities, not to take over those activities.
One could interpret these references to a "new law enforcement
agency" in the case of UNMINSET, "establishing a new police force" in
the case of UNMIH, establishing "a national police force" in the case of
UNAMIR, "restoring a civilian policing presence" in the case of
UNOCI, "re-establishing of Somali police" in the case of UNOSOM II,
and "restor[ing] law and order" in the case of UNAMSIL as inferring
that a police force did not exist in the host states, and so by necessity,
that the U.N. forces were required to take upon themselves implied pow-
ers of law enforcement until the host states established the new police
force. However, international law appears to require the express consent
of a host state before law enforcement officers can exercise actual police
functions in that state,'85 and so an implied powers argument is not par-
ticularly persuasive in this context. The conclusion, however, is a little
different when this implication is coupled with a broad Security Council
authorization for the U.N. force to take "all necessary means" in fulfill-
ing its mandate, without any express limitations provided concerning the
host state's responsibilities and rights. For example, UNOCI's mandate
authorizes it to "use all necessary means to carry out its mandate, within
its capabilities and its areas of deployment[.]' 18 6 UNAMSIL's updated
mandate in 2001 also gave it the power to "take the necessary action to
fulfill the additional tasks set out" by the Resolution, although this
power was circumscribed by the requirement that UNAMSIL "tak[e]
into account the responsibilities of the Government of Sierra Leone"187;
thus, UNAMSIL could not usurp the government's law enforcement role
even if it wanted to do so, at least not from a legal perspective. UNOCI's
mandate did not limit those "necessary" powers by the responsibilities of
the Government of C6te d'Ivoire, so it would be more acceptable from a
legal perspective if UNOCI were to take over law enforcement activities
there if it deemed this necessary.
183. S.C. Res. 1289, 10(d), U.N. Doc. S/RES/1289 (Feb. 7, 2000).
184. The Secretary-General, Ninth Report of the Secretary-General on the United Na-
tions Mission in Sierra Leone, 58, delivered to the Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/2001/228
(Mar. 14, 2001) (adopted by the Security Council in S.C. Res. 1346, 3, U.N. Doc.
S/RES/1346 (Mar. 30, 2001)).
185. See 1 OPPENHEIM'S INTERNATIONAL LAW § 119, at 387-88 (Robert Jennings &
Arthur Watts eds., 9th ed. 1992).
186. S.C. Res. 1528, supra note 180, 8.
187. S.C. Res. 1289, supra note 183, 10.
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The importance of assisting domestic police forces reform and de-
velop should not be underestimated, in terms of helping remove a
potential threat to international peace and security in the long run. When
it comes to RCA use in the field, however, domestic police forces that
work alongside U.N. forces would be of great assistance to the U.N.
force if they used RCAs rather than the U.N. forces."' Without an ex-
press mandate to act as a domestic police force, U.N. forces should
refrain from using RCAs, even when police forces temporarily withdraw
from a particular area, as occurred in Haiti. '89
c. Authorization to Maintain a Secure Environment
Arguably, several U.N. mandates could authorize a limited law en-
forcment function through language authorizing U.N. troops to
"maintain a secure environment." UNMISET's mandate, for example,
required it to "contribute to the maintenance of the external and internal
security of East Timor."' 9 This is similar to the mandates of other U.N.
forces that fall short of authorizing law-enforcement activities. For
example, the mandate of UNOSOM II provides it with a role in main-
taining the security environment of Somalia. Paragraph 14 of Resolution
814 (UNOSOM II's mandate) "[requests the Secretary-General,
through his Special Representative, to direct the Force Commander of
UNOSOM II to assume responsibility for the consolidation, expansion
and maintenance of a secure environment throughout Somalia."' 91 Like-
wise, the mandate for UNFICYP in Cyprus makes clear that the
Government of Cyprus "has the responsibility for the maintenance
and restoration of law and order."' 92 Paragraph 6 of that mandate
"[recommends that the function of [UNFICYP] should be, in the interest
of preserving international peace and security, to use its best efforts to pre-
188. Please note that there have been instances where domestic police have worked
alongside U.N. forces, and the police used RCAs without such use being imputed to U.N.
forces. See, e.g., Armed U.N. Troops Rush Rock-Throwing Students, A.P., May 11, 1995 (re-
porting that Haitian police used tear gas against a group of students throwing rocks, but that
the crowd did not disperse until UNMIH troops rushed the crowd with their riot gear donned);
At Least 2 Die as Police Fire on Haitian Marchers, WASH. PosT, Mar. 1, 2005, at A12 (noting
that U.N. peacekeepers in Haiti were accompanying demonstrators when police fired tear gas
followed by bullets at the demonstrators, without the U.N. troops knowing why); Alex Efty,
Greek Cypriot Bikers Ride into U.N. Buffer Zone, 3 Injured, A.P., Aug. 6, 1995 (reporting that
Greek Cypriot police used tear gas against protestors, many of whom were riding motorbikes,
but that only barbed wire used by UNFICYP troops actually stopped the protestors); Ginger
Thompson, Haitians Flock to Vote, on a Day of Anger and Hope, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 8, 2006, at
A3 ("Police officers fired tear gas and United Nations soldiers fired shots into the air.").
189. See, e.g., McKinley supra note 69, at A7 (reporting that Haitian police forces with-
drew without giving U.N. forces any warning).
190. S.C. Res. 1410, supra note 165, 2(b)-(c).
191. S.C. Res. 814, supra note 181, 14.
192. S.C. Res. 186, 1 2, U.N. Doc. S/RES/186 (Mar. 4, 1964).
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vent a recurrence of fighting and, as necessary, to contribute to the main-
tenance and restoration of law and order and a return to normal
conditions.'" '93 With both UNOSOM II and UNFICYP (even though the
former was a Chapter VII operation and the latter was a Chapter VI op-
eration), the question becomes whether a request to "assume
responsibility for the consolidation, expansion and maintenance of a se-
cure environment" and a recommendation to "contribute to the
maintenance and restoration of law and order," respectively, connote the
enforcement of law. References to "security" and "law and order" re-
semble more the enforcement of peace than the enforcement of
particular laws. "Law and order" and "law enforcement" often are asso-
ciated with one another in the domestic context. However, there is a
subtle distinction between the two. Maintaining law and order has more
to do with preserving the peace and less to do with upholding a particu-
lar law, much like how a sheriff in the Wild West might make an outlaw
out of anyone who challenged his authority.'94 In the domestic context,
the distinction typically is overlooked because peace and law are tied
together. However, in the context of U.N. forces, peace and law arguably
are less connected, as is demonstrated by the ability of the Security
Council to authorize measures that trump conflicting legal norms in the
name of maintaining international peace and secuity; 95 thus the subtle
distinction is far more important here. This is so even if the United
Nations and states might treat these terms as interchangeable in common
parlance.
d. No Law-Enforcement-Related Authorization
The mandates for the U.N. forces discussed in Part II provide these
forces with no law enforcement role. 96 The earlier mandates for the
United Nations Command in Korea and UNEF I in the Gaza Strip called
for a cessation of hostilities and monitoring of that cessation,' 9 not law
193. Id. 5.
194. See, e.g., Hanan Ashrawi, A Conversation with Dr. Hanan Ashrawi, 7 ILSA J.
INT'L & COMP. L. 649, 665 (2001).
195. See U.N. Charter arts. 25, 103.
196. See, e.g., S.C. Res. 1279, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1279 (Nov. 30, 1999) (providing
MONUC with no law-enforcement role); S.C. Res. 1445, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1445 (Dec. 4,
2002) (providing the same).
197. S.C. Res. 82, 1-3, U.N. Doc. S/RES/82 (June 25, 1950) (providing the mandate
for the United Nations Command in Korea and calling for an "immediate cessation of hostili-
ties" and for "North Korea to withdraw forthwith their armed forces to the 38th parallel");
G.A. Res. 1000, 1, U.N. GAOR, Emergency Special Sess., Supp. No. 1, pt. 1, at 2, U.N.
Doc. A/3354 (Nov. 4, 1956) (calling for UNEF I to "secure and supervise the cessation of
hostilities in accordance with all the terms of General Assembly resolution 997 (ES-I) of 2
November 1956"); G.A. Res. 997, U.N. GAOR, Emergency Special Sess., Supp. No. 1, pt. 1,
at 2, U.N. Doc. A/3354 (Nov. 4, 1956) (mentioning nothing about law enforcement).
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enforcement. Admittedly, UNEF I eventually took control over civil af-
fairs in the Gaza Strip, even though this was not provided for in its
mandate, nor did it happen until after UNEF I's use of RCAs, and so it is
irrelevant for this Article.'9
Later U.N. forces also focused on monitoring the cessation of hos-
tilities and otherwise maintaining the peace. SFOR's mandate derived
from Security Council Resolution 1031, which authorized the Imple-
mentation Force (IFOR, the predecessor of SFOR) to implement the role
specified in Annexes 1A and 2 of the 1995 General Framework Agree-
ment for Peace dealing with the military aspects of this agreement and
inter-entity boundary lines.' 99 Under Annex 1A of the General Frame-
work Agreement for Peace (GFA), IFOR's main task was to "establish a
durable cessation of hostilities" by doing such things as keeping the par-
ties separated.2° Security Council Resolution 1088 established SFOR as
the legal successor to IFOR for an initial period of eighteen months. °' A
key point here is that law enforcement was not entrusted to IFOR or
SFOR. Rather, Article 11(3) of Annex IA to the GFA required the parties
(the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Federation of Bosnia and
Herzegovina, and the Republika Srpska) to "provide a safe and secure
environment for all persons in their respective jurisdictions, by maintain-
ing civilian law enforcement agencies operating in accordance with
international recognized standards. 2 2 The civilian aspects of the Agree-
ment were entrusted to the U.N. International Police Task Force
(UNIPTF) under Annex 11 of the GFA, but even this only gave UNIPTF
the role of assisting the parties in maintaining civilian law enforce-
ment." 3 Usurping the role of law enforcement was not part of the
Agreement. Besides, UNIPTF was not the U.N. force that used RCAs in
Bosnia; rather, it was SFOR, which lacked a mandate to involve itself
with law enforcement.
Similarly, KFOR's mandate was established by Security Council
Resolution 1244, which provided that it was responsible, as the interna-
tional security presence, for, inter alia, "[dieterring renewed hostilities,
maintaining and where necessary enforcing a ceasefire, and ensuring the
withdrawal and preventing the return into Kosovo of Federal and Repub-
lic military, police and paramilitary forces" and "[e]nsuring public
198. See supra notes 54-55 and accompanying text.
199. See S.C. Res. 1031, 1 14, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1031 (Dec. 15, 1995).
200. Military Aspects of the Peace Settlement, Annex IA to the General Framework
Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina art. II, Dec. 14, 1995, 35 I.L.M. 91 (1996)
[hereinafter General Framework Agreement].
201. See S.C. Res. 1088, 18, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1088 (Dec. 12, 1996).
202. General Framework Agreement, supra note 200, Annex 1A, art. H1(3).
203. Id. Annex 11, arts. I, H.
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safety and order until the international civil presence can take responsi-
bility for this task.' '24 The international civil presence referred to here
later received the name the United Nations Interim Administration Mis-
sion in Kosovo (UNMIK). Among other things, UNMIK was responsible
under Resolution 1244 for "[m]aintaining civil law and order, including
establishing local police forces and meanwhile through the deployment
of international police personnel to serve in Kosovo[.]"205 While UNMIK
had more of a law-enforcement type role in Kosovo, all of the instances
of RCA use described in Part II above were by KFOR, not UNMIK.
While in practice they might have been expected to work together to
maintain civil law and order, the express language in their mandates
ought not to be ignored merely out of a fear of being legalistic. After all,
what would be the point of carefully crafting the mandates of U.N.
forces if the details could be disregarded ad libitum? Even if, arguendo,
KFOR had the international civil presence's powers to maintain civil law
and order when it used RCAs prior to the point when UNMIK could take
responsibility for these tasks, the question still remains whether this
power could be considered law enforcement. As already discussed, law
enforcement is exactly what its name denotes-the enforcement of law.
From a review of the material on KFOR, KFOR did not appear to be en-
forcing any law, but rather was using whatever force was necessary to
maintain order, however KFOR defined it.2°6 Indeed, as provided in Arti-
cle 1(2) of the Military Technical Agreement Between the International
Security Force ("KFOR") and the Governments of Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia and the Republic of Serbia, KFOR enjoyed "the authority to
take all necessary action to establish and maintain a secure environment
for all citizens of Kosovo and otherwise carry out its mission," without
any reference to law being required. 27 Therefore, even if KFOR went to
great lengths to call its troops police officers, these troops actually still
would function as peace enforcers, not law enforcers, which is com-
mendable except when trying to fit a certain KFOR activity under the
title of law enforcement. Had there been evidence of KFOR operating to
enforce law in the traditional sense of the word (with such characteristics
as understandability and non-retroactivity of that law),208 then this con-
clusion might have been different.
204. See S.C. Res. 1244, supra note 165, 9 (emphasis added).
205. See id. I 11 (i).
206. See supra note 194 and accompanying text (distinguishing between "law enforce-
ment" and "law and order").
207. Military Technical Agreement Between the International Security Force ("KFOR")
and the Governments of Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the Republic of Serbia art. 1(2),
U.N. Doc. S/1999/682 (July 9, 1999).
208. See, e.g., LoN L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW 38-39 (1969) (providing his
eight desiderata of bad law).
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In sum, this section asserts that only one of the fourteen U.N. forces
that have used RCAs was clearly authorized to act in a law-enforcement
capacity (namely, UNMISET in East Timor), while another might have
been able to act in such a capacity if it deemed it necessary (namely,
UNOCI in C6te d'Ivoire). The other twelve missions could not have
been acting in a law enforcement capacity when they used RCAs on
thirty-eight occasions, based on the formal sense of the phrase "law en-
forcement" and the types of activities their mandates authorized.
Critics will wonder why one has to look only at the formal sense of
the phrase "law enforcement" and only at the activities expressly pro-
vided for in the mandates. They will advocate a loose interpretation of
law enforcement that includes activities that may resemble those of tra-
ditional law enforcement although without the name. However, this
would inappropriately put the cart before the horse, so to speak, by al-
lowing whatever actions happen on the ground to trump the clear
language of the mandate. Such an approach to peace support operations
conceivably would lead to chaos.
Moreover, critics will raise the possibility that U.N. forces find
themselves in a law-enforcement-type situation when, for example, they
temporarily are required to guard prisoners (assuming the absence of
such powers in their mandate). These forces might then argue that cer-
tainly they should be allowed to use RCAs when a riot breaks out among
the prisoners. In response, this Article asserts that the line between law
enforcement and warfare by U.N. forces is too difficult to draw-and to
expect U.N. forces to draw-to allow U.N. forces the discretion to de-
cide in which situations they may use RCAs and in which situations they
may not. Given the alternative, non-toxic, less-lethal weaponry available,
which is described towards the end of the Article, there is no point run-
ning the risk that the discretion will be mistakenly used or abused.
Nonetheless, the following section explores one caveat: the possibil-
ity that U.N. forces may act in a law-enforcement capacity when acting
to enforce international law.
3. Enforcement of International Law
Abram Chayes and his co-authors propose that "law enforcement"
within the CWC context can include enforcing international law.2°
David Fidler challenges this assertion by arguing that "the system of in-
ternational law suffers deficiencies in the means available for
209. See Abram Chayes et al., Closing the "Law Enforcement" and "Military Pur-
poses" Loopholes (unpublished discussion paper, 2nd Workshop of the Pugwash Study Group
on the Implementation of the Chemical and Biological Weapons Convention, May 27-29,
1994, at 1).
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enforcement of its rules.,,2 ' However, this point cannot logically be ex-
tended to a conclusion that the system has no means for enforcement, as
he appears to do when he dismisses the possibility that "law enforce-
ment" in CWC Article II(9)(d) includes both domestic and international
law.211 On the contrary, Security Council enforcement actions under
Chapter VII and lawful countermeasures by states are just two methods
of enforcement that ought not to be overlooked.212 This debate has par-
ticular relevance to this Article, which has as its focus a type of Security
Council action-namely, the authorization of U.N. forces to commit cer-
tain acts.
The question becomes exactly which part of international law these
U.N. forces might be enforcing. U.N. forces usually act to give effect to
-- 213
their respective mandates, not to general international law. The Security
Council typically provides these unique mandates,214 although the Gen-
eral Assembly and even the parties to a dispute have been known to
establish U.N. forces with a mandate to take certain actions."5 Therefore,
210. Fidler, supra note 143, at 28, 32-33 (citing 1 OPPENHEIM'S INTERNATIONAL LAW,
supra note 185).
211. Id.
212. See generally UNITED NATIONS SANCTIONS AND INTERNATIONAL LAW (Vera
Gowlland-Debbas ed., 2001); N.D. White & A. Abass, Countermeasures and Sanctions, in
INTERNATIONAL LAW 505 (Malcolm David Evans ed., 2003).
213. See U.N. DEPT. OF PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS, Meeting New Challenges: Fre-
quently Asked Questions 3, 5-6, 11, 14, 20, 23 (2006). Some commentators assert that the first
time a U.N. force was authorized to enforce its mandate was in 1993 with UNOSOM nI. See
Sean D. Murphy, Nation-Building: A Look at Somalia, 3 TUL. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 19, 28
(1995) (citing U.N. Doc. S/PV.3188 (Mar. 26, 1993), at 7, 17-19, 26). However, according to
the cited U.N. source, Somalia appears to be the first instance in which U.N. forces were au-
thorized to rebuild a country and take other steps beyond merely keeping the peace, not that
the enforcement of a mandate had any larger a role to play than in the past. Indeed, U.N.
forces essentially have enforced their mandates from the very beginning by basing their pow-
ers on their specific mandates, whether those included keeping the peace between two
belligerents or rebuilding a country.
214. Recall that there are three types of U.N. military operations. See supra note 5. All
U.N.-authorized forces have operated under a mandate from the Security Council. U.N. Charter
art. 42. Of the sixty-three U.N.-controlled forces that have been authorized to date, sixty-one
have had their mandates established by a Security Council resolution. For a comprehensive list of
these resolutions, see Appendix 1 of this Article. Some of these mandates may have originated as
a proposal from the Secretary-General or some other entity, although the Security Council typi-
cally incorporates these proposals by reference or by establishing a unique mandate of its
own. But see infra note 215 (providing two exceptions).
215. See, e.g., G.A. Res. 1000, supra note 197, 1 (establishing UNEF I in Egypt);
Certain Expenses of the United Nations (Article 17, Paragraph 2, of the Charter), Advisory
Opinion, 1962 I.C.J. 151, 168 (July 20) (determining that the General Assembly had the legal
capacity to establish UNEF, the expenses of which were "expense[s] of the Organization");
Agreement Between the Republic of Indonesia and the Kingdom of the Netherlands Concern-
ing West New Guinea (West Irian), Indon.-Neth., Aug. 15, 1962, 437 U.N.T.S. 274, available
at http://www.indonesiaseoul.org/archives/papua/Agreement%20between%20RI%20and%20
Netherland.pdf (last visited Mar. 31, 2010).
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the question is not whether U.N. forces are acting to enforce general in-
ternational law, but rather whether the underlying agreements or
resolutions that they are enforcing can be considered law. The definition
and discussion of law enforcement provided above is important here.16
Under that particular definition, Security Council and General Assembly
resolutions generally would not constitute law per se since they do not
derive directly from a sovereign state but rather from organs of interna-
tional organizations . 7 This is so even though the organs derive their
powers from the acts of sovereign states-that is, in the states' creation
of the United Nations through ratification of the U.N. Charter and their
votes on particular resolutions. Moreover, under a legal positivist defini-
tion of law, it is irrelevant that the Security Council has some coercive
and binding powers under Chapter VII and Article 25 of the U.N. Char-
ter. As Martti Koskenniemi suggests, from a traditional lawyer's
perspective, the fact that the Security Council has the power to force
states to act a certain way does not make such actions and edicts law.
2'8
Indeed, the fact that Security Council decisions might carry the force of
law, as Leland Goodrich and his co-authors assert, 2'9 does not make these
resolutions law per se. Otherwise, Security Council decisions, by defini-
tion, never would be able to breach law, because those decisions are
law-a proposition that many international lawyers would deem unten-
able. °
Two possible exceptions might include situations in which, first,
states establish a U.N. force directly through a treaty and, second, a U.N.
force operating under a Security Council mandate has the task of enforc-
216. See supra notes 143-156 and accompanying text.
217. Please note, however, that other valid definitions of law, and even other valid defi-
nitions of legal positivism, could lead to a different conclusion on this point.
218. See Martti Koskenniemi, The Police in the Temple: Order, Justice and the UN, 6
EUR. J. INT'L L. 325, 327 (1995).
219. See LELAND M. GOODRICH ET AL., CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS 207-11 (3d
rev. ed. 1969).
220. See Gabriel H. Oosthuizen, Playing the Devil's Advocate: The United Nations Se-
curity Council Is Unbound by Law, 12 LEIDEN J. INT'L L. 549, 550 (1999). Please note that
this does not seem to be the majority view on the legal status of Security Council resolutions.
See, e.g., HILARY CHARLESWORTH & CHRISTINE CHINKIN, THE BOUNDARIES OF INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW: A FEMINIST ANALYSIS 172 (2000); Christopher C. Joyner, Strengthening
Enforcement of Humanitarian Law: Reflections on the International Criminal Tribunal for the
Former Yugoslavia, 6 DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 79, 88 (1995). Admittedly, the line between
law and the force of law is extremely fine, and it likely is irrelevant in most situations. How-
ever, since this Article is taking such a close, textualist look at the mandates of U.N. forces, it
is necessary to emphasize this most subtle of distinctions. Undoubtedly some critics will dis-
miss such legal formalism; yet it is through such formalism that law gains its wonderful
predictability, and therefore it must not be forgotten. A more detailed analysis of Security
Council resolutions as law is reserved for a future publication that is more directly oriented
towards legal theory.
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ing a treaty-perhaps a cease-fire agreement, a type of treaty often men-
tioned in the mandates of U.N. forces. Both of these situations come
much closer to falling within the legal positivist definition of law en-
forcement, on account of the fact that the norms created by the treaties
flow directly from the edicts and actions of states. The sole example in
which states created a U.N. force under the first exception-i.e., through
a treaty-is that of the United Nations Secretary Force in West New
Guinea (West liian). The force was created through an agreement be-
tween the Netherlands and Indonesia and designed to assist in the
transfer of this territory from the Netherlands to the United Nations
Temporary Executive Authority.221 This comes the closest to the en-
forcement of international law, in that the mandate for that U.N. force
222
was created directly by states. However, that U.N. force ostensibly did
not use RCAs during its operations and so is largely irrelevant to this
Article's thesis. The latter exception is potentially far more relevant here,
as the Security Council often gives U.N. forces express responsibilities
in supervising the implementation of cease-fire agreements established
by at least one state. The question arises whether any of the mandates for
the fourteen missions and forces mentioned in Part H above require them
to enforce a treaty, which goes beyond mere verification, observation,
investigation, monitoring, or advising.
a. No Focus on Treaties
After a thorough review of the mandates for the fourteen missions and
forces discussed in Part II, six of the fourteen-the United Nations Com-
mand in Korea, KFOR in Kosovo, MINUSTAH in Haiti, UNOSOM H in
Somalia, UNFICYP in Cyprus, and UNMISET in East Timor-mention
nothing about enforcing treaties, or even monitoring or verifying the
implementation of treaties.221 It is impossible to say that the troops of the
United Nations Command in Korea were enforcing a treaty when they
used RCAs in 1951, since no treaties existed until the parties signed the
Korean Armistice Agreement on July 27, 1953.224
221. Agreement Between the Republic of Indonesia and the Kingdom of the Netherlands
Concerning West New Guinea (West Irian), supra note 215, art. VII.
222. This is the case notwithstanding the resolution that the General Assembly adopted
after the fact to formally acknowledge the role that the Agreement gave the Secretary-General
in implementing it. See G.A. Res. 1752 (XVII), U.N. GAOR (Sept. 21, 1962). The closest
example of the enforcement of international law can be found in SFOR and its mandate in
Security Council Resolution 1031. See infra Part III.A.3.c.
223. See S.C. Res. 1542, supra note 176; S.C. Res. 1410, supra note 165 (UNMISET);
S.C. Res. 1244, supra note 165 (KFOR); S.C. Res. 814, supra note 181 (UNOSOM II); S.C.
Res. 186, supra note 192 (UNFICYP).
224. See Agreement Between the Commander-in-Chief, United Nations Command, on
the One Hand, and the Supreme Commander of the Korean People's Army and the Commander
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b. Authorization to Monitor the Implementation of Treaties
The mandates for the other eight U.N. forces authorize them to su-
pervise, observe, investigate, monitor, or advise concerning
implementation of a treaty, but not to enforce those treaties. The mandate
of UNEF I in the Gaza Strip authorized it to "secure and supervise the
cessation of hostilities in accordance with all the terms of General As-
sembly resolution 997 (ES-I) of 2 November 1956,'' 225 which terms
involved "[u]rg[ing] the parties to the armistice agreements promptly to
withdraw all forces behind the armistice lines. 226 Therefore, UNEF I was
to supervise compliance with the armistice agreement, not to enforce it.
UNMIL's mandate provides it with the responsibility of supporting the
implementation of the Liberian ceasefire agreement of June 17, 2003 .27
In particular, paragraph 3(a) of Resolution 1509 requires UNMIL "to
observe and monitor the implementation of the ceasefire agreement and
investigate violations of the ceasefire. 228 In addition, paragraph 3(h) re-
quires UNMIL to "liase with the [Joint Monitoring Committee] and to
advise on the implementation of its functions under the Comprehensive
Peace Agreement and the ceasefire agreement." 229 As already mentioned,
observation, monitoring, and advising are far different forms of supervi-
sion from enforcement.
UNMIH's mandate, Security Council Resolution 867, mentions two
treaties-the Governors Island Accord and the New York Pact-giving
rise to the question of whether UNMIH was to enforce them. The Presi-
dent of Haiti, Jean-Bertrand Aristide, and the Commander-in-Chief of
the Armed Forces of Haiti, Lieutenant-General Raoul C6dras, signed the
Governors Island Agreement on July 3, 1993, which was designed to
resolve the crisis in Haiti by starting a dialogue among its political pow-
ers.23" The goal was to establish a political truce, a plan for Parliament to
return to normal operations, an arrangement to confirm the new Prime
Minister, and an agreement to adopt instruments to help with the transi-
tion, including the creation of a new police force.2 1 ' The principal
political forces in Haiti and political blocs in Haiti's Parliament came
together for talks from July 14-16, 1993, which culminated in their sign-
of the Chinese People's Volunteers, on the Other Hand, Concerning a Military Armistice in
Korea, July 27, 1953, 4 U.S.T. 234. Furthermore, as there were no states that signed this
agreement, one cannot say that it flowed from the edicts and acts of a state.
225. G.A. Res. 1000, supra note 197, 1.
226. G.A. Res. 997, supra note 179, 2.
227. S.C. Res. 1509, supra note 177, 3.
228. Id. I 3(a).
229. Id. 3(h) (emphasis added).
230. See Governors Island Agreement, supra note 174, 5 (containing and summarizing
the Governors Island Agreement).
231. See id.
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ing of the New York Pact, which provided for a six-month political truce
along with, inter alia, all of the goals articulated in the Governors Island
Agreement.232 The mandate of UNMIH mentions these treaties. Para-
graph 1 of Resolution 867 makes the extension of UNMIH's mandate
dependant on a Security Council review of "whether or not substantive
progress had been made towards the implementation of the Governors
Island Agreement and the political accords contained in the New York
Pact.' 233 On its face, this provision could be seen as ambiguous because it
is unclear as to who is to implement these treaties-the parties or
UNMIH. However, when interpreting the provision in light of the entire
resolution and the treaties themselves, it would appear that the parties
are to implement them because nowhere is UNMIH expressly required
to implement them whereas the treaties do expressly require such im-
234plementation from the parties. Similarly, the mandate of UNAMIR in
Rwanda specified that UNAMIR's term could be extended beyond six
months "only upon a review by the Council ... as to whether or not sub-
stantive progress ha[d] been made towards the implementation of the
Arusha Peace Agreement. '235 Again, it is unclear whether the parties or
UNAMIR were to make progress in implementing the Arusha Agree-
ment. Again, when interpreting the provision in light of the entire
resolution and the treaties, it would appear that the parties to the Arusha
Peace Agreement were to implement it because nowhere is UNAMIR ex-
pressly required to do so, while the Agreement itself expressly requires
implementation by the parties.236 In addition, Resolution 872 requires
UNAMIR to "monitor observance of the cease-fire agreement, which
232. See The Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary-General on the Situation of
Democracy and Human Rights in Haiti, 3 & Annex, delivered to the Security Council and
the General Assembly, U.N. Doc. S/26297, A/47/1000 (Aug. 13, 1993) [hereinafter New York
Pact] (containing and summarizing the New York Pact).
233. S.C. Res. 867, supra note 172, 1.
234. See Governors Island Agreement, supra note 174, 5-6 (parties pledging to each
other to cooperate in implementing the Agreement, and granting the United Nations merely
the role of verifying that the parties had complied with both the letter and spirit of the agree-
ment, not of enforcing such compliance); New York Pact, supra note 232, Annex (laying out
what the parties to the Pact promised to undertake, without creating obligations on the United
Nations beyond providing experts to give technical and juridical advice on the drafting of
legislation to create the Conciliation Commission and in its implementation, and not actually
implementing the legislation).
235. S.C. Res. 872, supra note 178, 2.
236. See Peace Agreement Between the Government of the Republic of Rwanda and the
Rwandese Patriotic Front, Aug. 4, 1993, art. 5, Permanent Representative of the United Re-
public of Tanzania, Letter Dated 23 December 1993 from the Permanent Representative of the
United Republic of Tanzania to the United Nations Addressed to the Secretary-General, An-
nex I, delivered to the Security Council and General Assembly, U.N. Doc. S/26915 (Dec. 23,
1993); see also S.C. Res. 872, supra note 178, 11 ("Urg[ing] the parties to implement the
Arusha Peace Agreement in good faith....") (second emphasis added).
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calls for the establishment of cantonment and assembly zones and the
demarcation of the new demilitarized zone and other demilitarization
procedures," as well as to "investigate at the request of the parties or on
its own initiative instances of alleged non-compliance with the provi-
sions of the Arusha Peace Agreement relating to the integration of the
armed forces, and pursue any such instances with the parties responsible
and report thereon as appropriate to the Secretary-General. 237 Regardless
of what these agreements provide, what is clear is that UNMIH's and
UNAMIR's mandates are limited to monitoring and investigating matters
relating to these treaties, not enforcement of these treaties.
UNAMSIL's mandate is somewhat different from other mandates
that require U.N. forces to assist in the implementation of a peace
agreement. Paragraph 8(a) of Resolution 1270 requires UNAMSIL to
"cooperate with the Government of Sierra Leone and the other parties to
the Peace Agreement in the implementation of the Agreement." 238 Given
that the following subparagraph starts with "assist,, 239 it is difficult to
argue that "cooperate" and "assist" are synonymous-after all, why else
would the Security Council use different terms for the same concept in
such close proximity? Nonetheless, what is clear is that the requirement
to "cooperate" falls far short of a requirement to enforce that agreement
against the will of the parties; rather, "cooperate" would seem to have
the opposite meaning. The only other treaty that the mandate mentions is
the ceasefire agreement of May 18, 1999, adherence to which
UNAMSIL was required to monitor.24° Yet again, monitoring is different
from enforcement.
One of the major tasks assigned to MONUC, operating in the
Democratic Republic of the Congo, is to "monitor the implementation of
the [1999 Lusaka] Ceasefire Agreement and investigate violations of the
ceasefire. '' 2 ' However, monitoring implementation and investigation of
violations is different from actually enforcing the agreement. Indeed,
paragraph 1 of Resolution 1279 "[c]alls upon all parties to ... imple-
ment fully the provisions of the Ceasefire Agreement, 242 and does not
expressly require MONUC to enforce the agreement. Resolution 1279
mentions no other treaties, and no later resolutions require MONUC to
enforce a treaty.
Resolution 1528 authorizes UNOCI in C6te d'Ivoire to "observe and
monitor the implementation of the comprehensive ceasefire agreement of
237. S.C. Res. 872, supra note 178, 3(b), 3(e).
238. S.C. Res. 1270, supra note 182, 8(a) (emphasis added).
239. Id. T 8(b).
240. Id. I 8(e).
241. See S.C. Res. 1279, supra note 196, 7(a).
242. See id. 11.
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3 May 2003, and investigate violations of the ceasefire," all of which
falls short of a requirement to enforce the treaty.24 3 Another provision of
Resolution 1528 "[sltresses the importance of the complete and uncon-
ditional implementation of the measures provided for under the Linas-
Marcoussis Agreement," although the resolution makes clear that the
implementation obligation applies to the parties when it
"demands that the parties fulfil their obligations under the Linas-
Marcoussis Agreement."2 Therefore, it is clear that UNOCI does not
have the role of enforcing this agreement or any other treaties.
c. Authorization to Enforce a Treaty
Only one of the fourteen U.N. forces has a mandate that provides an
unequivocal authorization to enforce a treaty. IFOR, the legal predeces-
sor of SFOR, had a clear mandate in Security Council Resolution 1031
to "take all necessary measures to effect the implementation of and to
ensure compliance with Annex 1-A of the [General Framework Agree-
ment for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina.]" 245 This example comes
closest to international law enforcement since the General Framework
Agreement flowed directly from the edicts of a state and the U.N. forces
are obliged through their mandate to enforce those edicts.
Despite the examples above, the question remains whether these
U.N. forces act to enforce the U.N. Charter itself. After all, U.N. Charter
Article 2(3) requires states to settle their disputes through peaceful
means and Article 2(4) prohibits states from threatening or using force
against each other outside of self-defense and lawful collective-security
measures; 246 surely adherence to these provisions is what U.N. forces are
trying to accomplish, if nothing else. Nevertheless, the mandates for the
fourteen U.N. forces discussed above are silent concerning general
obligations under the U.N. Charter. While the U.N. Charter acts as the
foundation for these forces and all other U.N. activities, it cannot be said
to play a direct role in shaping the activities of these U.N. forces beyond
giving the Security Council and General Assembly the ability to establish
the mandate for such forces to handle threats and potential threats to inter-
national peace and security. 2 4 7 After all, U.N. forces act in accordance with
243. S.C. Res. 1528, supra note 180, 1 6(a).
244. Id. 10 (emphasis in original).
245. S.C. Res. 1031, supra note 199, 15 (emphasis added).
246. See U.N. Charter arts. 2(3), 2(4).
247. See id. art. 24(1) (providing the Security Council with "primary responsibility for
the maintenance of international peace and security"); id. art. 11 (giving the General Assem-
bly a role in maintaining international peace and security); Certain Expenses of the United
Nations (Article 17, Paragraph 2, of the Charter), Advisory Opinion, 1962 I.C.J. 151, 163
(July 20) (asserting that the Security Council has primary responsibility over maintaining
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their mandates, 28 and the U.N. Charter is never mentioned as a source of
power or limitation for them.
Moreover, the question remains whether treaties actually are law.
Certainly the majority opinion would say yes; after all, the classic
sources doctrine, which is based on Article 38 of the ICJ Statute, lists
international conventions as a principal source of international law. "9
The present Article is not a theoretical piece that focuses on authorita-
tively challenging that opinion; fortunately numerous international law
scholars already have done so. Gerald Fitzmaurice first argued in 1958,
and others have explored since then, that treaties can be interpreted as
sources of obligations, as opposed to sources of law.25° While parties to a
particular treaty are bound by that agreement based on international con-
tract principles and general international law, such principles actually are
pseudo-law inasmuch as they are not generally applicable.25' This point
gets into the subtleties between trait,-contrat and traite-loi, a distinction
that might be somewhat obscure for those less familiar with the French
approach to treaty law, although a valid distinction nonetheless. Ulti-
mately, at least according to Fitzmaurice's line of reasoning, treaties
constitute a source of law only when their rules and obligations are
deemed to be reflective of custom.2 2 Assuming this line of reasoning is
correct, which this Article accepts on account of the persuasive analysis
these eminent international law scholars provide, then none of the peace
international peace and security while the General Assembly has secondary responsibility
after the Security Council).
248. See supra note 213 and accompanying text.
249. See Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 38(l)(a), June 26, 1945, 59 Stat.
1055, 1060, 3 Bevans 1179, 1187 (entered into force Oct. 24, 1945).
250. See Gerald Fitzmaurice, Some Problems Regarding the Formal Sources of Interna-
tional Law, in SYMBOLAE VERZIJL 153 (F.M. van Asbeck et al. eds., 1958); see also DAVID
KENNEDY, INTERNATIONAL LEGAL STRUCTURES 33-36 (1987) (discussing that legal natural-
ists "reinterpreted treaty law to be binding as an expression of community judgement about
the justice of the norms included," rather than binding as law per se); Tadeusz Gruchalla-
Wesierski, A Framework for Understanding "Soft Law", 30 MCGILL L.J. 37, 37, 39-46
(1984) (explaining that treaties contain legal and non-legal soft law, or rather obligations that
the parties retain a large measure of discretion over, which may be distinct from normal law);
Maurice Mendelson, Are Treaties Merely a Source of Obligation?, in PERESTRO1KA AND IN-
TERNATIONAL LAW 81 (W.E. Butler ed., 1990); JAN KLABBERS, THE CONCEPT OF TREATY IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW 1-2 (1996).
251. See, e.g., PAUL REUTER, INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF TREATIES 26-27 (Josd
Mico & Peter Haggenmacher trans., Kegan Paul Int'l Ltd., 2d ed. 1995) (1972); see also
MALCOLM N. SHAW, INTERNATIONAL LAW 74 (4th ed. 1997) (1977) (alluding to the same
distinction); Fitzmaurice, supra note 250, at 153 (alluding to the distinction); Alex
Glashausser, What We Must Never Forget When It Is a Treaty We Are Expounding, 73 U. CIN.
L. REV. 1243, 1267-68 (2005) (internal footnotes omitted) (also alluding to the same distinc-
tion).
252. See Fitzmaurice, supra note 250, at 153. Therefore, these scholars would seem to
suggest either that the majority does not operate under the correct definition of "law" or that
its view of treaties is insufficiently nuanced.
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treaties and ceasefire agreements mentioned in U.N. force mandates are
law because they are specific to particular disputes and not generally
applicable. Regardless, if any of the mandates of U.N. forces authorize
the enforcement of international law, SFOR's does; the rest of the thir-
teen mandates fall short.
For the reasons stated in this section, this Article joins the others
who have asserted that RCAs can be used lawfully only for domestic (or
internal) law-enforcement purposes253-that is, in enforcing laws passed
by a state's own competent authority and within that state's own jurisdic-
tion. This assertion is not as narrow as it might first seem with respect to
states. For example, use of tear gas by military police in enforcing mili-
tary law within proper jurisdiction, such as a base, post, or embassy
grounds, 25 is considered as internal use even though technically not
within state territory, and thus fits squarely within this definition of law
enforcement.2 " Nevertheless, with regard to U.N. forces, it does mean
that they might lawfully use RCAs only in certain operations when act-
ing specifically as a domestic police force (and when authorized to act as
such), and possibly within areas of their direct and complete control,
such as at the U.N. Headquarters in New York.
4. Minding the Gap
The difference between "method of warfare" and "law enforcement"
seems relatively well established in the CWC, with the first reflecting
military force and the second reflecting domestic police force, a distinc-
tion in activities which began in the mid-nineteenth century with the Age
of Specialization. The question, however, arises whether there is a gap
between these notions. If there is a gap--such as use in non-warfare and
non-law-enforcement settings-then it is not enough to provide that
RCAs cannot be used as a method of warfare but that they can be used
for law enforcement.257 Ample support exists for such a gap. Indeed,
there are many functions of military forces that are neither "warfare" nor
253. See, e.g., Eric P.J. Myjer, The Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weap-
ons: Moving Closer Towards an International Arms Control Organization? A Quantum Leap
in the Institutional Law of Arms Control, in ISSUES OF ARMS CONTROL LAW AND THE CHEMI-
CAL WEAPONS CONVENTION 76-77 (Eric P.J. Myjer ed., 2001); Fidler, supra note 143, at
30-32.
254. U.S. Policy for Flame, Riot Control Agents & Herbicides, U.S. Army Field Manual
3-11, ch. 1, available at http://www.enlisted.info/field-manuals/fm-3-1 1-flame-riot-control-
agents-and-herbicide-operations.shtml (last visited Mar. 31, 2010) [hereinafter U.S. RCA
Policy].
255. See DANDO, supra note 109, at 76.
256. See CHARLES TILLY, COERCION CAPITAL AND EUROPEAN STATES, A.D. 990-1990,
at 29 (1990).
257. See HENCKAERTS & DOSWALD-BECK, PRACTICE, supra note 34, at 1743.
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"law enforcement"-after all, there is a whole category of operations
known as MOOTW, or military operations other than war, which in-
cludes for example disaster relief and counter-narcotics operations. This
gap is further reflected between the language of the Convention and the
interpretations of various governments. For example, in defining "me-
thod of warfare," then U.S. President Bill Clinton provided the U.S.
Senate with his interpretation of "method of warfare," which included
methods used in international and internal armed conflict. Peacetime uses
that included "law enforcement operations" and a host of other activities-
"humanitarian and disaster relief operations, counter-terrorist and hostage
rescue operations, and noncombatant rescue operations"--did not fit
within his definition of "method of warfare." '258 It is within this supposed
gap of non-law-enforcement, non-warfare "other" activities where RCA
use by U.N. forces might exist under this first set of prohibitions. This is
where the second prohibition set comes into play, on account of its clearer
language, which is discussed in the following section.
B. Second Prohibition Set: Riot-Control Agents
as Temporary Incapacitator
There is another set of prohibitions that is free from this tricky "me-
thod of warfare" qualifier 9 This second set begins with Article I(1)(b)
of the CWC, which bans the development, production, acquisition,
stockpiling, retention, transfer, use, and military preparation for use of
chemical weapons, and the assistance, encouragement, and inducement
for others to do any of these activities.260 Article 1(1 )(a) defines a chemi-
cal weapon as a toxic chemical, which is defined in Article 11(2) as
"[any chemical which through its chemical action on life processes can
cause death, temporary incapacitation or permanent harm to humans or
animals."26' The only provision that modifies this prohibition is the ex-
ception for law enforcement under Article II(9)(d), which does not
mention a "method of warfare. 262 As a Russian proverb states, "One who
sits between two chairs may easily fall down. 263 Under this second set of
CWC provisions, there simply is no second chair for RCAs to fall be-
tween, unlike the first prohibition set of provisions that contains the
258. Supra note 156 and accompanying text.
259. See David P. Fidler, The International Legal Implications of "Non-Lethal" Weap-
ons, 21 MICH. J. INT'L L. 51, 72-73, 75 (1999) (identifying this qualifier as a major source of
confusion over RCAs under the CWC).
260. See CWC, supra note 3, art. I(1)(b).
261. See id. arts. 11(1)(a) & 11(2) (emphasis added).
262. See id. art. II(9)(d).
263. M. DUBROVIN, A BOOK OF ENGLISH AND RUSSIAN PROVERBS AND SAYINGS (1993).
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unclear phrase "method of warfare" along with the unclear phrase "law
enforcement."
Critics might point to the legal canon lex specialis derogat legi gen-
erali (specific law prevails over general law) to argue that the ambiguous
"method of warfare" set of provisions ought to govern RCAs, since the
earlier set of provisions mentions them by name, while the second set
mentions only the admittedly more general "chemicals [causing] death,
temporary incapacitation or permanent harm." However, this Article posits
that these are synonyms to a certain extent in that RCAs cause death, tem-
porary incapacitation, or permanent harm. Therefore, both sets of
provisions are potentially relevant in a given situation at the same time.
Some experts appear to agree with this position. For example, Chayes and
his co-authors point out that the first set was intended to be a redundancy
for the second set.264 The second set makes clear that RCAs must not be
used except for law enforcement purposes. That RCAs at least incapaci-
tate temporarily seems intuitive, even though they do not immobilize as
some incapacitating agents such as opioides do.265 Indeed, RCAs cause
temporary blindness in addition to extreme irritation and pain to exposed
skin, nasal and oral areas, and airways. 26' The United States claims that the
CWC does not address RCAs due to their "transient," rather than
"incapacitating," effect.267 However, the qualifier "temporary"--as in "tem-
porary incapacitation" in the CWC's definition of "toxic chemical"-has
264. See Chayes et al., supra note 209, at 3 (viewing the first set of provisions as "reit-
erat[ing] a rule already implicit in the Convention's text" at Article II(1)(a), which rule
implicates the second set of prohibitions); see also Barbara Hatch Rosenberg, Riot Control
Agents and the Chemical Weapons Convention, Paper for the Open Forum on Challenges to
the Chemical Weapons Ban, May 1, 2003, at 36-37 (May 1, 2003), available at http://
www.sussex.ac.uk/Units/spru/hsp/documents/OpenForumCWC.pdf (last visited Mar. 31,
2010). As previously noted, what this Article refers to as the first set of prohibitions was actu-
ally negotiated and drafted later than the second set, as Article I(5) was not added until the
final draft, when the non-aligned states insisted on this redundancy before they would agree to
it.
265. See YIN SUN & KwOK Y. ONG, DETECTION TECHNOLOGIES FOR CHEMICAL WAR-
FARE AGENTS AND Toxic VAPORS 26-27 (2005) (distinguishing between incapacitating agents
and RCAs). But see CHARLES S. BROCATO & KATHRYN E. KING, CHEMICAL/BIOLOGICAL
WARFARE: How You CAN SURVIVE 58 (2002) (not distinguishing); SEYMOUR M. HERSH,
CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL WARFARE: AMERICA'S HIDDEN ARSENAL 182-83 (1968) (same).
266. See generally Sidell, supra note 10; Robert J. Kaminski et al., Assessing the Inca-
pacitative and Deterrent Effects of Oleoresin Capsicum During Resistive Encounters with the
Police, Paper Presented at the National Defense Industrial Association's Non-Lethal
Defense Conference IV, Mar. 20-22, 2000 (quantitatively showing how pepper spray tempo-
rarily incapacitates targets). One commentator suggests that the category of "incapacitating
agents" was designed to cover anesthetics, although even this commentator acknowledges that
the CWC's broad language here easily can include RCAs. See T6th, supra note 7, at 174-75.
267. HENCKAERTS & DOSWALD-BECK, PRACTICE, supra note 34, at 1745 (quoting US
FIELD MANUAL § 38(d) (1956)) (describing RCAs as having "merely transient effects that
disappear within minutes after exposure to the agent has terminated"); see also Schmitt, supra
note 132, at 286 n.94.
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existed since the earliest rolling texts of the draft Convention268 and cap-
tures the essence of the term "transient. 269 It is difficult to see how short-
term blindness and restricted breathing are not incapacitation, even if
that incapacitation lasts only for a few minutes. The Australian Defence
Force Manual and the Canadian LOAC Manual both consider RCAs as
"tear gas and other gases which have debilitating but non-permanent
effects."70 Even U.S. Army field manuals describe RCAs as "produc[ing]
temporary irritating or disabling physiological effects when in contact
with the eyes or when inhaled. 27' In 1998, the Deputy Assistant Judge
Advocate General to the U.S. Department of the Navy concluded, when
reviewing the legality of pepper spray, that pepper spray is "designed
specifically to temporarily incapacitate" and has "physiological effects
[that], while relatively painful, are temporary.'272 All of this suggests that
it might not be appropriate to distinguish RCAs from incapacitating
agents.
In sum, RCAs squarely fit under Article II(2)'s definition of toxic
chemicals, in addition to fitting squarely under Article I(5)'s prohibition
of RCAs as a method of warfare. Under either the first set of prohibi-
tions or the second, RCAs are unlawful, except under certain conditions
related to law enforcement. Therefore, under this second set of prohibi-
tions, the gap between "method of warfare" and "law enforcement"
ceases to provide a gray area in which RCAs might be acceptably used.
To be clear, by asserting that U.N. forces should not use RCAs except in
a law-enforcement capacity, this Article is not requiring of the United
Nations and U.N. forces more than what the CWC requires of its mem-
ber states, even though member states may not agree with this particular
interpretation of the CWC. Inasmuch as U.N. forces typically do not en-
gage in law enforcement stricto sensu, there is no reason for U.N. forces
to carry RCAs at all, let alone use them. The next section looks specifi-
268. See Robinson, Solving, supra note 14, at 3 (citing 1987/88 Ek6us Rolling Text,
CD/795, Feb. 2, 1988). As incapacitating weapons were legal before the CWC, the debate
used to surround the divide between incapacitating and lethal chemical weapons. See ROBIN
CLARKE, WE ALL FALL DOWN: THE PROSPECT OF BIOLOGICAL AND CHEMICAL WARFARE 49
(1968). The continuing debate suggests that the divide merely shifted, although it is entirely
unclear how proponents of RCA get around the express qualifier "temporary."
269. See AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (4th ed. 2006),
available at http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/transient (last visited Mar. 31, 2010) (de-
fining the adjective "transient" as "remaining in place only a brief time" and "transitory").
270. HENCKAERTS & DOSWALD-BECK, PRACTICE, supra note 34, at 1744 (quoting Aus-
tralia, Defence Force Manual § 413 (1994); Canada, LOAC Manual § 27 (1999) (quoting
same but replacing "which" with "that")).
271. See HERSH, supra note 265, at 60 (emphasis added).
272. HENCKAERTS & DOSWALD-BECK, PRACTICE, supra note 34, at 1758 (quoting U.S.
Dep't of the Navy, Legal Review of Oleoresin Capsicum (OC) Pepper Spray, May 19, 1998,
§§ 4-5, 6(c)).
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cally at whether these legal norms under the CWC apply to U.N. forces
per se.
C. Application of RCA Norms to U.N. Forces
The preceding sections of this Part focused on the international legal
norms that currently exist concerning RCAs under the CWC. The ques-
tion arises whether U.N. forces are bound by these particular legal norms
through international law, rather than through the domestic laws of the
host or troop-contributing states. ICJ Statute Article 38(1) states that in-
ternational law can be established through international conventions,
international custom, and general principles of law, among other sources
of law,2 73 and so these are the primary types of law that this section ana-
lyzes when looking for relevant norms concerning RCA use by U.N.
274forces .
1. Treaties and U.N. Forces
Beginning with international conventions, the CWC consistently re-
fers to binding state parties,2 7 5 not entities that are not state parties such
as the United Nations. Nowhere in the CWC are non-state actors (other
than the OPCW) given legal obligations. In 2004, the U.N. Security
Council adopted a resolution under Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter-
Resolution 1540-that requires states to adopt laws to ensure that the
provisions of the CWC (especially Articles I, VI, and VII) cover the ac-
tivities of non-state actors operating within the states' territory so that
there are no safe havens for CWC violators.276 However, Resolution 1540
does not impose legal obligations on non-state actors themselves. As the
ICJ determined in its Reparations advisory opinion, the United Nations
"certainly is not" a state, but has a "large measure of international per-
sonality" vis-A-vis the complete international legal personality of
states. 277 The ICJ has since maintained that distinction between the
273. See Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 38(1), June 26, 1945, 59 Stat.
1055, 1060, 3 Bevans 1179, 1187.
274. Although this Article focuses on the legal obligations of the United Nations con-
ceming the activities of U.N. forces, it is important to reiterate that troop-contributing states
likely will have undertaken legal obligations through their ratification of the CWC. See supra
note 8 and accompanying text.
275. See, e.g., CWC, supra note 3, art. I (starting all five paragraphs with "Each State
Party[,]" then laying out the general obligations of the CWC under each respective provision).
276. See S.C. Res. 1540, 1-3, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1540 (Apr. 28, 2004); Lisa Tabassi &
Robert Silvers, Enforcement of the Chemical Weapons Convention: Actual Investigations and
Prosecutions of Offences, CHEM. DISARMAMENT Q., Dec. 2004, at 19.
277. Reparations for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations, Advisory
Opinion, 1949 I.C.J. 174, 179 (Apr. 11).
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United Nations and states, 278and its opinion is persuasive in determining
whether the CWC directly applies to the United Nations and U.N. forces.
In an effort to apply these provisions indirectly to the United Na-
tions, some might argue that the United Nations is bound by the same
treaty obligations as are all of its member states, since the United Na-
tions (or any other international organization) is an alter ego for its
member states.279 Alternatively, each member state of the CWC has an
obligation under Article VII(1)(a) of the CWC to "[p]rohibit natural and
legal persons anywhere on its territory or in any other place under its
jurisdiction as recognized by international law from undertaking any
activity prohibited to a State Party under this Convention, including en-
acting penal legislation with respect to such activity."2 ° If states have an
obligation to stop subordinate entities from engaging in prohibited ac-
tivities under the CWC, then perhaps states have a parallel obligation to
stop transnational entities from engaging in such activities. Inasmuch as
states contribute troops to U.N. forces and retain a measure of control
over them, it is not difficult to envision an international court or tribunal
analogizing to an alter-ego or subordinate-superior relationship and con-
cluding that member states' obligations can flow upstream to the United
Nations and U.N. forces. Nonetheless, the far more traditional view is
that the law applicable to the United Nations includes only international
law and the domestic law of the host state, subject to the provisions of
any relevant Status of Forces Agreements (SOFAs), not the domestic law
or legal obligations of the troop-contributing country.
Regardless of whether either of these analogies is made, two major
problems still remain. First, the CWC has 188 signatories (three of
which are not U.N. members, i.e., the Cook Islands, the Holy See, and
Niue), which leaves seven U.N. members that are not party to the CWC.
Further, even if all 192 members of the United Nations were party to the
CWC, these analogies still would not be valid since they ignore the in-
ternational legal personality of the United Nations, which is distinct
from that of its members.28' Indeed, if international organizations are to
have legal personality in the international system, then these arguments
cannot work with regard to creating obligations for international organi-
zations. Nevertheless, it is not beyond the realm of possibility that an
international court or tribunal could rely on either argument and ignore
278. See, e.g., Difference Relating to Immunity from Legal Process of a Special Rappor-
teur of Commission on Human Rights, Advisory Opinion, 1999 I.C.J. 62, 94 (Apr. 29)
(Weeramantry J., separate opinion).
279. See, e.g., Jan Klabbers, The Paradox of International Institutional Law, 5 INT'L
ORG. L. REv. 151, 166, 169 (2008).
280. CWC, supra note 3, art.VII(1)(a).
281. See supra note 275 and accompanying text.
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the existence of international legal personalities to find that the United
Nations and U.N. forces have treaty obligations under the CWC.
2. Customary International Law and U.N. Forces
There remains the possibility of relying on customary international
law to create obligations that bind the United Nations and U.N. forces 2
Briefly stated, customary international law is a source of international
law that is established by general and consistent state practice (or usus)
accompanied with an acknowledgement of that practice being legally
obligatory (or opino jurs). Concerning the state practice element, the
practice need not be universally consistent, although significant inconsis-
tencies generally will frustrate the formation of custom.
2M
Jean-Marie Henckaerts and Louise Doswald-Beck assert that the
prohibition on RCAs as a method of warfare constitutes customary in-
ternational law confirmed by state practice.28 Assuming, arguendo, that
state practice sufficiently supports this assertion, this still might not be
enough to establish a customary international law norm that is applicable
to the United Nations and U.N. forces: the question remains whether the
customary norm prohibiting RCA use as a method of warfare covers
peacekeeping and other complex activities in which U.N. forces typi-
cally engage. The majority of states, led by the United Kingdom, have
tried to interpret the RCA prohibition as broadly as possible to cover all
use in a non-law-enforcement setting, while the United States has ada-
mantly interpreted the prohibition narrowly so that RCAs can continue to
.. 287
be used in activities such as U.N. peacekeeping operations. U.S.
282. See, e.g., Boris Kondoch, The United Nations Administration of East Timor, 6 J.
CONFLICT SECURITY L. 245, 261 (2001); August Reinisch, Developing Human Rights and
Humanitarian Law Accountability of the Security Council for the Imposition of Economic
Sanctions, 95 AM. J. INT'L L. 851, 855 (2001).
283. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) ON FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 102(2) (1987).
284. See, e.g., Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v.
U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, 98 (June 27); Fisheries (U.K. v. Nor.) (July 25), 1951 I.C.J. 116, 131
(Dec. 18); MICHAEL AKEHURST, A MODERN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL LAW 28 (6th
ed. 1987).
285. See HENCKAERTS & DOSWALD-BECK, RULES, supra note 30, at 264. Please note
that Henckaerts and Doswald-Beck cite practices (military manuals and/or legislation) of only
twelve states, see id. at 264, which might be insufficient to demonstrate usus, and they say
nothing about opinio juris in this context.
286. See HENCKAERTS & DOSWALD-BECK, RULES, supra note 30, at 264; Harper, supra
note 110, at 136-37.
287. See supra note 156 and accompanying text; see also Exec. Order No. 11,850, 3
C.F.R. 980 (1971-1975) (establishing U.S. policy towards RCA use in settings outside of
domestic law enforcement); S. Exec. Res. 75, 105th Cong., 1st Sess., 143 Cong. Rec.
S3378,5817 (April 17, 1997), § 2(26) (Senate insisting that the policies of Executive Order
No. 11850 not be modified as a result of CWC ratification, and otherwise requiring, inter alia,
that RCAs be allowed for operations where the United States is not a party to the conflict and
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officials have recognized that the U.S. position represents the minority
view,288 although this has not stopped the disagreement over the applica-
bility of the CWC to RCA use. Regardless, this disagreement likely is
sufficient to stop this nascent customary norm from covering the types of
activities in which U.N. forces typically engage, and therefore likely will
not cover the activities of U.N. forces themselves. Other commentators
assert that the Geneva Gas Protocol has attained the status of customary
international law;289 however, even assuming this is true, it has little im-
pact on the analysis here because the norms under the Geneva Gas
Protocol relating to RCAs are too vague to be determinative in this
analysis. At a minimum, many key states, including the United States,
have made clear that they do not consider RCAs to be prohibited under
the Geneva Gas Protocol, which would undermine the assertion that the
Geneva Gas Protocol reflects customary international law.290 Because
these provisions do not create customary international law norms in rela-
tion to RCAs, there is no need for this Part to discuss whether this
customary international law would apply to international organizations
such as the United Nations and the forces it controls or authorizes.
3. General Principles of Law and U.N. Forces
General principles of law might also create obligations on the United
Nations in the RCA-use context. For example, the doctrine of interna-
tional estoppel could create an obligation for the United Nations if the
United Nations voluntarily made an unambiguous statement that it con-
sidered the CWC, or the provisions regarding RCAs, as binding upon it
and another entity detrimentally relied on this statement in good faith.292
Former Secretary-General Annan's call for the total elimination of
chemical weapons, which opened this Article, arguably is not suffi-
in operations under U.N. Chapter VI or VII). But see KOPLOW, supra note 7, at 38 (noting that
the U.S. position towards liberal RCA use now has "[o]nly small operational consequences"
because "the United States has emplaced severe internal restraints against even approaching
any uses of riot control agents in the most contentious hypothetical cases[,]" but not specify-
ing what those internal restraints might be).
288. See Robinson, Solving, supra note 14, at 3.
289. See, e.g., William V. O'Brien, Biological/Chemical Warfare and the International
Law of War, 51 GEO. L.J. 1, 32-36 (1962).
290. See Jozef Goldblat, The Environmental Modification Convention of 1977: An Anal-
ysis, in ENVIRONMENTAL WARFARE: A TECHNICAL, LEGAL AND POLICY APPRAISAL 53, 62-63
(Arthur H. Westing ed., 1984) (discussing that some states entered reservations to the Geneva
Gas Protocol to enable themselves to use irritants in times of war); John Norton Moore, Rati-
fication of the Geneva Protocol on Gas and Bacteriological Warfare: A Legal and Political
Analysis, 58 VA. L. REV. 419, 477-78 (1972) (focusing on the U.S. perspective).
291. See, e.g. AMERASINGHE, supra note 6, at 19-20.
292. See IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 646 (5th ed.
1998).
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ciently unambiguous to establish an obligation for the United Nations
under international estoppel, since it did not even hint that the United
Nations itself had any sort of obligation to refrain from using such
weapons. This is so despite the fact that the International Court of Justice
adopted a relatively low standard for the application of the estoppel doc-
trine under the Nuclear Tests cases. 93 By requiring an unambiguous
unilateral statement from the United Nations, some form of consent by
the United Nations still is required in order to hold it legally responsible.
This is true even assuming that general principles of law can apply to
international organizations (which might not be a valid assumption if
these are general principles of domestic law). The United Nations would
have had no such domestic law to contribute to the development of that
general principle, and therefore it might be difficult to say that the
United Nations implicitly consented to the application of that general
principle of law to itself. Nevertheless, former Secretary-General An-
nan's call for the total elimination of chemical weapons arguably is
sufficient to create a strong moral obligation on the United Nations to
refrain from using RCAs in its operations, given their questionable legal-
ity under the CWC.
As a result of the apparent lack of binding legal obligations on the
United Nations to stop its forces from using RCAs, one is left to make
normative arguments as to why U.N. forces have a moral obligation to
refrain from using RCAs in their operations, and why the United Nations
and interested states should take steps to see that this norm is followed.
The following two Parts focus on these two aspects.
IV. REASONS FOR PROHIBITING RIOT-CONTROL AGENTS
Assuming, arguendo, that the United Nations cannot be held respon-
sible for violations of the CWC by U.N. forces per se, the United
Nations prohibiting its forces from using RCAs still makes sense from a
moral and strategic perspective due to the dangers inherent in RCA use.
Indeed, the United Nations has a profound interest in protecting all of its
forces,29 4 if only to encourage greater troop contributions in the future.
293. See Nuclear Tests (Austl. v. Fr.), 1974 I.C.J. 253, 266-67 (Dec. 20) ("It is well
recognized that declarations made by way of unilateral acts, concerning legal or factual situa-
tions, may have the effect of creating legal obligations."). No other U.N. statements were
found that even come close to being sufficiently unambiguous to create an obligation under
this doctrine.
294. See Difference Relating to Immunity from Legal Process of Special Rapporteur
of Commission on Human Rights, Advisory Opinion, 1999 I.C.J. 88, 92 (Apr. 29) (stating
that "protection of its personnel, when engaged about their duties, is of prime importance to
the proper functioning of the United Nations system"); Robert C.R. Siekman, The Legal
Spring 2010]
Michigan Journal of International Law
One must not forget that all weapons have their advantages and disad-
vantages.9 Although there are benefits to RCA use by U.N. forces, such
benefits come at an overly high price-truly a Faustian bargain.296 Whe-
reas the previous Part looked at the legal basis for using RCAs, this Part
shifts to a more practical analysis of the advantages and disadvantages
that force commanders ought to consider when making operational deci-
sions to carry and use RCAs. Because the disadvantages outweigh the
advantages, the United Nations and interested states should take steps to
shape the legal norms in such a way so as to prohibit U.N. forces from
carrying and using RCAs.
A. Benefits to U.N. Forces from Riot-Control Agents
Admittedly, less-lethal weapons such as RCAs hold benefits for
military and peace operations alike. The fundamental benefit that propo-
nents rely on when promoting RCA use is that these weapons are more
humanitarian vis-it-vis traditional weapons because they are less lethal.297
The ability of RCAs to temporarily incapacitate insurgents potentially
decreases the danger of fratricide and noncombatant injuries, and lessens
the danger to soldiers who have to deal with insurgents. 98 In Vietnam,
some commanders and politicians saw the "deployment of available
chemical weapons (tear gas) for offensive operations during the early
stages of the operation" as indispensable, especially in urban conflicts,
because of their low lethality.299 More recently, U.S. Army Major General
David Grange expressed pride for having ordered his SFOR troops in
Bosnia & Herzegovina to use tear gas on the occasion reported at the
Responsibility of Military Personnel, in DEMOCRATIC ACCOUNTABILITY AND THE USE OF
FORCE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 108, 116 (Charlotte Ku & Harold K. Jacobson eds., 2003)
(recognizing that, although the 1994 Safety Convention does not expressly apply to U.N.-
authorized forces, it still "may be considered to apply also to UN-authorized (even if not UN-
led operations").
295. See Robin M. Coupland, "Calmatives" and "Incapacitants": Questions for Inter-
national Humanitarian Law Brought by New Means and Methods of Warfare with New
Effects, Paper at the Open Forum on the Chemical Weapons Convention: Challenges to the
Chemical Weapons Ban, The Hague, May 1, 2003, at 24, available at http://
www.sussex.ac.ukfUnits/spru/hsp/documents/OpenForumCWC.pdf (last visited Mar. 31,
2010).
296. See generally Mark Wheelis, "Non-Lethal" Chemical Weapons: A Faustian Bar-
gain, ISSUES IN SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY, Spring 2003, at 74.
297. See id. at 76.
298. See Harper, supra note 110, at 159 (mentioning the immediate benefit of avoiding
unnecessary noncombatant casualties from using RCAs in warfare as a trade off with easier
escalation); Cook et al., supra note 15, at 37; Schmitt, supra note 132, at 286.
299. See Dave Eberhart, The U.S. 's Tear Gas Quandary in Iraq, NEWSMAX.COM, Apr. 4,
2003, http://www.newsmax.com/archives/articles/2003/4/3/214326.shtml (last visited Mar.
31, 2010) (quoting 1st Lt. Scott Nelson, the commanding officer of Charley Company, 1st
Battalion, 5th Marines); see also HERSH, supra note 265, at 39, 172-74.
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beginning of Part II.A above, and wished there had not been so many
bureaucratic barriers hindering its greater use, because he believed it
saved lives then.3°° While there is no question that RCA use has the
potential to save lives, one must also assess and acknowledge the costs-
the topic of the following section. At the least, one would hope that
U.N.-force commanders would show some sensitivity to the controversy
surrounding RCAs and not dismiss constraints as mere bureaucratic an-
noyances.
Another potential, although unpersuasive, benefit for allowing U.N.
forces to use RCAs is to enable them to threaten retaliation in kind. In-
deed, RCAs can easily be made or acquired by non-state actors, which
has led to their increased use. For example, in 1999 alone, the Center for
Nonproliferation Studies reports twenty-seven instances of tear gas by
non-state actors.3 ' Some evidence suggests that tear gas continues to be
used by non-state actors, for example, when hungry Haitian protesters
used tear gas in their assault on the presidential palace in 2008.3o2 Such
reasoning not only threatens the United Nations' moral high ground, but
also potentially violates the spirit of Article I of the CWC, which prohib-
its chemical weapons "under any circumstances," indicating that
retaliation in kind is not acceptable.
B. Dangers to U.N. Forces from Riot-Control Agents
The perceived benefits from RCAs are outweighed by several
dangers, each of which increases the chances of injury to U.N. forces.
U.N.-authorized forces are in a particularly precarious position vis- -vis
regular U.N.-controlled peacekeeping forces due to their lack of blue
helmets and their accompanying protection"' (whatever the value of that
protection might be in reality). While RCAs clearly can help U.N. forces
protect civilians and contain low-level disturbances-a fact that certainly
should not be ignored-this section focuses on the protection of U.N.
forces because it assumes that this approach will have a greater impact
300. See Paul Elias, U.S. Tear Gas Use in Iraq May Violate Weapons Treaties, A.P.,
Mar. 2, 2003, available at http://chronicle.augusta.com/stories/030303/ira_124-3007.shtml
(last visited Mar. 31, 2010). See generally supra notes 57-58.
301. See Oppenheimer, supra note 117.
302. See Jonathan M. Katz, Haiti President Asks U.N. for Long-Term Help, A.P., Sept.
26, 2008, available at http://www.usatoday.com/news/world/2008-09-26-un-haitiN.htm (last
visited Mar. 31, 2010).
303. See, e.g., Convention on the Safety of United Nations and Associated Personnel
arts. 9, 14, 15, U.N. Doc. A/RES/49/59 (Feb. 17, 1995) (establishing the crime of attacking
U.N. peacekeepers, and requiring the prosecution or extradition of perpetrators); The Secre-
tary-General, UN Model Status-of-Forces-Agreement for Peacekeeping Operations, Report
of the Secretary General, Annex 45, U.N. Doc. A/45/594 (Oct. 9, 1990) [hereinafter Model
SOFA].
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on the decisions of the United Nations and troop-countributing countries
inasmuch as their interests are shown to be directly affected by RCA use.
1. Complex U.N. Peace Support Operations
Part III.A.2 above focused on the question of whether the U.N.
forces that have used RCAs in their operations could have been doing so
as a part of law enforcement. Apart from UNMISET in East Timor,3°
none of the other missions or forces were expressly authorized to act in a
law-enforcement capacity. Even if U.N. forces can engage in law-
enforcement activities as a regular part of their mandated responsibili-
ties, the United Nations might not want to rely on this exception because
it simply is too difficult to apply to extremely complex peace support
operations in a way that provides confidence that RCAs are being used
lawfully. In the abstract, some U.N. forces are mandated to act as a buf-
fer between combatants without themselves getting involved in the
hostilities-so-called first-generation peacekeeping operations. 3°5 In real-
ity, though, actual mandates and necessities on the ground have
transformed these U.N. operations into far more complex endeavors."
This is to say nothing about multifunctional second- and third-generation
operations that have far broader mandates to, inter alia, use force beyond
mere self-defense and have both military and civilian elements to
them.3 7 If one recognizes some activities of a U.N. force as falling under
"law enforcement" and some not, these activities can be so intertwined
as to hinder effective distinction. For example, Frits Kalshoven foresees
a situation in which tear gas would be used on one street comer in riot-
control mode, and on another comer of the same intersection as a
method of warfare in capturing members of an armed group., nThe
304. See generally supra notes 167-170.
305. See Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Elaboration of an International Con-
vention Dealing with the Safety and Security of United Nations and Associated Personnel,
28, U.N. Doc. A/49/22(SUPP) (Aug. 23, 1994) (describing the ideal U.N. peacekeeping
operation as simply standing between belligerent forces); Ralph Wilde, Taxonomies of Inter-
national Peacekeeping: An Alternative Narrative, 9 ILSA J. INT'L & COMp. L. 391 (2002)
(discussing the different classifications of U.N. peace support operations).
306. See, e.g., Sally Morphet, U.N. Peacekeeping and Election-Monitoring, in UNITED
NATIONS, DIVIDED WORLD: THE UN's ROLES IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 183, 235
(Adam Roberts & Benedict Kingsbury eds., 1993) (arguing that first-generation peacekeeping
operations actually are "complex and varied").
307. See, e.g., THOMAS G. WEISS ET AL., THE UNITED NATIONS AND CHANGING WORLD
POLITICS 21-137 (3d ed. 2001); Michael W. Doyle, War Making and Peace Making: The
United Nations' Post-Cold War Record, in TURBULENT PEACE: THE CHALLENGES OF MAN-
AGING INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT 529, 532-33 (Chester A. Crocker et al. eds., 2001);
Micaela Frulli, A Turning Point in International Efforts to Apprehend War Criminals, 4 J.
INT'L CRIM. JUST. 351,359-60 (2006).
308. See KALSHOVEN & ZEGVELD, supra note 132, at 174; see also Jan Medema, The
CWC and Non-Lethal Weapons (unpublished discussion paper, 7th Workshop of the Pugwash
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United Nations obviously would not want to classify any of its activities
as warfare, even though they might be virtually indistinguishable from
war-like activities of states. These different U.N. force activities easily
blur together for U.N. forces on the ground, just as the mandates of po-
lice and military forces tend to blur when military personnel use less-
lethal weapons.3 9 In a recent week-long meeting to develop doctrine for
international police peacekeeping, the U.N. Department of Peacekeeping
Operations itself acknowledged that two of the four strategic challenges
it faces in the peacekeeping context are the complexity of the tasks on
the ground and a lack of knowledge and doctrine.31° At this point in time,
it is impractical to expect U.N. forces to ponder the subtle nuances of
when they can and cannot use RCAs-a difficult determination even
when made with the best intentions.
Admittedly U.N. forces operate under rules of engagement, in which
their protocols for RCA use are spelled out (protocols which likely will
depend upon the level of the threat faced). While the model, mission-
specific, and revised U.N. rules all are kept confidential, one gets the
sense from reading the work of authors with access to these rules that
they are quite simple, and there are few, if any, reassurances that they
capture legal subtleties. Nor is it prudent to try to simplify into a carry-
along card the complex legal principles relating to RCAs as contained in
the CWC and as applied in extremely complex operations. Therefore, for
the sake of preserving the integrity of the CWC regime, it would be ideal
to prohibit U.N. forces from carrying and using RCAs.
2. "Non-Lethal" as a Misnomer
The label "non-lethal" for these chemical weapons is a misnomer.'
As Robin Coupland of the ICRC asserts, "No weapon when used and as a
function of its design carries a zero risk of mortality among its victims.
312
In particular, so-called non-lethal chemical incapacitants generally have a
lethality rate of ten to twenty percent, which is comparable to that of mili-
tary firearms (approximately thirty-five percent), artillery (approximately
Study Group on the Implementation of the Chemical and Biological Weapons Convention,
June 6-8, 1997, at 4).
309. See Robin Coupland & Dominique Loye, Legal and Health Issues: International
Humanitarian Law and the Lethality or Non-Lethality of Weapons, in NON-LETHAL WEAP-
ONS: TECHNOLOGICAL AND OPERATIONAL PROSPECTS 63 (Malcolm Dando ed., 2000).
310. See Annica Hansen, U.N. Dept. of Peacekeeping Operations, Address: Developing
Doctrine for International Police Peacekeeping-Engaging Peacekeeping Training Centres,
15th IAPTC Annual Conference, Sydney, Austl., Nov. 23-28, 2009, at 4, available at
http://www.fivepages.com.au/members/iaptc2009/public-html/images/l 5th%20IAPTC%20A
nnual%20Conference%20Prograin.pdf (last visited Mar. 31, 2010).
311. See supra note 10.
312. Coupland, supra note 295, at 24.
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twenty percent), grenades (approximately ten percent), and civilian
handguns (approximately ten percent)." 3 Most surprisingly, the lethal
gases of the First World War had a lethality rate of approximately seven
percent.3 A somewhat recent example of the lethality of so-called non-
lethal weapons is the Moscow theater hostage rescue of October 2002,
where the calmative gases that Russian security forces used had over a
fifteen percent lethality rate on the hostages alone."5 Although RCAs
have a lethality rate of approximately 0.5 percent,3 6 this rate is not insig-
nificant, especially when used on a large crowd, as in the forty instances
of use by U.N. forces described above in Part II. For example, if RCAs
are used on a crowd of a thousand people, approximately five people will
die. Chances of lethality increase when RCAs are used in large doses, in
confined spaces, and on weaker individuals such as the elderly, pregnant
women, and children.317 Even in healthy adults, RCAs can cause bron-
chospams, chemical pneumonitis, pulmonary edema (fluid in the lungs),
heart failure, hepatocellular damage, gastroenteritis with perforation (if
ingested), and serious dermatitis with erythema and blisters when a large
dose is delivered in an area with high temperature and humidity-all of
which can be fatal.3 8 Multiple exposures to RCAs can cause the forma-
tion of tumors, pulmonary disease, and reproductive problems. '9
Furthermore, these agents often are used incorrectly, thus exacerbating
their dangerous effects. 20
Not only are RCAs lethal, they occasionally are used in combination
with more-lethal weapons as a force multiplier, where the agent is used
to drive targets out from cover, making the targets vulnerable to attack
313. See Wheelis, supra note 296, at 75-76.
314. See J.P. PERRY ROBINSON, THE PROBLEM OF CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL WAR-
FARE I: THE RISE OF CB WEAPONS 129 (1971).
315. See Judith Miller & William J. Broad, U.S. Suspects Opiate in Gas in Russia Raid,
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 29, 2002, at Al. There are rumors that U.S. Special Forces also have issued
such non-lethal calmative gases, although the U.S. Department of Defense has denied these
allegations vehemently. See Robinson, Solving, supra note 14, at 6-7.
316. See Wheelis, supra note 296, at 77.
317. See, e.g., BROCATO & KING, supra note 265, at 161 (1968); Fry, supra note 8, at
507.
318. The Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary-General, Chemical and Bacterio-
logical (Biological) Weapons and the Effects of Their Possible Use, 148-53, delivered to
the Security Council, the General Assembly, the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament
and the Governments of Member States, U.N. Doc. S/9292/Rev. 1, A/7575/Rev. 1 (June 30,
1969); DANDO, supra note 109, at 75-76; Hu et al., supra note 43, at 660-61; Chemical Agent
Effects, Jane's Chem-Bio Web, Jan. 1, 1999, § 5.3, http://jcbm.janes.com.
319. See Hu et al., supra note 43, at 661-62.
320. See id.
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from more-lethal weaponry.3 2' Those who might question whether this
approach still exists today need only look to the use of tear gas in clear-
ing Afghan caves or the use of white phosphorus in the November 2004
Falluja offensive in Iraq to flush insurgents out from their hiding places
so they could be more vulnerable to U.S. firepower. 22U.N. forces also
reportedly have used RCAs in combination with tanks and machine
guns, such as in the July 2005 operation against supposed gangs in
Haitil, perhaps to increase the efficacy of those other weapons. In addi-
tion to such offensive use, U.N. forces often accompany RCA use with
gunfire into the air.324 Even this can be problematic because the people
on the ground do not necessarily know that shots are not being aimed at
them, unless they are watching the firing troops (which will not always
be the case).325 Therefore, use of RCAs might signal to the targets that
lethal force is imminent, thus sparking an immediate, disproportionate
reaction.
Furthermore, RCAs (although lethal) still are less-lethal than the al-
ternatives and may cause agitated targets not to be as deterred as they
would be by alternative weaponry, thus potentially putting U.N. forces in
greater danger of attack. Thus, RCAs can put U.N. forces in a vulnerable
position from multiple perspectives.
3. Escalation of Hostilities
Any intervention by U.N. forces in a riot runs the risk of escalating
hostilities within a host state. Reliance on RCAs by U.N. forces, how-
ever, poses a special risk of panic and inadvertent or deliberate
escalation, not unlike the risks associated with all chemical agents.326 For
example, Iranian troops fled in panic when Iraq used tear gas on the bat-
tlefield in July 1982.32 During the Korean War, North Korean pamphlets
321. Harper, supra note 110, at 149-51; Wheelis, supra note 296, at 75-76; Joseph D.
Tessier, Note, Shake & Bake: Dual-Use Chemicals, Contexts, and the Illegality of American
White Phosphorus Attacks in Iraq, 6 PIERCE L. REV. 323 (2007).
322. See, e.g., MIR BAHMANYAR, AFGHANISTAN CAVE COMPLEXES 1979-2004: MOUN-
TAIN STRONGHOLDS OF THE MUJAHIDEEN, TALIBAN & AL QAEDA 31-32 (2004) (discussing
U.S. cave-clearing techniques in Afghanistan); Al Kamen, Chemical Reactions, WASH. POST,
Nov. 18, 2005 (discussing U.S. use of white phosphorus in Iraq). For more information on the
legality of using white phosphorus, see generally Tessier, supra note 321.
323. See supra note 71 and accompanying text.
324. See, e.g., Clarence Roy-Macaulay, U.N. Checking Allegations that Peacekeepers
Killed Two Civilians During Riot, A.P., Aug. 23, 2002 (reporting that U.N. forces fired shots
into the air while employing tear gas).
325. It is irrelevant whether the bullets are encased in rubber or not. Please also note that
experts predict that less-lethal weapons will continue to be used in conjunction with conven-
tional weapons in future armed conflicts. See, e.g., Coupland & Loye, supra note 309, at 63.
326. See Adelman, supra note 28, at 444.
327. BURCK & FLOWERREE, supra note 43, at 115. Surprisingly, given its effectiveness,
this was the only report of RCA use during the Iran-Iraq War.
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decried as an atrocity U.S. use of RCAs against a POW uprising.32 The
use of tear gas by U.N. forces in Haiti on January 13, 2005, which led to
street protests when it was falsely believed that a woman died on account
of tear gas, is an example of how a situation can escalate when RCAs are
used. 29 These examples indicate how RCA use can raise tensions, when
subjects either do not know the less-lethal nature of the gases or believe
that the use was inappropriate for the situation. UNAMIR's use of RCAs
on peaceful protestors in Rwanda in 1994 (which U.N. officials later
recognized as a mistake)33° may have added to the tensions between the
warring parties and the United Nations.3 ' UNFICYP troops in Cyprus
and UNMIL troops in Liberia should feel fortunate that no such escala-
tion was reported after they deliberately used tear gas against protesting
schoolchildren in 1993 and 2004, respectively.332 Such panic and anger
may provoke extreme retaliation by the other side, who may see gas va-
pors and users in protective gear and assume the worst.333 Even if
targeted forces know that the deployed gases are less-lethal RCAs, ten-
sions may still escalate if these forces consider RCAs as prohibited
chemical weapons (as a reasonable reading of the CWC might indicate),
or if the use seemed cruel (as with deliberate use on primary-school
children or pregnant women).
Tear gas and other RCAs appear to be a type of "gateway" chemical
weapon, much like how gateway-drug theory sees use of tobacco, alco-
hol, and marijuana as leading to harder drugs.334At least two authors
assert that Germany developed and deployed its devastating chemical
weapons during the First World War only after France initiated chemical
attacks with tear gas.333 One author asserts that use of lethal chemical
weapons in Manchuria, Ethiopia, and Yemen all started with tear gas use,
and goes on to claim that "[e]very confirmed resort to lethal chemical
warfare has started with tear gas. 336 After prohibiting tear gas in all
armed conflicts, the Netherlands Military Manual states that such use
"runs the danger of provoking the use of other more dangerous chemi-
328. CRODDY, supra note 43, at 117.
329. Bracken, supra note 73.
330. See supra note 92 and accompanying text.
331. Again, this is not to say that this use of RCAs in Rwanda somehow contributed to
the genocide or that there would not be ample justification for using RCAs in the face of an
impending genocide.
332. Supra notes 87, 105 and accompanying text.
333. See KALSHOVEN & ZEGVELD, supra note 132, at 42-43.
334. See generally Denise B. Kandel et al., Stages of Progression in Drug Involvement
from Adolescence to Adulthood: Further Evidence for the Gateway Theory, 53 J. STUD. ON
ALCOHOL 447 (1992).
335. See CRODDY, supra note 43, at 118; HABER, supra note 20, at 24.
336. "Non-Lethal" Weapons, the CWC and the BWC, 61 CBW CONVENTIONS BULL. 2
(Sept. 2003) [hereinafter "Non-Lethal" Weapons].
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cals.' 337 Even proponents of RCA use in warfare recognize the dangers of
chemical escalation when RCAs are used. For example, one U.S. official
acknowledged in 1980 that U.S. use of RCAs could convince other states
that they are entitled to respond with more-lethal chemical weapons of
their own.338 Moreover, a U.S. Army Field Manual warns commanders
that targeted forces may misunderstand RCA use as a chemical weapons
attack, and requires that they "consider international ramifications and
Rules of Engagement before recommending the use of herbicides or
RCAs. 33 9 Support for the notion that RCAs lead to chemical escalation
can be found in state practice. The Viet Cong responded to U.S. reliance
on tear gas by acquiring its own chemical agents.i Insurgents during
the Spanish Civil War threatened to use their own form of "gas" after
the Spanish government deployed tear-gas shells against insurgents'1 41
positions. Some commentators have speculated that Saddam Hussein
would have relied on U.S. use of RCAs, had it used them, as a pretext
to unleash his far-more-lethal chemical weapons during the First Gulf
War.142 Although mere speculation, KFOR's use of tear gas in 1999
may have convinced Serb forces that it was acceptable for them to
(reportedly) use a different less-lethal weapon, BZ, against the Kosovo
Liberation Army in 1999.
4 3
Even if RCA use does not immediately lead to escalation, it might
do so indirectly over time as a state becomes dependant on RCAs and
increases its reliance on them. For example, even though then U.S. Sec-
retary of State Rusk stated in March 1965 that the United States would
only use tear gas for riot control in Vietnam, use became virtually unlim-
ited just five months later when the tactical advantages to RCAs became
readily apparent after a U.S. Marine successfully drove four hundred
civilians and enemy combatants from a cave using CS grenades without
civilian injuries.44 Regardless of whether the escalation is direct or
337. See HENCKAERTS & DOSWALD-BECK, PRACTICE, supra note 34, at 1744-45 (quot-
ing Netherlands, Military Manual § 14 (1993)).
338. See HENCKAERTS & DOSWALD-BECK, PRACTICE, supra note 34, at 1756-57 (citing
U.S. Dept. of State, Memorandum of Law by a Legal Adviser on the "Reported Use of
Chemical Agents in Afghanistan, Laos, and Kampuchea," Apr. 9, 1980).
339. See U.S. RCA Policy, supra note 254, MCRP 3-3.7.2.
340. See CLARKE, supra note 268, at 48.
341. See HENCKAERTS & DOSWALD-BECK, PRACTICE, supra note 34, at 1762 (citing
SIPRI, The Problem of Chemical and Biological Warfare, 1 RISE OF CB WEAPONS 147
(1971)).
342. See Eberhart, supra note 299.
343. See ROBERT HUTCHINSON, WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION: THE No-NONSENSE
GUIDE TO NUCLEAR, CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS TODAY 229 (2003).
344. See DANDO, supra note 109, at 76-77; HERSH, supra note 265, at 173-79; "Non-
Lethal" Weapons, supra note 336, at 2 (discussing the transformation of U.S. policy and use
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indirect, U.N. forces ought to take steps to avoid such escalation by re-
fraining from relying on chemical agents such as RCAs.
4. Hasty Use of Indiscriminate Weapons
RCAs used hastily and in an indiscriminate manner cause serious
problems. Military planners might be more eager to use more force ear-
lier and reserve questions for later if convinced that no permanent
damage can be done to their targets or to those carrying out the attacks.45
As already mentioned, this belief is unfounded and, combined with
overuse, could lead to disastrous consequences.
While RCAs and other less-lethal weapons might decrease casualties
in the short-term, they also might decrease combatants' efforts to dis-
criminate between combatants and noncombatants. 346 The international
humanitarian law (IHL) principle of discrimination requires that an at-
tacker be able to differentiate between combatants and military
objectives, on the one hand, and noncombatants and civilian objects, on
the other, with the attacker then targeting only the former.4 7 Even though
this principle is central to all of IHL, it is perhaps best reflected in Arti-
cle 48 of the First Additional Protocol to the Geneva Conventions:
In order to ensure respect for and protection of the civilian popu-
lation and civilian objects, the Parties to the conflict shall at all
times distinguish between the civilian population and combat-
ants and between civilian objects and military objectives and
accordingly shall direct their operations only against military ob-
jectives. 348
This principle essentially creates an obligation for combatants to exer-
cise reasonable care to ensure that they cause no unnecessary suffering
to civilians. The IHL prohibition of indiscriminate attacks applies to all
attacks, regardless of whether the weaponry is more- or less-lethal. The
indiscriminate nature of chemical weapons, rather than their lethality,
likely was the impetus for interwar efforts to ban their use. Indeed, only
two percent of casualties from chemical weapons died during the First
World War, compared with 25.8 percent of non-gas casualties, and only
4.1 percent of non-fatal gas casualties were discharged as disabled, com-
of tear gas in Vietnam); see also KOPLOW, supra note 7, at 162-63 (concluding his book with
strong advice that states avoid being "lulled into overuse of non-lethal weapons").
345. See generally Cook et al., supra note 15, at 39.
346. See DANDO, supra note 109, at 16.
347. See Michael N. Schmitt, The Principle of Discrimination in 21st Century Warfare,
2 YALE HUM. RTS. & DEv. L.J. 143, 148-49 (1999).
348. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to
the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts art. 48, June 8, 1977, 1125
U.N.T.S. 3.
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pared with the 25.4 percent wounded by non-gases. 9 These statistics cut
against the argument made by RCA proponents, who rely exclusively on
RCAs' low lethality in concluding that they are "humane." Low lethality
alone ought not determine how humane a weapon is. The prohibition of
indiscriminate attacks must be given its due consideration.
RCAs generally are considered to be indiscriminate area weapons.35
One need only remember the roughly thirty Haitian schoolchildren
treated for tear-gas inhalation and skin irritation to understand that RCAs
continue to be indiscriminate area weapons today."' RCAs typically are
so indiscriminate that not even those who deploy them are entirely safe
from their effects-for example, when the wind changes directions after
the gas is released. Allowing U.N. forces to use such indiscriminate
weapons as RCAs in their missions makes as much sense as allowing
swimmers to relieve themselves in a designated portion of a pool.352
Admittedly, it is possible for RCAs to be delivered in more targeted
ways than as aerosolized sprays, which could decrease their indiscrimi-
nacy. For example, the Deputy Assistant Judge Advocate General of the
U.S. Navy conducting the legal review of the pepper spray explained that
the "contemplated [Oleoresin Capsicum] dispersers utilize a target spe-
cific stream of ballistic droplets for controlled delivery and minimal
cross contamination (i.e., point target delivery), rather than an aerosol-
ized spray which increases the likelihood of unintended subject
impact." '353 However, as the use of "contemplated" in this quote indicates,
this type of dispersal mechanism might not be that common. Even if,
arguendo, U.N. troops had the capacity to deliver all RCAs in streams of
state-of-the-art "ballistic droplets," there still would remain the tendency
to use them too hastily before giving warnings or before clearly identify-
ing the target as a combatant, which is a distinct problem from the
perspective of the IHL principle of discrimination.
5. History of Abuse
Virtually all weapons and weapon systems can be tied to past acts of
oppression. However, tear gas and other RCAs have had a particularly
close connection with severe human rights violations and torture in the
349. See CLARKE, supra note 268, at 162.
350. See MICHAEL O'HANLON, TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE AND THE FUTURE OF WAR-
FARE 92 (2000); Hu et al., supra note 43.
351. Bracken, supra note 73.
352. See MAD MAG., June 2009, at 1 (attributing to Alfred E. Neuman a similar analogy
of having a smoking section in a restaurant).
353. See HENCKAERTS & DOSWALD-BECK, PRACTICE, supra note 34, at 1758 (quoting
U.S. Dept. of the Navy, Legal Review of Oleoresin Capsicum (OC) Pepper Spray, May 19,
1998, §§ 4-5, 6(c)).
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past,3 ' and do so again. As David Koplow points out, RCAs could pro-
vide torturers with the ideal tool, given the fact that they typically do not
leave detectable wounds when inflicting temporary yet intense harm.355
These less-lethal weapons can be used in dangerous, if not sinister, ways
that the designers did not imagine or intend.356 For example, tear gas gre-
nades were used against Japanese-American internees in Californian
internment camps around the time of the Second World War, which
raised serious human rights concerns.357 Over the years, some delegates to
the First Committee of the U.N. General Assembly have acknowledged
that RCAs occasionally have been used inhumanely to disperse protes-
tors. 58 More recently, there have been several reports that Guantanamo
Bay prisoners have been abused with pepper spray.359 In addition, Darfur
police used tear gas, in addition to brutal force, against refugees in a
U.N.-supervised camp, apparently as U.N. officials stood by and
watched.36 U.N. forces themselves have used tear gas on communities
regularly subjected to repression by local police authorities, as occurred
in Haiti in July 2005.361 This use might easily be confused with the abuse
that dissidents might have suffered at the hands of their local authorities,
especially if the U.N. forces took no action against the past abuse of
those local authorities.
Some critics will think it is impossible that U.N. forces would use
RCAs as a form of torture and that it is unbelievable that anyone would
ever fear such abuse from U.N. forces. However, if anything has been
learned from the past decade's allegations of sexual exploitation and
354. See Hu et al., supra note 43.
355. See KOPLOW, supra note 7, at 138.
356. See Fidler, supra note 259, at 98.
357. See Natsu Taylor Saito, Justice Held Hostage: U.S. Disregard for International
Law in the World War II Internment of Japanese Peruvians-A Case Study, 40 B.C. L. REv
275, 295-96 (1998).
358. See HENCKAERTS & DOSWALD-BECK, PRACTICE, supra note 34, at 1750-51 (quot-
ing, inter alia, Saudi Arabia, Statement Before the First Committee of the U.N. General
Assembly, §§ 108-10, U.N. Doc. A/C.I/PV.1717 (Dec. 10, 1969)).
359. See, e.g., Tom Allard, US Tortured Second Australian: Electric Shocks, Claims
Lawyer, SYDNEY MORNING HERALD, May 21, 2004, at 1; Rendition Is Just Another Word for
Torture, IRISH TIMES, Apr. 5, 2006, at 18. One newspaper report even claims that such abuse
has gotten worse since U.S. President Barack Obama entered office. See Jail's Sting in the
Tail, SYDNEY MX (Sydney, Austl.), Feb. 26, 2009, at 10 (reporting that guards in Guan-
tanamo Bay have applied pepper spray to prisoners' toilet paper).
360. See The Genocide Must be Stopped, ScoTsMAN (U.K.), Nov. 18, 2004, at 27.
361. See supra note 82 and accompanying text; see also Stevenson Jacobs, Police Open
Fire During Pro-Aristide Protest in Haiti, Killing at Least One, Witnesses Say, A.P., Mar. 24,
2005 (reporting that local police killed two during earlier peaceful protests in Cite Soleil,
although the police claimed that they only fired tear gas).
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abuse by U.N. forces,3 62 it is that not all U.N. forces are angels, as some
are inclined to believe. Further, what is most important in the context of
avoiding escalation is public perception: U.N. forces should avoid even
the appearance of impropriety, and so should foreswear use of RCAs and
all weapons of oppression in their operations.
6. Deadly Delivery
The delivery mechanisms for these agents can also cause serious in-
juries and death when used at close range or dispersed with an exploding
mechanism.3 63 A U.S. Marine Corp Reference Publication provides such
a warning with regard to RCA projectiles launched from rifle-equipped
grenade launchers, which purportedly can penetrate wood.36 These RCA
projectiles, as well as RCA grenades, mortar and artillery shells, and
even cluster bombs,365 create potentially lethal shrapnel. In fact, this fact
was central to Germany's argument that its use of poison gas delivered
by exploding projectiles in battles after the Battle of Ypres was not tech-
nically a violation of the 1899 Hague Gas Declaration: its projectiles did
not have the "sole object" of diffusing poison gas.366 Using non-lethal
RCAs in a manner that has such lethal effects can dramatically escalate a
conflict. Whether such ordnance as artillery shells and cluster bombs can
be used in riot-control is an entirely separate matter, which relates more
to the dangers from escalation.
7. Destabilizing an Important Disarmament Regime
Finally, any violation or perceived violation undermines the chemi-
cal weapons disarmament regime and destabilizes the international
community. Indeed, it is believed that the use of tear gas and defoliants
during the Vietnam War severely weakened the Geneva Gas Protocol.67
Israeli use of tear gas has often inflamed its neighbors to the point of
destabilizing the entire region, especially when tear gas proved fatal
362. See generally Elizabeth F. Defeis, U.N. Peacekeepers and Sexual Abuse and Exploi-
tation: An End to Impunity, 7 WASH. U. GLOBAL STUD. L. REv. 185 (2008) (providing a
thorough analysis of these alleged crimes).
363. See, e.g., Hu et al., supra note 43.
364. U.S. Marine Corps, Marine Corps Res. Publ'n 3-3.7.2, FLAME, RIOT CONTROL
AGENT, AND Herbicide Operations, FM 3- 1/MCRP 3-3.7.2 Appendix B (Aug. 19, 1996), at
4, available at http://www.fas.org/irp/doddir/army/fm3-11-11-excerpt.pdf (last visited Mar.
31, 2010).
365. See Rosenberg, supra note 264, at 36 (discussing how the Bazalt Works in Russia
is weaponizing RCAs in this manner).
366. See George Bunn, Banning Poison Gas and Germ Warfare: Should the United
States Agree?, 1969 Wis. L. REv. 375, 376 (1969).
367. See DANDO, supra note 109, at 81 n.26.
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when used in a confined space in high concentrations. 68 The stability of
the CWC regime would likely suffer if U.N. forces continue to use
RCAs on a large scale, partly because of the CWC's express prohibition
and partly because U.N. forces are meant to be exemplary forces. Im-
proper use of RCAs at least undermines the CWC disarmament regime,
and at most threatens its entire undoing.369 Moreover, U.N. forces, in par-
ticular U.N.-controlled peacekeeping operations, have always had as
their primary task the disarmament of parties to a conflict.37° If U.N.
forces are to be successful in disarming parties to a conflict, they may
not be seen as using prohibited weapons themselves.37' Otherwise, the
United Nations and its forces may lose legitimacy in the eyes of the bel-
ligerents.
Given these seven concerns, it might be best for the United Nations
to take steps to prohibit RCAs in all situations. Doing so would help en-
sure against chemical escalation during or as a result of U.N. operations.
With these points in mind, the following Part looks at how best to limit
RCA possession and use during U.N. operations.
V. HOW TO PROHIBIT RIOT-CONTROL AGENTS
U.N. forces can best be protected from the dangers mentioned in the
preceding Part by an express prohibition by the Security Council on their
use and possession of RCAs. This Part discusses six ways in which the
United Nations and interested states can help ensure that U.N. forces
forsake RCAs in future operations, in addition to the simple act of pro-
hibiting them in U.N. rules of engagement.
A. Prohibition by the Security Council
The first and easiest way to prohibit U.N. forces from possessing or
using RCAs is for the Security Council simply to prohibit such posses-
368. See BURCK & FLOWERREE, supra note 43, at 197-200.
369. See DANDO, supra note 109, at 188.
370. In 1964, Bowett noted that disarmament was one of the main functions of peace-
keeping. See D.W. BOWETT, UNITED NATIONS FORCES: A LEGAL STUDY 268-74 (1964).
Nearly three decades later, Schachter saw disarmament as a main peacekeeping activity. See
Oscar Schachter, Authorized Uses of Force by the United Nations and Regional Organiza-
tions, in LAW AND FORCE IN THE NEW INTERNATIONAL ORDER 65, 80 (Lori Fisler Damrosch
& David J. Scheffer eds., 1991). Moreover, then U.S. Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-
Ghali similarly emphasized the role in disarmament that U.N. peacekeeping operations play.
See The Secretary-General, Report of Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali Pursuant to
the Statement Adopted by the Summit Meeting of the Security Council on 31 January 1992, at
32, delivered to the Security Council and the General Assembly, U.N. Doc. S/24 111,
A/47/277 (June 17, 1992).
371. See DANDO, supra note 109, at 189-90.
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sion and use when crafting the mandates for these forces. This essen-
tially is the only way for the United Nations to prohibit their use by
U.N.-authorized forces because the initial authorization is the main way
the United Nations currently exercises control over these forces (al-
though the development of other control mechanisms over these forces
would be ideal).372 U.N.-controlled operations also rely on a Security
Council mandate, which also is the main way the Security Council exer-
cises control over these forces,373 so their RCA use could be curtailed if
their authorizations took this into account as well.
B. U.N. Accession to the CWC
The United Nations could formally accede to the CWC. As Part
IH.C.1 above emphasizes, only a state can be a party to the CWC. How-
ever, if the CWC allowed U.N. accession, there would be nothing to stop
it from joining the CWC, particularly given its international legal
personality. 74 To do so would require amendment of the accession clause
of Article XX to include international organizations, which in turn would
require an Amendment Conference called by a third of the membership,
in which a majority voted in favor of the amendment and none opposed
it, followed by ratifications or acceptances by all of those states that
voted in favor.375 A simplified process is available only for technical
changes to the CWC annexes, which requires only a proposal, recom-
mendation by the Executive Council, and no objection by a state party
within ninety days.376 These amendments certainly are easier said than
done. Although a few technical changes to the CWC successfully have
been made, the type of substantive amendment that this section mentions
would likely take years of intense political wrangling and would require
endorsement from member-states' legislatures. Still, if there is enough
political will for such an amendment, it remains a possibility.
Unfortunately, the CWC lacks a provision similar to Article 96 of the
First Additional Protocol of the Geneva Conventions, which allows a
372. See, e.g., James W. Houck, The Command and Control of United Nations Forces in
the Era of "Peace Enforcement", 4 DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 1, 51-53 (1993).
373. See id. at 22-23 (1993) (also noting how the Secretary General controls the daily
aspects of peacekeeping missions). Traditional U.N.-controlled forces also can be limited by
the consent of the parties involved in the conflict through Status-of-Forces Agreements, as
discussed infra Part V.C.
374. See, e.g., FINN SEYERSTED, UNITED NATIONS FORCES IN THE LAW OF PEACE AND
WAR 344 (1966) ("There can be no doubt that the United Nations has the inherent capacity to
become a party to the conventions on warfare if their terms permit it to accede."); Joseph P.
Bialke, United Nations Peace Operations: Applicable Norms and the Application of the Law
of Armed Conflict, 50 A.F. L. REV. 1, 48 (2001).
375. CWC, supra note 3, art. XV(2).
376. Id. art. XV(4)-XV(5).
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non-state party to a conflict to accede sua sponte to the obligations of the
Geneva Conventions and which then obliges the other parties to the con-
flict to follow the obligations contained in the Geneva Conventions.377
Several commentators assert that the United Nations should not join the
Geneva Conventions even if it could because doing so would make bel-
ligerents view U.N. forces differently, perhaps as combatants, thus
putting them in danger of being targeted.3" However, such dangers do
not exist when joining the CWC, as state belligerents are absolutely pro-
hibited from using and possessing chemical weapons, including certain
uses of RCAs, under the CWC.
Assuming, arguendo, that it were possible for the United Nations to
accede to the CWC, doing so would oblige the United Nations to include
within its initial authorizations some mechanism for ensuring that its
authorized forces do not rely on RCAs unlawfully-whether through
express prohibition of such use, reference to the CWC, or reference to a
yet-to-be created Secretary-General Bulletin addressing this topic. Still,
U.N. accession to the CWC would have limited impact on U.N.-
authorized forces, since the United Nations has no direct control over the
rules of engagement or the daily functioning of these forces outside of its
initial authorization and subsequent amendments to that authorization.
C. Prohibition in SOFAs
The United Nations could include an RCA prohibition in Status of
Forces Agreements. Such an approach has been used with regard to
binding U.N. forces to abide by the Geneva Conventions.379 The 1999
U.N. Secretary-General's Bulletin on the observance by U.N. forces of
international humanitarian law included in section 3 a requirement that
the United Nations, through its SOFAs with host states, "ensure that the
[U.N.] force shall conduct its operation with full respect for the princi-
ples and rules of the general conventions applicable to the conduct of
military personnel.'38 While the SOFAs referred to in this bulletin typi-
cally act as a type of privileges and immunities agreement between the
377. See Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relat-
ing to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts art. 96(2), June 8, 1977,
1125 U.N.T.S. 3.
378. See Bialke, supra note 374, at 49; Umesh Palwankar, Applicability of International
Humanitarian Law to United Nations Peace-Keeping Forces, 294 INT'L REV. RED CROSS 227,
232 (1993).
379. See DOCUMENTS ON THE LAWS OF WAR, supra note 5, at 723.
380. Secretary-General's Bull., Observance by United Nations Forces of International
Humanitarian Law, § 3, U.N. Doc. ST/SGB/1999/13 (Aug. 6, 1999). Please note that the legal
weight of this declaration is unknown. For example, it is unclear whether this bulletin creates
a basis upon which a prosecutor could charge U.N. forces with war crimes. This topic is re-
served for future research.
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United Nations and the host state, there is no reason why their scope
could not be expanded to include a provision requiring U.N. forces to
abide by the CWC's prohibitions concerning RCAs 8' While this ap-
proach will work with regard to U.N.-controlled forces, since the United
Nations typically negotiates these SOFAs with host states, the United
Nations will not have any influence over SOFA negotiations for U.N.-
authorized forces because the lead entity negotiates the SOFA on behalf
of the group.382 Likewise, there are a host of pre-existing SOFAs between
troop-contributing countries and host states that will not be subject to the
requirement mentioned in the Secretary-General's Bulletin or the United
Nations' SOFAs with the host state. The United Nations and the interna-
tional community, nevertheless, could put considerable pressure on these
states and entities to include within their new or amended SOFAs a pro-
vision addressing the prohibition of RCAs, although the United Nations
ultimately has no control over the contents of these SOFAs. Alterna-
tively, the United Nations could include the necessary language in a
provision of the Model SOFA. At least one scholar asserts that the rules
in the Model SOFA are customary law binding the United Nations, the
host state, and the participating states concerning all U.N. operations,
regardless of whether a relevant SOFA already has entered into force.'"
Inclusion of this language in the Model SOFA would simplify dramati-
cally the task for the United Nations of binding all of its forces to obey
the prohibitions on RCAs. That said, it is unclear whether a provision in
the Model SOFA would be sufficient to form customary international
law without the requisite state practice and opinio juris.
3
D. Declaration of War
Contributing states that are opposed to RCA possession and use by
any member of a U.N. force could declare a "state of war" with the U.N.
forces. Such a declaration could trigger the CWC's "method of warfare"
language. While this option admittedly is drastic, states have done this in
the past so that violations of IHL by their own forces could be treated as
381. It must be noted again that most troops probably already have obligations under the
CWC, given that most, if not all, of the contributing states are party to the CWC. Still, there
might be merit in trying to establish a separate obligation directly on U.N. troops in case a
troop-contributing state happens not to be a party to the CWC at the time of violation or if one
is interested in holding the United Nations itself accountable for the violation of these norms.
382. For example, NATO signed the Interim Agreement for Peace and Self-Government
in Kosovo, a type of SOFA, on behalf of the rest of NATO with the Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia, which agreement ensured the immunity of NATO personnel, among other things.
See Siekman, supra note 294, at 115-16.
383. See id. at 108.
384. See generally CHARLESWORTH & CHINKIN, supra note 220, at 62-66.
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war crimes.385 Assuming states felt strongly enough about RCA prohibi-
tion, why not in the case of RCAs? While such a declaration would bind
only the declaring state, it might deter states from using RCAs for fear of
being seen as violating CWC Article 1(5). Nonetheless, it must be ac-
knowledged that this option is difficult for the obvious reason that states
dislike declaring war these days, even when military force is being used
in an interstate setting that would have been considered a "war" before
the Second World War. Besides, if states are participating in a U.N.
peace support operation, they generally have already decided to take a
separate path from that involving war.
E. Prohibition by the Secretary-General Bulletin
The Secretary-General could issue a bulletin prohibiting the carriage
and use of RCAs by U.N. forces, similar to his 1999 bulletin requiring U.N.
forces to abide by NIL in all operations. Doing so conceivably would apply
the prohibition of RCAs (as a method of war) to national contingents in
U.N.-controlled operations whose states are not party to the CWC. 8 6 A sig-
nificant problem with regard to U.N.-authorized forces is that they generally
are not bound by such bulletins, although they could be bound by the con-
tent if the bulletin in question represented lex lata as opposed to lexferenda.
One way to fix this shortcoming would be for the Security Council to incor-
porate such a bulletin into its authorization by reference, which is essentially
the same as the first option mentioned above.
Another alternative with the same effect would be for the Secretary-
General to issue a directive through the U.N. Department of Peacekeeping
Operations to all U.N. peacekeepers to refrain from carrying and using
RCAs in all of their operations. This is what happened in July 2007,
when such a directive required U.N. peacekeepers in Liberia, East
Timor, C6te d'Ivoire, Haiti, Kosovo, and the D.R.C. to refrain from car-
rying and using rubber bullets and bean-bag rounds after U.N.
peacekeepers killed two ethnic Albanian protestors with rubber bullets
expired thirteen years prior. The protestors had been protesting, along
with three thousand other individuals, the United Nations' plan for Kos-
ovo.38  Whether it is by a bulletin or a Secretariat directive for U.N.
peacekeeping forces, the Secretary-General has a crucial role in develop-
ing the norms that regulate the activities of these forces, regardless of
whether or not these norms are legally binding.
385. See Siekman, supra note 294, at 121.
386. See DOCUMENTS ON THE LAWS OF WAR, supra note 5, at 721.
387. See id. at 722. After all, who gave power to the Secretary-General to bind states in
such matters?
388. See Nebi Qena, U.N. Suspends Rubber Bullets, A.P., July 12, 2007 (explaining that
rubber coatings harden over time and may become fatal after expiration).
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F. Creation of an Armament Review Body
Finally, there is the possibility of the Security Council creating a
body to review the legality of the activities and armaments of U.N.
forces,'" or some other mechanism to review the authorizations it cre-
ates."9 This is a particularly attractive option inasmuch as it involves the
Security Council, through its subsidiary organ, to a greater extent and on
an ongoing basis in the operations it initiates through its resolutions, thus
increasing the chances of the Security Council adjusting or clarifying the
parameters of its authorizations as the need arises. A fundamental prob-
lem with this and the other options is that the Security Council must
want to make a decision that impacts U.N. forces, either by subjecting
U.N. forces to the CWC's prohibitions regarding RCAs or in some other
manner. Given U.S. eagerness to rely on RCAs in peace operations in the
past and its veto within the Security Council, all of the options men-
tioned in this Part might not be viable at this time. Still, as Clarke's
Second Law states, "The only way of discovering the limits of the possi-
ble is to venture a little way past them into the impossible. 39'
CONCLUSION
Dulce bellum inexpertis-War is sweet to the inexperienced. This
is not to say that military commanders who applaud RCA use are inex-
perienced. Rather, critics likely will discount much of this Article as
the ivory-tower ruminations of a lifelong civilian, and they will have a
point. This Article admittedly has focused on what U.N. forces should
not do, instead of explaining what they should do. This relatively nega-
tive approach to the methods and means of warfare for U.N. forces must
be particularly frustrating for U.N. force commanders who see the spec-
trum of tools at their disposal ever shrinking, first with the ban of rubber
bullets and bean-bag rounds in July 2007,392 and now the perceived prob-
lems with RCAs. The August 2007 lifting of the ban on rubber bullets for
those fired from shotguns only partially ameliorated the situation for these
commanders, if only because it strengthened the argument against RCA
use. Indeed, the United Nations decided to allow rubber-bullet-firing shot-
guns in an effort to avoid the severe injuries that indiscriminate RCA use
389. See DANDO, supra note 109, at 189.
390. See KAREL WELLENS, REMEDIES AGAINST INTERNATIONAL ORGANISATIONS 52
(2002).
391. ARTHUR C. CLARKE, Hazards of Prophecy: The Failure of Imagination, in PRO-
FILES OF THE FUTURE 27, 36 (1962).
392. See supra Part V.E.
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had caused to civilians in East Timor.393 Regardless, what these command-
ers need to realize is that international law essentially is negative in
orientation, inasmuch as it tells subjects of international law what they
cannot do.394 Some commentators have tried to extend the Lotus principle
to international organizations,39' finding some support in ICJ decisions
such as the Certain Expenses advisory opinion.396 However, such a no-
tion is not without its dangers.397 Nonetheless, international law tends to
provide limitations on subjects of the international legal order, and force
commanders generally will be well served if they get used to the frustra-
tion associated with international law filling (and fulfilling) this role.
This Article has argued that RCA reliance by U.N. forces is poten-
tially illegal and certainly bad policy. In light of these arguments, force
commanders should disavow RCAs for the following reasons:
• The CWC prohibits RCAs as a method of warfare and as a
temporary incapacitator, although both avenues of prohibition
are subject to the law-enforcement exception.
" Only one of the fourteen U.N. forces that have used RCAs
had a clear mandate to engage in law enforcement, which
means that thirty-nine instances of RCA use by U.N. forces
did not readily fall under this exception. Future use likely will
not fall under this exception either without changes to Secu-
rity Council practice when issuing mandates to U.N. forces.
• The activities of contemporary U.N. forces are sufficiently
complex to make it difficult to say with confidence that these
forces are not using RCAs as a method of warfare.
• Even if the United Nations and U.N. forces might not have
legal obligations directly under the CWC or customary inter-
393. See Rory Callinan, Mobs Out of Control, Fretilin Warns, AUSTL., Aug. 8, 2007, at 2.
394. See S.S. Lotus (Fr. v. Turk.), 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 10 (Sept. 7). But see Barce-
lona Traction, Light, and Power Co., Ltd. (Beig. v. Spain), 1970 I.C.J. 3 (Feb. 5).
395. See FINN SEYERSTED, OBJECTIVE INTERNATIONAL PERSONALITY OF INTERGOV-
ERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS: Do THEIR CAPACITIES REALLY DEPEND UPON THE
CONVENTIONS ESTABLISHING THEM? 28 (1963).
396. See Certain Expenses of the United Nations (Article 17, Paragraph 2, of the Char-
ter), Advisory Opinion, 1962 I.C.J. 151, 168 (July 20) ("But when the Organization takes
action which warrants the assertion that it was appropriate for the fulfilment of one of the
stated purposes of the United Nations, the presumption is that such action is not ultra vires the
Organization.") (emphasis in original).
397. See JAN KLABBERS, AN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONAL LAW
66-69 (2d ed. 2009) (discussing Seyersted's ideas and the response from other commentators,
and concluding inter alia that the notion of inherent powers for international organizations is
problematic because "it possibly goes against the wishes of the drafters" and because "it
seems to rely on a solid vision of the nature of international organizations").
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national law relating to RCAs, there are numerous moral and
strategic reasons for them to foreswear RCA use, such as
RCAs' considerable lethality, indiscriminate nature, history of
abuse, and tendency towards promoting escalation.
The United Nations and states that have an interest in seeing
U.N. forces refrain from RCAs can help by encouraging the
United Nations to accede to the CWC (if such becomes pos-
sible under the CWC) or declare itself as being legally bound
by the CWC; add express RCA prohibitions in their mandates
and SOFAs; and have the Secretary-General adopt a bulletin
prohibiting U.N. forces from using RCAs, among other op-
tions.
This Article has focused on developing these arguments and has left to
commanders and their legal advisers the task of choosing the weapons
that do not violate the limitations of international law, no matter how
frustrating those limitations might be from a tactical, strategic, or politi-
cal perspective.
Nonetheless, a few words of guidance still must be provided in order
to help in choosing more appropriate weapons. After all, commanders
are placed in an admittedly difficult position when faced with angry ci-
vilians (perhaps even children, pregnant women, and elderly citizens) on
the one hand, and a clear mission on the other. Certainly U.N. forces
should not use deadly force against such individuals.39 At the same time,
U.N. forces cannot abandon their mission and let these civilians do
entirely as they please. This is the exact situation where less-lethal meth-
ods and means are most needed. In such situations, U.N. forces should
be familiar with using non-toxic varieties of less-lethal weaponry, such
as slippery foams, acoustic and heat rays, and tasers, which carry many
of the same benefits as RCAs without the legal problems under the CWC
regime.3 One particularly promising category of non-toxic, less-lethal
398. This happened in Somalia on June 16 and September 9, 1993, when U.N. forces
used live rounds against demonstrators in Mogadishu (apparently without first trying to use
less-lethal weapons) after part of the group attacked the forces. Their response killed
approximately 20 and 126 Somalis (including women and children), respectively. See Mike
McCurry, U.S. Dep't of State Daily Press Briefing (Sept. 10, 1993); Pringle, supra note 56, at
13 (reporting that it was from the earlier incident that former U.N. Secretary-General Kofi
Annan started to call for U.N. forces to have riot-control gear); Watson, supra note 56, at
A13; Geoffrey York, U.S. Chief Rules Out Tear Gas in Somalia Guns Only Choice for U.N.
Troops, GLOBE & MAIL (Canada), Sept. 4, 1993 (reporting how the U.S. commander of the
U.N. force ordered the forces not to use tear gas as crowd control, an order which the Cana-
dian troops objected to).
399. See generally KoPLOW, supra note 7, at 14-21 (discussing modem NLWs and
noting some of the reasons why they have not been more successful); Paul R. Evancoe,
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weaponry is malodorants, which includes stinkbombs made up of sulfur
compounds, skatole, and other obnoxious (but not noxious) smells that
are specifically selected because they are "not incapacitating or a sen-
sory irritant," and thereby avoid problems with the CWC.4°° These types
of weapons give new meaning to this Article's title Gas Smells Awful,
although their use hopefully will help with crowd control with fewer
negative effects on the targets and the CWC regime than RCAs. Various
NATO member-states and Russia are busy developing non-RCA, less-
lethal weapons. 0' Even with these types of less-lethal weapons, extreme
care must be taken-especially with acoustic and heat rays-so as to
ensure that they are not used in an indiscriminate or other manner that
will raise problems under the IHL regime. Again, the focus of this Arti-
cle is on the CWC regime and suggesting what is inappropriate under
that body of law.
One also must not forget that traditional forms of crowd control
might be more effective than other less-lethal means and methods al-
ready mentioned. For example, in 1995, Greek Cypriot police used tear
gas against protestors in Famagusta, Cyprus, many of whom were on
motorbikes, although the protestors were not actually stopped until
UNFICYP troops deployed approximately a mile of barbed wire.4
Again, in 1995, the Haitian police's firing of tear gas over a period of
four hours failed to disperse a group of students throwing rocks, but
UNMIH troops succeeded by charging the crowd with their full riot-gear
donned.40'3 These more traditional forms of crowd control raise few, if
any, red flags from the perspective of international law, and therefore
ought not to be forgotten, especially when the alternatives mentioned in
the preceding paragraph appear not to suffice for all applications. Since
FPUs allegedly "master an array of non-lethal tactics" in their training,' °
presumably they know how to use tactics that do not involve RCAs.
If U.N. forces are to rely on RCAs without worrying about the legal
ramifications, the Security Council must use its Chapter VII authority to
expressly authorize them to engage in law enforcement, rather than
Non-Lethal Technologies Enhance Warrior's Punch, NAT'L DEF., Dec. 1993, at 25 (providing
examples of other non-lethal technologies).
400. See generally Sunshine Project, Non-Lethal Weapons Research in the US: Calma-
tives and Malodorants (Backgrounder Series No. 8, 2001), available at http://www.sunshine-
project.org/publicationsbk/bk8en.htmI (last visited Mar. 31, 2010).
401. See Brooks Tigner, NATO Panel to Consider Nonlethal Weapon Guidelines,
DEF. NEWS, Sept. 29-Oct. 5, 1997, at 16; Russia, NATO Cooperate in Developing Special
Counterterrorism Weapons, RIA NOVOSTI, July 7, 2004, http://en.rian.ruL/onlinenews/
20040707/39764573.html (last visited Mar. 31, 2010).
402. See Efty, supra note 188.
403. See Lisa M. Hamm, Armed U.N. Troops Rush Rock-Throwing Students, A.P., May
9, 1995.
404. Bruno et al., supra note 161, at 3-5.
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merely to assist local law enforcement officers. When providing this au-
thorization, it would be prudent for the Security Council to specify that
FPUs are to handle law enforcement as it relates to crowd and riot con-
trol since these units specialize in such matters and will be (or at least
should be) more familiar with how and when to use RCAs in an appro-
priate manner. In the absence of such a Security Council authorization, it
would be best-legally speaking-for these U.N. forces to refrain from
RCAs altogether.
By prohibiting RCAs, the United Nations has much to gain. In par-
ticular, the United Nations may protect its credibility and provide greater
protection to its forces. Moreover, U.N. actions would provide an exam-
ple for its member states, by abiding by such important international
legal norms as those contained in the Chemical Weapons Convention. As
Albert Einstein once said, obviously speaking in hyperbole to emphasize
the point, "Setting an example is not the main means of influencing an-
other, it is the only means." The CWC regime is too important an
institution to the maintenance of international peace and security for the
United Nations to risk undermining it through its own actions. The
United Nations does just that by continuing to use RCAs in its opera-
tions.
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Mission Security Citation Action Taken
Name Council
Resolution
MINURCAT S.C. Res. 1778 2, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1778 Established the United Nations Mission in
(Sept. 25, 2007) the Central African Republic and Chad
UNAMID S.C. Res. 1769 1 1, U.N. Doc. SIRES/1769 Established the African Union/United
(July 31, 2007) Nations hybrid operation in Darfur
UNMIT S.C. Res. 1704 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1704 Established the United Nations Integrated
(Aug. 25, 2006) Mission in Timor-Leste
UNMIS S.C. Res. 1590 1, U.N. Doc. SIRES/1590 Established the United Nations Mission in
(Mar. 24, 2005) Sudan
ONUB S.C. Res. 1545 2, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1545 Established the United Nations Operation
(May 21, 2004) in Burundi
MINUSTAH S.C. Res. 1542 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1542 Established the United Nations Stabiliza-
(Apr. 30, 2004) tion Mission In Haiti
UNOCI S.C. Res. 1528 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1528 Established the United Nations Operation
(Feb. 27, 2004) in C6te d'Ivoire
UNMIL S.C. Res. 1509 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1509 Established the United Nations Mission in
(Sept. 19, 2003) Liberia
UNMISET S.C. Res. 1410 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1410 Established the United Nations Mission of
(May 17, 2002) Support in East Timor
UNMEE S.C. Res. 1312 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1312 Established the United Nations Mission in
(July 31, 2000) Ethiopia and Eritrea
MONUC S.C. Res. 1279 4, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1279 Established the United Nations Organiza-
(Nov. 30, 1999) tion Mission in the Democratic Republic
of the Congo
UNTAET S.C. Res. 1272 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1272 Established the United Nations Transi-
(Oct. 25, 1999) tional Administration in East Timor
UNAMSIL S.C. Res. 1270 8, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1270 Established the United Nations Mission in
(Oct. 22, 1999) Sierra Leone
UNMIK S.C. Res. 1244 5, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1244 Established the United Nations Mission in
(June 10, 1999) Kosovo
UNOMSIL S.C. Res. 1181 6, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1 181 Established the United Nations Observer
(July 13, 1998) Mission in Sierra Leone
MINURCA S.C. Res. 1159 9, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1 159 Established the United Nations Mission in
(Mar. 27, 1998) the Central African Republic
UNPSG S.C. Res. 1145 13, U.N. Doc. S/RES/I 145 Established the United Nations Police
(Dec. 19, 1997) Support Group in Croatia
MIPONUH S.C. Res. 1141 2, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1 141 Established the United Nations Civilian
(Nov. 28, 1997) Police Mission in Haiti
UNTMIH S.C. Res. 1123 2, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1 123 Established the United Nations Transition
(July 30, 1997) Mission in Haiti
MONUA S.C. Res. 1118 2, U.N. Doc. S/RES/i 118 Established the United Nations Observer
(June 30, 1997) Mission in Angola
MINUGUA S.C. Res. 1094 j 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1094 Established the attachment of military
(Jan. 20, 1997) observers and medical personnel to the
United Nations Observer Mission in
Guatemala
UNSMIH S.C. Res. 1063 2, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1063 Established the United Nations Support
(June 28, 1996) Mission in Haiti
UNTAES S.C. Res. 1037 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1037 Established the United Nations Transi-
(Jan. 15, 1996) tional Administration for Eastern Slavonia
in Croatia
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Mission Security Citation Action Taken
Name Council
Resolution
UNMIBH S.C. Res. 1035 j 2, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1035 Established the United Nations Mission in
(Dec. 1, 1995) Bosnia and Herzegovina
UNCRO S.C. Res. 981 % 2, U.N. Doc. S/RES/981 Established the United Nations Confi-
(Mar. 31, 1995) dence Restoration Operation in Croatia
UNPREDEP S.C. Res. 983 2, U.N. Doc. S/RES/983 Decided that the United Nations Protec-
(Mar. 31, 1995) live Force within the former Yugoslav
Republic of Macedonia shall be known as
the United Nations Preventive Deploy-
ment Force
UNAVEM S.C. Res. 976 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/976 Established the United Nations Angola
III i(Feb. 8,1995) Verification Mission
UNASOG S.C. Res. 915 2, U.N. Doc. S/RES/915 Established the United Nations Aouzou
(May 4, 1994) Strip Observer Group
UNMOT S.C. Res. 968 1 2, U.N. Doc. S/RES/968 Established the United Nations Mission of
(Dec. 16, 1994) Observers in Tajikistan
UNOSOM II S.C. Res. 814 5-6, U.N. Doc. S/RES/814 The United Nations Operation in Somalia
(Mar. 26, 1993)
UNOMUR S.C. Res. 846 4 2, U.N. Doc. S/RES/846 Established the United Nations Observer
(June 22, 1993) Mission Uganda-Rwanda
UNAMIR S.C. Res. 872 1 2, U.N. Doc. S/RES/872 Established the United Nations Assistance
(Oct. 5, 1993) Mission for Rwanda
UNMIH S.C. Res. 867 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/867 Established the United Nations Mission in
(Sept. 23, 1993) Haiti
UNOMIL S.C. Res. 866 12, U.N. Doc. S/RES/866 Established the United Nations Observer
(Sept. 22, 1993) Mission in Liberia
UNOMIG S.C. Res. 858 12, U.N. Doc. S/RES/858 Established the United Nations Observer
(Aug. 24, 1993) Mission in Georgia
ONUMOZ S.C. Res. 797 1 2, U.N. Doc. S/RES/797 Established the United Nations Operation
(Dec. 16, 1992) in Mozambique
UNOSOM I S.C. Res. 751 12, U.N. Doc. SIRES/75l Established the United Nations Operation
(Apr. 24, 1992) in Somalia
UNTAC S.C. Res. 745 12, U.N. Doc. S/RESf745 Established the United Nations Transi-
(Feb. 28, 1992) tional Authority in Cambodia
UNPROFOR S.C. Res. 743 12, U.N. Doc. S/RESf743 Established the United Nations Protection
(Feb. 21, 1992) Force in the former Yugoslavia
UNAMIC S.C. Res. 717 12, U.N. Doc. S/RES/717 Established the United Nations Advance
(Oct. 16, 1991) Mission in Cambodia
UNAVEM II S.C. Res. 696 12, U.N. Doc. S/RES/696 Re-established the United Nations Angola
(May 30, 1991) Verification Mission
ONUSAL S.C. Res. 693 12, U.N. Doc. S/RES/693 Established the United Nations Observer
(May 20, 1991) Mission in El Salvador
MINURSO S.C. Res. 690 4, U.N. Doc. SIRES/690 Established the United Nations Mission
(Apr. 29, 1991) for the Referendum in Western Sahara
UNIKOM S.C. Res. 689 91 1-2, U.N. Doc. S/RES/689 Established the United Nations Iraq-
(Apr. 9, 1991) Kuwait Observation Mission in Iraq and
Kuwait
ONUCA S.C. Res. 644 1 2, U.N. Doc. S/RES/644 Established the United Nations Observer
(Nov. 7, 1989) Group in Central America
UNTAG S.C. Res. 632 1 2, U.N. Doc. S/RES/632 Established the United Nations Transition
(Feb. 16, 1989) Assistance Group in Namibia
UNAVEM I S.C. Res. 626 12, U.N. Doc. SIRES/626 Established the United Nations Angola
(Dec. 20, 1988) Verification Mission
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Name Council
Resolution
UNGOMAP S.C. Res. 622 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/622 Confirmed the arrangement for the United
(Oct. 31, 1988) Nations Good Offices Mission in Af-
ghanistan and Pakistan
UNIMOG S.C. Res. 619 N 2-3, U.N. Doc. S/RES/619 Established the United Nations Iran-Iraq
(Aug. 9, 1988) Military Observer Group in Iran and Iraq
UNIFIL S.C. Res. 425 3, U.N. Doc. S/RES/425 Established the United Nations Interim
(Mar. 19, 1978) Force for Southern Lebanon
UNDOF S.C. Res. 350 3, U.N. Doc. S/RES/350 Established the United Nations Disagree-
(May 31, 1974) ment Observer Force in the Golan Heights
UNIPOM S.C. Res. 211 2, U.N. Doc. S/RES/211 Established the United Nations India-
(Sept. 20, 1965) Pakistan Observation Mission
DOMREP S.C. Res. 203 2, U.N. Doc. S/RES/203 Mission of the Representative of the
(May 14, 1965) Secretary-General in the Dominican
Republic
UNFICYP S.C. Res. 186 4, U.N. Doc. S/RES/5575 Established the United Nations Peace-
(Mar. 4, 1964) keeping Force in Cyprus
UNYOM S.C. Res. 179 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/5331 Established the United Nations Yemen
(June 11, 1963) Observation Mission in Yemen
ONUC S.C. Res. 143 2, U.N. Doc. S/4387 (July Established the United Nations Operation
14,1960) in the Congo
UNTSO S.C. Res. 50 6, U.N. Doc. S/RES/801 Delegated authority to the United Nations
(May 28, 1948) Mediator in Palestine and the Truce Com-
mission
UNMOGIP S.C. Res. 47 17, U.N. Doc. S/RES/726 Established he United Nations Military
(Apr. 21, 1948) Observer Group in India and Pakistan
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